Akbar: Conquest and Consolidation of Empire

Conflicts with the Afghans — Second Battle of Panipat

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• The Mughal return to Delhi in 1555 had not ended the Afghan danger. Following the death of Humayun at Delhi (1556), the Mughals came within an ace of being expelled from India once again — even amid the disruption of the Afghan empire, ample resources in both men and leadership remained available to make a Mughal reconquest appear a near impossibility.
  • The Mughals had earlier defeated a much larger force under Sikandar Sur at Sirhind (1554), but Sikandar still commanded powerful forces in the north-eastern corner of Punjab. Adali, another claimant to the Sur throne, dominated Bihar and eastern U.P. from his capital at Chunar, while Bengal remained under Muhammad Khan Sur. Some 50,000 Afghans had also assembled near Jaunpur under the son of Jalal Khan Sur. News of Humayun’s death shook off Afghan demoralisation entirely.
• The resurgent Afghans drove the Mughals out of Bayana, Etawah, Sambhal, Kalpi, Narnaul, and Agra. Hemu, a general of Adali, “having swept before him the Amirs from the frontiers of Hindustan” (according to Badayuni), advanced upon Delhi with a huge force.

The Rise of Hemu

• Hemu’s rise — he has been described as a baqqal (trader), a term applied to all traders in medieval India — has long been a subject of historical debate.
  • By caste, Hemu was a Dhusar or Bhargava, a community claiming descent from Gaur Brahmans. He is said to have begun as a seller of saltpetre at Rewari, later serving as shuhna (market superintendent) at Delhi under Islam Shah, and also gaining experience as a soldier.
  • The precise stages of his rise to Chief Commander of Adali’s forces, and later to the position of wazir, remain unclear, though he clearly enjoyed Adali’s confidence from the outset — reportedly winning twenty-two battles against Adali’s opponents.
  • It would, however, be incorrect to portray Hemu as the leader of any kind of Hindu resurgence.
• According to Abul Fazl, after his victory at Delhi against Tardi Beg, “the ambition of sovereignty” stirred in Hemu’s mind. Badayuni claims Hemu assumed the title Bikramjit, like a great raja of Hindustan, and that he “had done his best there to subvert the ordinances of Islam” — though Badayuni offers no further detail, and Nizamuddin Ahmad merely notes that Hemu assumed the title of Raja Bikramjit.
  • However, the assumption of this title does not imply that Hemu proclaimed himself an independent king — none of the sources cited actually make this claim.
  • In fact, Hemu’s military force consisted almost entirely of Afghans. At the Second Battle of Panipat, fought against Bairam Khan on 5 November 1556, Hemu’s left wing was commanded by Ramaiyya, his sister’s son — with no evidence of Rajputs in his army. Declaring himself an independent king in this context would have been disastrous.
• There was, in fact, some murmuring against Hemu among the Afghans, who, per Badayuni, were “sick of his usurpation… prayed for his downfall” — largely out of jealousy at his rapid rise and the trust placed in him by Adali, who had furnished him with troops and treasure.
  • Hemu’s rise was, in truth, an index of the relatively open society that had developed under Afghan rule, and of the growing accord between Afghans and Hindu rajas — a pattern that continued under Babur, and was later reflected in Afghan support for Rana Pratap.

The Second Battle of Panipat (1556)

• Hemu’s defeat at Panipat stemmed partly from disaffection among some Afghan sardars, his own carelessness in allowing the Mughals to capture his artillery, and his excessive reliance on well-armed, trained elephants.
• Even so, the outcome remained uncertain: both Mughal wings were thrown into disarray, and Hemu advanced towards the centre — until, by chance, an arrow pierced his eye and he fainted. Unable to see him, his army panicked and dispersed.
  • Hemu was brought before Bairam Khan, who killed him after persuading the young Akbar to lightly touch his neck with a sword. A minaret was reportedly built from the heads of the slain, and immense treasure and stores were captured — though Hemu’s wife escaped with elephants laden with gold, the gold left behind was so plentiful it was distributed on shields. Hemu’s home was later attacked and his father killed.
• Abul Fazl himself praised Hemu for his lofty spirit, courage, and enterprise, wishing that had Akbar “come out of his veil,” or had there been a far-sighted counsellor at court, Hemu might have been kept prisoner and, if persuaded to join royal service, would have rendered distinguished service.

The Afghan Threat Persists

• The Afghan danger did not vanish with Hemu’s defeat. It took over six months of military operations and siege before Sikandar Sur surrendered at Mankot. Adali had already been killed earlier in battle with the king of Bengal, but the Afghans of Jaunpur remained active — per Abul Fazl, “the Afghans still carried in their brains the vapours of sedition.”
  • Ali Quli Khan Zaman chased off an Afghan force of 20,000 cavalry at Sambhal, then advanced on and gained Jaunpur without opposition.
• Afghan sardars continued to hold the powerful forts of Chunar and Rohtas, repeatedly attempting to establish a separate principality at Jaunpur:
  • After Bairam Khan’s downfall (1560), the Afghans proclaimed Sher Khan, a son of Adali and commandant of Chunar, as king, and advanced on Jaunpur — but Ali Quli Khan Zaman, then governor of Jaunpur, defeated them with local jagirdar support.
  • A third attempt followed in 1564, when the Afghans set up Awaz Khan, son of Salim Sur, as king and besieged Jaunpur; after an initial success, the Afghans dispersed to loot, allowing Ali Quli Khan Zaman a complete victory.
• Even afterward, the eastern region continued to pose problems: having defeated the Afghans, Ali Quli Khan Zaman himself began to dream of independence, forging an active alliance with the Afghans of Bihar and maintaining good relations with the Afghan ruler of Bengal.
• The situation confronting the Mughal empire in the east during Akbar’s early reign was thus remarkably similar to that faced by Humayun at his own accession.

Struggle With the Nobility

Bairam Khan’s Regency

• Jalaluddin Muhammad Akbar was born at Amarkot on 15 October 1542, while Humayun was in flight from Bikaner, and led an adventurous early life.
  • At just one year old, Humayun had to abandon him and flee to Iran when Kamran attempted to capture him; Akbar remained in Kamran’s custody for two years, and was well treated. It was only after Humayun recaptured Qandahar with Iranian help, then recovered and again lost Kabul to Kamran, that Kamran cruelly exposed young Akbar on the battlements to Humayun’s artillery fire — Akbar escaped unhurt.
  • Several tutors were subsequently appointed to train him, but Akbar showed far greater interest in hunting, riding, animal sports, and pigeon-flying, neglecting his studies to the point that he never learned to write.
• While campaigning against Sikandar Sur at Kalanaur, Akbar received news of Humayun’s death in Delhi, following a fall from his library.
  • The assembled nobles raised Akbar to the throne in 1556, and Bairam Khan — Akbar’s ataliq (tutor), appointed by Humayun, and the senior figure on the spot — was made wakil mutlaq, placed in charge of all political and financial matters.
  • Given the insecurity of the Mughal position, and considerable factionalism and demoralisation among nobles (many of whom had fled in panic before the Afghan advance), no one objected to Bairam’s elevated position. Bairam acted firmly, executing Tardi Beg for cowardice in evacuating Delhi, and punishing others as well.
  • Separately, Abul Muali, a noble close to Humayun, was apprehended at a feast celebrating Akbar’s coronation and imprisoned. While these actions may have been necessary, Bairam evidently used the moment to remove two potential rivals — a suspicion strengthened by the fact that Tardi Beg’s execution was concealed for three months, and that Munim Khan, governor of Kabul and another potential rival, postponed his departure for India upon hearing of these developments.
• This set the stage for Bairam Khan’s regency, lasting four years, from 1556 to 1560.
  • His achievements during this period were considerable: the threat to Kabul from Mirza Sulaiman of Badakhshan was averted; the kingdom was extended from Kabul to Jaunpur in the east and up to Ajmer in the west; the powerful fort of Gwalior was captured; an expedition was sent to conquer Malwa; and an effort to capture Ranthambhor was only abandoned following Bairam’s fall.

Bairam Khan’s Difficulties with the Nobility

• Bairam’s firm actions against potential rivals cowed the nobility into outward obedience, so long as he retained the young king’s confidence. Privately, however, Maham Anaga (Akbar’s foster-mother), her relations, and those of other foster-mothers such as the Atka Khail, deeply resented Bairam’s pre-eminence and worked to create a rift between him and Akbar.
  • Their efforts gained strength once Akbar’s mother, Hamida Banu Begum, and other female relatives — who had remained at Kabul during the earlier uncertainty — joined him at Agra. They sought to poison Akbar’s mind using minor incidents, such as an episode where elephants ran towards Bairam’s tent, which Bairam took as a plot against him and punished severely, or his redistribution of royal elephants to his own followers, at Akbar’s expense. Akbar, at this stage, instinctively supported Bairam.
• Over time, however, the nobles grew restive under Bairam’s domination and his efforts to concentrate all power in his own hands and those of a loyal coterie. Since Bairam was not himself sovereign, he could not build an entirely new nobility of his own, but could only advance comparatively junior, low-ranking officers loyal to him — alienating a large section of established nobles, a problem worsened when some of these officers proved inefficient or arrogant.
• The case of Shaikh Gadai: the sadr and a favourite of Bairam Khan, illustrates this tension.
  • Revenue affairs had earlier been managed by Pir Muhammad Khan, an old noble acting as Bairam’s wakil. He was dismissed following an unintended personal affront — Bairam had visited him while ill, but Pir Muhammad’s servant, not recognising Bairam, refused him entry.
  • Shaikh Gadai, now interfering in revenue affairs, proved arrogant and niggardly in granting madad-i-maash (revenue-free lands), insisting on personal appearances from applicants.
  • Contrary to some modern claims, Shaikh Gadai was neither low-born nor a Shia, nor a new appointee — having served as sadr since the first year of Bairam’s regency. The orthodox Badayuni himself praised his scholarly attainments, noting that for years scholars from Hindustan, Khurasan, Transoxiana, and Iraq consulted him as a religious authority — evidence against the claim that he was Shia.
• Bairam himself faced opposition from Turkish nobles, since he was a Turkman (an Iranised Turk) and considered Shia; yet he was, in fact, liberal, associating freely with people of all sects.
  • Badayuni praised him for his wisdom, generosity, sincerity, goodness of disposition, and humility, crediting him with the reconquest of Hindustan and the building of the empire through his valour — and further calling him “a great friend to religion” who never missed his regular prayers, praise carrying particular weight given Badayuni’s own orthodox Sunni views.
  • The dominant faction of nobles at court were Chughtai Turks, with whom Bairam worked cooperatively, making no effort to displace them — indeed maintaining cordial relations with the powerful Uzbek faction, including Ali Quli Khan Zaman and his brother Bahadur Khan.
• While the Turkish nobles were willing to work with Bairam, their envy led them to continually try to poison Akbar’s opinion of him. They found their opportunity when Shaikh Gadai, seen merely as a clerk, began interfering in high revenue and administrative affairs, his arrogance causing widespread offence.
  • Yet neither this envy, nor resentment at the rise of low-ranking officers, would have mattered much had Akbar — now growing up — not increasingly wished to exercise power himself. It was here that the women close to him became decisive: Maham Anaga explained to Akbar that “as long as Bairam Khan would remain, he would not allow His Majesty any authority in the affairs of the empire; and that in reality the imperial power was in his hands” (Nizamuddin).
  • Certain missteps by Bairam lent weight to these claims — it was widely felt that while the emperor’s own servants held poor jagirs and lived in poverty, those serving Khan-i-Khanan Bairam Khan enjoyed ease and luxury. The emperor himself had virtually no privy purse — on one occasion, his request for a mere seventeen rupees was nearly refused, until Maham Anaga intervened and paid from her own funds.

Bairam Khan’s Downfall

• The conspiracy leading to Bairam’s downfall followed Akbar’s move from Agra to Delhi, ostensibly for a hunting expedition. Once Akbar issued a farman summoning all nobles to his side, even those close to Bairam deserted him. Bairam submitted, but was later goaded into open rebellion by those seeking his ruin.
  • Turning back from Bikaner while en route to Mecca, Bairam entered Punjab in revolt. Akbar swiftly triumphed, and Bairam submitted once more. Akbar offered him a choice: a handsome jagir in the sarkar of Kalpi and Chanderi, the post of confidential advisor to the emperor, or a pilgrimage to Mecca. Bairam chose the last — but was assassinated en route by an Afghan, out of personal spite, at Patan in Gujarat.
  • Since Bairam’s wife, Salima, was Akbar’s cousin, Akbar married her and raised her son, Abdur Rahim, who went on to become a great noble in his own right.
• Bairam’s downfall cannot be read as a reaction against Khurasani nobles, since the position of Turkish nobles saw no diminution during his regency. Some modern historians instead view it as a reaction by the nobility against a centralising tendency — a policy that could only succeed under a ruler with the necessary military skill and political sagacity, meaning Bairam’s own centralisation of power could only ever be temporary.
  • Bairam had, notably, made no effort to curb the financial and administrative powers of nobles within their own jagirs, so that revenues from the khalisa (crown lands) had virtually dried up. His general increase of the jama (assessed income) widened the gap between paper and real income, creating opportunities for favouritism — and making Bairam and his favourites a target for nobles who felt shortchanged in the allotment of productive jagirs.

Struggle for Wikalat, and the Revolt of the Uzbek Nobles and Others

• Bairam’s downfall intensified factionalism among the nobility, with powerful nobles increasingly inclined to act independently of imperial wishes. The post of wakil — combining financial, military, and administrative authority — became the focal point of factional struggle, contested chiefly between Maham Anaga (seeking the post for her son, Adham Khan) and Shamsuddin Khan, Akbar’s foster-father, who had played a key role in Bairam’s fall.
• After some experimentation, Akbar granted the post to Munim Khan, a close associate of Humayun and former governor of Kabul, whom Akbar affectionately called “Khan Baba” (much as he had once addressed Bairam Khan).
  • Munim Khan chose to work closely with Maham Anaga, whose influence and standing with the young emperor made this a natural alliance — her power grew accordingly, with many of her followers rising to high posts. Some historians consider the period between Bairam’s fall (March 1560) and Munim Khan’s first wikalat (September 1560 – November 1561) as the height of Maham Anaga’s influence, during which, per Abul Fazl, she considered herself “the substantive wakil, and sat on the masnad as such.”
• Yet even this period cannot properly be termed one of “petticoat government,” since Akbar’s wishes still had to be sought and obtained before any matter was settled. Though, per Abul Fazl, “Akbar was still behind a veil” — meaning uninvolved in daily administration — he asserted himself on several occasions:
  • In early 1561, upon learning that Maham’s son Adham Khan, sent to conquer Malwa, had withheld the choicest spoils of war, Akbar made a forced march and compelled Adham Khan to surrender the elephants and other booty.
  • Akbar similarly proceeded to Kara (near modern Allahabad) against Ali Quli Khan Zaman — a protégé of Munim Khan — to recover treasures accumulated in the Jaunpur campaigns against the Afghans.
• Munim Khan’s removal in November 1561, and the appointment of Atka Khan as wakil, sharpened factional conflict and diminished Maham Anaga’s influence — leading to the murder of Atka Khan in his own public diwan by Adham Khan (June 1562).
  • An enraged Akbar had Adham Khan thrown from the fort’s staircase to his death — marking the end of Maham Anaga’s remaining influence; she died shortly afterward. Without vindictiveness, Akbar had a fine mausoleum built for Adham Khan, which survives to this day.
• After Atka Khan’s murder, Munim Khan was reappointed wakil. Akbar now moved decisively to strengthen central control over the nobility:
  • In 1561, he ordered an inquiry into revenue arrears across the various sarkars and subahs (called vilayats) administered by different commanders — prompted by widespread noble encroachment on khalisa income, especially where nobles also served as local hakims (commandants), a major cause of the near-empty imperial treasury. This also explains Akbar’s insistence on receiving his fair share of war spoils.
  • A further step separated the executive and revenue responsibilities of jagirdars, reducing (and sometimes breaking up) jagir sizes — first implemented in Munim Khan’s own jagirs in the sarkar of Hissar-Firoza.
    • It remains unclear how far this policy could be applied to the large clan-held jagirs elsewhere: the Atka Khail held jagirs in the Punjab; the Uzbeks in eastern U.P. and Malwa; the Qaqshals in Kara-Manikpur; and the Mirzas around Sambhal. Only after defeating the powerful Uzbek faction could Akbar break up these large clan holdings.

The Uzbek Rebellion

• The leading Uzbek nobles — Ali Quli Khan Zaman, Bahadur Khan, Sikandar Khan, Iskandar Khan, and Abdullah Khan — were closely related and had held important posts since Humayun’s time. Bahadur Khan had fought actively at Panipat against Hemu and briefly served as wakil after Bairam’s fall; Ali Quli Khan Zaman had distinguished himself against the Afghans of eastern U.P. and served as governor of Jaunpur.
• Abdullah Khan Uzbek, governor of Malwa, was the first to show inclinations towards independence, acting increasingly autonomously; when Akbar approached Sarangpur (then Malwa’s capital) to rein him in, Abdullah fled to Gujarat (1564). His many transgressions were pardoned at Munim Khan’s request — but this rebellion hardened Akbar’s already unfavourable opinion of the Uzbeks.
  • Akbar’s opinion of Khan-i-Zaman was further soured by his infatuation with a camel driver’s son, whom he addressed as “My Padshah,” standing before him and performing kornish (bowing).
• At the time, Ali Quli Khan Zaman and his clansmen controlled Awadh, Jaunpur, and Banaras — territory once part of the old Jaunpur kingdom. Capitalising on lingering sentiment for regional independence (reflected in earlier Afghan rebellions), he cultivated a close friendship with Sulaiman Karrani, the Afghan ruler of Bengal, and courted Afghan sardars of Bihar, recruiting soldiers from all groups — Hindustanis, Afghans, and Uzbeks alike — to raise a force of some 30,000. It may be argued these were largely defensive measures, given the Uzbeks’ sense of inadequate reward for service and fear of Akbar’s growing prejudice against them.
• Taking no chances, Akbar planned a hunt in the region in 1565, summoning Iskandar Khan, governor of Awadh, to court. Alarmed, the Uzbek nobles convened at Jaunpur and decided on open revolt — one group under Iskandar Khan attacking Kannauj via Lucknow, another striking Kara-Manikpur (near Allahabad).
• In confronting the Uzbeks in eastern U.P., Akbar had to account for the ambitions of the Bengal ruler, who sought control of Bihar and had besieged Rohtas fort, while also propping up the Jaunpur rebels as a buffer against the Mughals — sending two well-known Afghan generals, Sulaiman Mankali and Kalapahar, to aid Ali Quli Khan Zaman.
  • Akbar responded with vigorous diplomatic and military measures: dispatching an envoy to the powerful rival ruler of Orissa, who agreed to act against Bengal if it continued aiding Khan Zaman, and offering support to the Rohtas commandant. Diplomatically isolated, the Uzbeks were soon militarily put to flight. Akbar made Jaunpur his headquarters, instructing nobles to build houses there until the Uzbeks were fully crushed.
  • Operations against the Uzbeks lasted two years, prolonged in part because Munim Khan, owing to old friendship with the Uzbeks and a desire to preserve balance, sought to protect them and halted operations at critical moments. Despite his own reservations, Akbar agreed, at Munim Khan’s urging, to pardon the Uzbek leaders and restore their jagirs (1566).

The Threat from Mirza Hakim

• Meanwhile, Akbar faced a fresh danger: his half-brother, Mirza Hakim, ousted from Kabul by Mirza Sulaiman of Badakhshan, sought refuge in the Punjab — a request Akbar granted.
  • En route, however, ill-advisers persuaded Mirza Hakim that Lahore could easily be captured while Akbar remained occupied with the Uzbeks in the east. After sacking Bhera, he laid siege to Lahore fort. On hearing this, Akbar marched from Agra with 50,000 troops.
  • Unable to win over the Punjab nobles through bribery, Mirza Hakim retreated as Akbar approached Lahore in early 1567. Akbar did not pursue him beyond the Indus, and Mirza Hakim subsequently made peace with Mirza Sulaiman, who returned to Badakhshan.
• In Akbar’s absence, the Uzbek nobles rose once more, seizing territory up to Kannauj and besieging the town. In a bid to sow disaffection in Akbar’s camp and emphasise their complete break with him, they proclaimed Mirza Hakim king, issuing coinage (sikka) and having the khutba read in his name — but failed entirely in their objective, since Mirza Hakim had already left Punjab, having proven a failure at Kabul, and the Uzbek nobles no longer commanded their earlier prestige.
  • The threats posed by the eastern Uzbek rebellion and Mirza Hakim’s western incursion in 1566 should thus not be overstated. Akbar’s domestic position was so secure that when the sons of Sultan Hussain Mirza rebelled over an inadequate jagir at Sambhal, local officials easily quelled them, forcing them to flee first to Malwa, then Gujarat.
• Returning from Lahore, Akbar pursued the Uzbeks vigorously. In a desperate battle near Kara in June 1567, Khan-i-Zaman was killed and Bahadur Khan captured and executed. To assert his authority, Akbar removed the Atka clan’s various nobles from the Punjab, and, in the words of Bayazid Byat (Akbar’s earliest biographer), “like stars dispersed them, giving to each one of them a jagir in various corners of Hindustan.”
• The defeat of the Uzbek nobles and the Mirzas’ rebellion effectively ended the challenge posed by the old nobility opposed to centralisation, who had sought a more decentralised order preserving noble power and privilege.
  • Centralisation, however, carried its own risk of dissidence and regional resurgence, as seen in the old Jaunpur kingdom, Malwa, and elsewhere. With the exception of Asaf Khan — an Irani who rebelled to retain the gains of his Garh-Katanga campaign — most rebellions of this period were led by Turani nobles. This became a significant factor behind the growing induction of Iranis and Indian Muslims (such as the Barha Saiyids) into the nobility.

Early Expansion of the Empire (1560–76)

• In a brief span of roughly fifteen years, the Mughal empire expanded from the upper Ganga valley to encompass Malwa, Gondwana, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Bihar, and Bengal.
• Much credit for this expansion belongs to Akbar himself, for his boundless energy, initiative, perseverance, personal leadership, and his remarkable ability to be present at critical junctures — often via astonishingly long forced marches. Equally important, however, was the rise of competent and dedicated men: Akbar’s talent for spotting ability, and his willingness to promote men of humble background, made his government more genuinely open to talent than any before it.

Malwa

• The process of expansion effectively began with the conquest of Malwa in 1561, gaining further momentum after the Uzbek rebellion’s defeat in 1567.
• Akbar justified the conquest on the grounds that Malwa had once belonged to Humayun. It was then ruled by Baz Bahadur, son of Shujaat Khan (governor of Malwa under Sher Shah, who had rebelled at Adali’s rise). A noted warrior, Baz Bahadur had secured his position by defeating and killing all his brothers — though he had himself been defeated by the formidable Rani Durgavati in his attempt to extend rule over Gondwana. Like Adali, he was a reputed musician, his love of music and poetry — much of it addressed to his companion, the beautiful Rupmati — becoming legendary in Malwa.
• Nizamuddin Ahmad, Akbar’s bakhshi, sought further justification for the attack by claiming Baz Bahadur indulged in unspecified “unlawful and vicious practices,” neglecting his kingdom such that “the arms of tyrants and oppressors had become long on faqirs and on the poor,” with most subjects “stricken almost to death by the hand of his tyranny” — framing Akbar’s conquest as a liberation of the people from tyranny.
  • Whatever the merits of this framing, the actual 1561 invasion, led by Adham Khan and Pir Muhammad Khan, brought the people not relief but unspeakable cruelty. Defeated, Baz Bahadur fled, abandoning his possessions, women, and dependents, including Rupmati.
  • Adham Khan mercilessly killed all prisoners — sparing neither Shaikhs nor Saiyyids — and dragged many women into his harem. Rupmati chose death over such dishonour.
  • Akbar intervened and marched to Malwa — less to punish these cruelties than to claim his own share of the loot. When Adham Khan was recalled, Pir Muhammad then invaded Burhanpur in Khandesh, where Baz Bahadur had taken refuge, repeating similar atrocities.
  • Though Baz Bahadur briefly recovered Malwa, he was forced to flee again, taking shelter first with Rana Udai Singh, before finally submitting to Akbar, who enrolled him as a mansabdar of 1,000, soon raised to 2,000 in recognition of his musical accomplishment.

Garh-Katanga

• Even as Malwa was absorbed, Asaf Khan, governor of Kara (Allahabad), sought both treasure and territory at the expense of Garh-Katanga (modern Gondwana) — a kingdom gradually built up over the 15th century by subordinating numerous local rajas, comprising by this time some 48,000 square miles, numerous forts, cities and towns, and roughly 70,000 inhabited villages.
  • Named after the towns of Garh and Katangi in modern Jabalpur district, and populated mainly by Gonds (hence also called Gondwana), the kingdom had for sixteen years been ruled by the beautiful and talented Rani Durgavati — daughter of Raja Shalivahan of Mahoba, widowed with a young son (aged three or four), and governing capably with the help of skilled advisors. Renowned for her skill with bow and gun, she is said to have never rested until slaying a tiger she had heard of.
• Though relatively remote, the kingdom had fought a series of wars in Bhata (the erstwhile state of Rewa in Bundelkhand) and with the rulers of Malwa. The recent Mughal conquest of Malwa, and the imposition of Mughal suzerainty over Bhata, left the kingdom exposed to pressure from both flanks — a vulnerability the Rani did not seem to fully grasp, though she had sent her minister, Adhar Kayastha, to negotiate peace with Akbar. These negotiations failed, likely because Akbar demanded her submission and the cession of territory.
• Asaf Khan, having learned through spies of the Rani’s fabulous wealth, had long sought a pretext to attack, and had already been raiding her borders. His 1564 attack with 10,000 troops may initially have seemed just another frontier raid — the Rani, though nominally commanding some 20,000 cavalry, substantial infantry, and 1,000 elephants, could raise only about 2,000 troops in response.
  • Her minister, Adhar Kayastha, advised retreating to gather greater strength, but the Rani, following Rajput custom, considered retreat dishonourable. She advanced, gaining an initial advantage against the Mughal vanguard, but was defeated near Damoh by Asaf Khan’s main force, by then swollen to 50,000 — including defected troops of the Rani’s own subordinate rajas. Wounded, the Rani chose to stab herself to death rather than face capture and dishonour — the end of one of the country’s most gallant woman-warriors and rulers.
  • Asaf Khan then advanced on the capital, Chauragarh, gallantly defended to the death by the Rani’s son, Bir Narayan, after the women of the fort performed jauhar. Asaf Khan captured immense wealth — gold, silver, jewels, and 1,000 elephants — while Kamla Devi, Durgavati’s unharmed younger sister, was sent to the imperial harem.
• Though the conquest of Gondwana added greatly to imperial territory, its immediate effect was to turn Asaf Khan’s head: like Adham Khan in Malwa, he retained most of the treasure, sending only 200 elephants to Akbar. Incensed, Akbar nonetheless stayed his hand given the ongoing Uzbek rebellion.
  • When Asaf Khan learned he would be asked to account for the missing wealth, he fled — first to the Uzbeks, then back to Gondwana, where he was pursued, before finally submitting; Akbar restored him to his former position, and he went on to render good service. Per Abul Fazl, though a Tajik of the writing class (ahl-i-qalam), “he did deeds which made Turks humble” — illustrative of Akbar’s practice of advancing men of all backgrounds on merit.
  • Seeing little further use in retaining Garh-Katanga directly, Akbar recalled Asaf Khan in 1567, restoring the kingdom to Chandra Shah, brother of the Rani’s late husband — retaining only ten forts to round off the Malwa subah.

Rajasthan

• Unlike Malwa and Garh-Katanga, the Mughal drive into Rajasthan was not chiefly driven by desire for territory or wealth — no empire based in the upper Ganga basin could feel secure with a powerful rival power centre on its flank, a lesson already evident in Babur’s conflict with Rana Sanga and Sher Shah’s with Rao Maldeo.
  • Dominating Rajasthan was also a means to a further end: the routes to both Gujarat (with its sea-ports) and Malwa ran through it, and control of either required at least minimal control over the Rajasthan states.
• Mughal rule had already extended over parts of Mewat in 1556, followed by Ajmer and Nagaur. In 1562, during Akbar’s first pilgrimage to the tomb of Muinuddin Chishti at Ajmer, Raja Bharmal, ruler of Amber, submitted to Mughal authority.
  • This was followed by the occupation of the powerful fort of Merta, and briefly of Jodhpur amid a disputed succession following Maldeo’s death — Maldeo had nominated Chandrasen as heir, prompting his elder brother, Ram Chandra, to seek Mughal help and be reinstated, though Chandrasen soon recovered Jodhpur.
• Following the crushing of the Uzbek rebellion, Akbar turned his attention decisively to Rajasthan, whose most powerful and prestigious kingdom remained Mewar.
  • Some prior negotiation between Akbar and the Rana appears to have taken place — evidenced by an episode in which the Rana’s son, Sakat, present in the imperial camp at Dholpur, was asked by Akbar what service he would perform if ordered to attack the Rana — though the exact nature of these negotiations remains unknown. Per Abul Fazl, the Rana, proud of his mountain strongholds, wealth, and loyal Rajputs, would not “lower his head of obedience before anyone, for none of his ancestors had bowed down and kissed the ground” — a reference to the personal submission Akbar insisted upon, even when the Rajputs, during the siege of Chittor, had offered to accept Mughal suzerainty and pay tribute (peshkash).
  • The Rana, Udai Singh, had further offended Akbar by sheltering both the deposed Baz Bahadur of Malwa and the Mirzas after their flight from Sambhal.

The Siege of Chittor

• The strength of Chittor fort left besiegers only two viable methods: a prolonged siege to starve out the defenders, and sabats (covered trenches) dug up to the walls for mining beneath them.
  • Some 5,000 skilled builders, carpenters, and stonemasons were assembled for this work, but continual Rajput fire killed one or two hundred of them daily — offering some context for Akbar’s bitterness when, after a four-month siege, and following the death of the redoubtable Rajput warrior Jaimal, the defenders performed jauhar and died fighting, Akbar ordered a general massacre.
  • Beyond those who died fighting in sorties, 8,000 Rajputs perished within the fort defending their temple, alongside 40,000 peasants who had aided them. In total, roughly 30,000 people were killed in the massacre that followed, though the skilled marksmen Akbar had specifically sought to punish escaped through a ruse. This was the last such massacre Akbar ordered.
  • This episode cannot be justified on any ground, and reflects only that Akbar had not yet shed the Central Asian tradition of brutality toward defeated opponents.
• The fall of Chittor (March 1568) was followed by the capture of Ranthambhor and Kalinjar in Bundelkhand. More significantly, when Akbar reached Nagaur in 1570, the rulers of Marwar, Bikaner, and Jaisalmer accepted Mughal suzerainty, and in return were permitted to continue ruling their states, receiving mansabs and jagirs — leaving Mewar alone to uphold the flag of regional independence.

Gujarat

• Akbar next turned to Gujarat, which had been racked by succession disputes since Bahadur Shah’s death, with rival nobles installing real or fake claimants to the throne — a situation worsened by the Mirzas, who had seized Broach, Baroda, and Surat, and by growing Portuguese ambitions over the region’s ports.
  • Given Gujarat’s strategic importance and rich handicraft and agricultural production, Akbar could not allow it to descend further into ruin. Per Nizamuddin, it had been reported to Akbar that in a Gujarat “arranged like a paradise,” the tyranny of its rulers and the refractoriness of its usurping factions were bringing desolation and ruin.
  • Akbar was, in fact, invited to intervene by Itimad Khan Habshi, then ruler at Ahmadabad, seeking to restore order.
• Towards the end of 1572, Akbar marched on Gujarat via Ajmer, Merta, and Sirohi. With the support of Habshi and Gujarati nobles, he occupied Ahmadabad without opposition, though action against the Mirzas in south Gujarat remained necessary.
  • Akbar displayed considerable personal daring here — attacking Ibrahim Hussain Mirza’s strong detachment at Sarnal with just forty men upon learning the Mirza was attempting escape; though victorious, he could not prevent the Mirza’s flight. He then besieged and captured Surat in early 1573, inducing many local rajas to submit.
  • The Portuguese also arrived to present gifts to the emperor. Earlier, at Khambayat, Akbar had for the first time seen — and sailed upon — the Sea of Oman (Arabian Sea); per contemporary chronicler Arif Qandhari, on 17 Shaban / 23 December 1572, “His Majesty boarded a fast-moving boat and ordered that an assembly of pleasure and enjoyment may be arranged, and he gave himself to a drinking bout there.”
• Following his success at Surat, Akbar appointed Khan-i-Azam Aziz Koka, his milk-brother and favourite, as governor of Gujarat, placing trusted nobles over the sarkars of Patan, Dholka, Broach, and Baroda, before returning to Agra to attend to the situation in the east.
  • Akbar’s administrative arrangements here closely mirrored those adopted by Humayun during his own Gujarat conquest — and, following Akbar’s departure, the situation, too, proved remarkably similar: the Habshi and Gujarati nobles, the Mirzas, and Hindu rajas rose in concert to expel the Mughals.
  • Unlike Askari, who had retreated under similar pressure during Humayun’s reign, Aziz Koka entrenched himself at Ahmadabad. Akbar postponed his planned eastern campaign and undertook another remarkable personal intervention — marching from Fatehpur Sikri to Ahmadabad in just eleven days, at the head of roughly 3,000 troops. The emperor’s presence demoralised the rebels, securing a decisive victory that broke the back of Gujarati opposition in 1573, though sporadic resistance continued for some time.

Bengal

• The conquest of Gujarat cleared the way for Akbar to turn to affairs in the east. Bengal had become independent following Islam Shah’s death, with Sulaiman Karrani eventually emerging victorious from a confused succession struggle. The Karranis, holding large jagirs in Bihar, restored strong Bengali influence over the province — even Patna (founded by Sher Shah) and Hajipur remained under Afghan Bengal’s rule, along with the powerful fort of Rohtas.
  • Akbar’s eastern campaign thus targeted not merely Bang and Lakhnauti (north Bengal), but, per Nizamuddin Ahmad, “the country of Bihar” as well.
• The immediate trigger was Daud Khan’s declaration of independence: unlike his predecessors, who had maintained nominal loyalty to the Mughal crown by avoiding a separate khutba and coinage, Daud Khan — commanding some 40,000 cavalry, 1,40,000 infantry, 3,600 elephants, and an artillery park reputedly of 20,000 guns and thousands of war-boats — had the khutba and sikka issued in his own name.
  • Under capable leadership, the Afghans of Bengal and Bihar could indeed have posed Akbar a serious challenge. Munim Khan, governor of Jaunpur, was first tasked with the response, advancing on and besieging Patna, but made little headway against the entrenched Afghan defence.
• Once freed from Gujarat affairs, Akbar advanced east with a large army and flotilla. After capturing Hajipur and Patna, he pursued Daud Khan into Bengal itself, before handing command to Munim Khan, now made governor of Bengal, and returning to Agra.
  • Here again, though Akbar — like Humayun — treated the Bengal-Bihar campaign as a combined operation, his management differed sharply: he first consolidated Gujarat before turning east, and did not personally lead the Bengal campaign throughout.
  • Munim Khan concluded a treaty with Daud in March 1575, following a hard-fought victory at Tukaroi (district Balasore). His death soon after at Gaur, however, sparked renewed hostilities, and Daud reoccupied his old capital, Tanda, forcing a shameful Mughal retreat into Bihar.
  • Akbar appointed Hussain Quli Khan-i-Jahan as the new governor of Bengal; in another closely contested battle, Daud Khan was defeated and killed (1576).
• The Mughal victory over Daud Khan may be considered the effective end of the long struggle against the Afghans — though sporadic conflict with Afghan rulers of Orissa and entrenched Afghan zamindars of southern and eastern Bengal continued into the reign of Jahangir.

Emergence of a Composite Ruling Class

• The induction of Rajputs and other Hindus into imperial service, on equal footing with others, marked a significant step toward a composite ruling class.
  • An analysis of nobles ranked 500 zat and above listed in the Ain-i-Akbari shows that between 1575 and 1595, Hindus numbered 30 out of 184 — roughly one-sixth of the total — of whom 27 were Rajputs. These figures nonetheless understate the true significance of Rajput and Hindu involvement in imperial service.
  • Badayuni, who disapproved of this development and repeatedly emphasised the influence of Akbar’s Rajput wives on his liberal religious policy, wrote of “Hindu infidels who are indispensable, and of whom half the army, and country, will soon consist, and of whom there is not among the Mughals and Hindustanis a qaum so powerful” that Akbar “could not have enough” of them.
• Akbar did not confine service to powerful rajas and zamindars alone — he opened service to talent broadly, drawing many capable men, Hindu and Muslim alike, from humble backgrounds, some of whom rose to considerable prominence.
  • Among the Rajputs, several subordinate sardars caught Akbar’s eye and were drawn directly into imperial service — including Raisal Darbari, Rai Manohar, Bedi Chand, and Lunkaran Kachawaha.
  • An even more significant group emerged among revenue experts, many drawn from the Khatri and Kayastha castes, who had long worked at lower levels of state revenue administration and as financial advisors (peshkars) to various noble households — their induction into the higher revenue bureaucracy was, however, a distinctly new development.
    • Todar Mal, who had earlier served in the revenue department under Sher Shah Sur, took part in military campaigns against the Uzbeks and in Gujarat, and played a leading role in the Bengal expedition, eventually rising to wazir and carrying out significant revenue reforms.
    • Rai Patr Das, also a Khatri, served as diwan of the Bihar and Kabul subahs, was granted the title Raja Bikramajit, and reached the mansab of 5,000.
    • Birbal, a close associate of Akbar, remains among the best known of these figures.
    • Rai Purushottam, a Brahmin, was appointed bakhshi.
  • When the subahs were organised, eight of the twelve provincial diwans were Khatris and Kayasthas — reflecting a second, administrative channel of advancement that also benefited a section of Indian Muslims.
• Under Babur, imperial service had drawn chiefly upon Hindustanis, mostly Afghans, many of whom dropped away following conflict with Humayun. On their return to India, the Mughals inducted two principal groups of Hindustani (Indian) Muslims into service:
  • The Saiyads of Barha, famed for military valour and said to have come to India from Arabia during the Sultanate period — earning, on account of their reckless bravery, the right to serve in the vanguard of the army under Akbar, though none of them rose to particularly high positions.
  • The Shaikhzadas — drawn from learned or Shaikh families long settled in India, including Shaikh Gadai, Bairam Khan’s favourite. Badayuni, himself a mullah, took an unfavourable view of this section, calling them time-servers and hypocrites; most lived on madad-i-maash (revenue-free grants), with only a few holding zamindari status. Influential in society, the Shaikhzadas were especially courted by Akbar following his break with the Uzbek nobles.
  • Another Hindustani group, the Kambohs, apparently a clan or tribe also represented among Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs, were noted for sagacity and quick apprehension. Shahbaz Khan, its most prominent member, played a prominent role in campaigns against Rana Pratap and in Bengal, and applied the dagh (horse-branding) system rigorously as Mir Bakhshi, being noted also for his piety and wealth.
  • From Jahangir’s time onward, Afghans began to advance further, their numbers growing alongside Mughal expansion into the Deccan; Marathas also began entering service from this period.
• The development of a composite nobility naturally reduced the dominance of Turani nobles in service — following the Uzbek rebellion, growing numbers of Iranis, especially from Khurasan, were inducted, being considered more suited to administrative roles than the Turanis.
  • A recent study finds that, between 1575 and 1595, of the 184 nobles ranked 500 zat and above, Turanis numbered 64 (34.78%), Iranis 47 (25.54%), Hindustanis 34 (18.48%), and Rajputs/other Hindus 30 (16.30%) — the background of the remaining nine being unknown.
• Akbar also worked to weaken clan-tribal ties, mandating that noble military contingents be mixed — comprising Mughals, Hindustanis, and Rajputs — though, in practice, Mughal and Rajput nobles were permitted contingents composed exclusively of their own kin where circumstances required.
• Thus emerged, under Akbar, a nobility balanced across ethnic and religious lines, and an army relatively free of narrow clan-tribal loyalty — grounded in the older principle, dating to Nizam-ul-Mulk’s Siyasat Nama (11th century), that no single ethnic group should dominate the nobility or army, lest the ruler become dependent upon it.
  • Where this earlier principle had applied solely within a wholly Muslim ruling class, Akbar extended it further by incorporating Hindus — particularly Rajputs — into the nobility and army as a genuine counterweight to other groups.
  • A genuinely balanced, multi-ethnic nobility could, in principle, have paved the way toward a fully integrated ruling class — though this in turn required an integrated religious, cultural, and political outlook, whose emergence within such an ethnically balanced composite elite remained a real and ongoing challenge.

Last Phase of Akbar’s Reign — Rebellions and Further Expansion of the Empire

• Having traced the empire’s rapid growth up to 1576, a phase of consolidation followed. From 1580 onward, however, the reign saw serious rebellion in the east, unrest in Bengal, Bihar, Rajasthan, and the north-west, further expansion in the east, west, and Deccan, and, finally, the rebellion of Akbar’s favourite son and chosen successor, Salim.

The Bengal-Bihar Rebellion (1580)

• Early in 1580, a serious rebellion broke out among nobles posted in Bengal — arguably the last significant attempt by the nobility to halt, or even reverse, the centralisation of monarchical power (and, by extension, the power of central officials, which had grown steadily since the Uzbek rebellion’s suppression in 1567).
  • The dagh (branding) system for horses and other animals, introduced in 1574, along with periodic inspections of animal quality, had caused deep resentment — though enforcement had been relatively lax during the ongoing Bengal campaign against the Afghans. After the campaign concluded, Rai Purushottam and Mulla Muhammad Yazdi were sent to restore order, but their harsh, tactless demands for old accounts — compounded by the intrigues of agents loyal to Mirza Hakim — inflamed noble resentment further.
  • The mullahs were similarly discontented, having lost or seen reduced their revenue-free lands. The qazi of Jaunpur issued a fatwa declaring it a religious duty to rebel against the emperor, since “the Emperor has in his dominions made encroachments on the grant lands belonging to us and to God.”
  • The final trigger was a reduction — to half or less — of the allowance (bhatta) paid for service in Bengal and Bihar. The rebellion engulfed both provinces, with rebels going so far as to have the khutba read in Mirza Hakim’s name.
• Akbar responded with a mix of firm and conciliatory measures. The rebellion was largely suppressed by Mirza Aziz Koka and Todar Mal by the time Mirza Hakim invaded the Punjab — though even at the height of the Bengal-Bihar crisis, this invasion made little practical difference, since Akbar remained in command at Agra with a large army, and Mirza Hakim — known as a drunkard and coward who had already lost Kabul multiple times — could hardly have withstood him.
  • Following Mirza Hakim’s retreat from Lahore and the Mughal advance to Kabul, Akbar nonetheless chose to restore Kabul to him — likely because the eastern rebellion had not yet fully ended, and Akbar had no wish to extend his commitments further.

Expansion in the North-West

• The empire’s next phase of north-western expansion followed Abdullah Uzbek’s capture of Badakhshan in 1584, ousting the Timurids. Fearing an Uzbek attack on Kabul, Mirza Hakim and the ousted Timurid prince Mirza Sulaiman appealed to Akbar for help — before Akbar could act, however, Mirza Hakim died of excessive drinking (1585).
  • Akbar instructed Man Singh, then in charge of the frontier, to advance and occupy Kabul, while Akbar himself moved to the Indus, camping at Attock, and appointed Man Singh governor of Kabul.
• Simultaneously, vigorous efforts kept the Khyber Pass open against rebellious Afghan tribesmen, entailing a series of difficult expeditions through inhospitable terrain. It was during one such operation that Akbar’s favourite, Birbal, advancing rashly too far into mountain defiles, was surrounded and killed — a loss that grieved Akbar deeply, but only strengthened his resolve to subdue the Afghan tribes, a slow and painstaking process ultimately achieved.
• In 1586, Akbar decided to conquer Kashmir after its ruler, Yaqub Khan, refused to render personal homage despite earlier submission.
  • An initial invasion under Raja Bhagwant Das was repulsed, but the task was completed by Qasim Khan (1587). Soon after, several hill rajas of Jammu, along with Ladakh and Baltistan (referred to as Tibet Khurd and Tibet Buzurg, “small” and “great” Tibet), submitted to Mughal authority. Akbar made his first visit to Kashmir in 1589.
• In 1590, Akbar sent a force to capture lower Sindh — upper Sindh, with its capital at Bhakkar, already being under Mughal control — necessary for opening the trade route from Qandahar to Multan, and down the Indus to the sea.
  • Meanwhile, remaining regions such as Baluchistan, previously outside imperial control, were subdued.
• The final major acquisition in the region was the capture of Qandahar, providing the Mughals with a more scientific, defensible frontier; in the west, Kathiawar was similarly conquered.

Eastern Consolidation and the Turn Towards the Deccan

• Man Singh was transferred from Kabul to Bihar in 1587, where he pursued a forward policy — conquering Orissa as well as Dacca in eastern Bengal (then under Afghan control), and compelling Cooch Bihar to accept Mughal suzerainty.
• With Mughal conquests in North India thus rounded off, Akbar turned his attention towards the Deccan (Mughal relations with the Deccan being addressed in a separate chapter).

The Rebellion of Salim

• The final years of Akbar’s reign were clouded by the rebellion of his son and chosen successor, Salim. Although Akbar’s rule was far too well established to be genuinely shaken by it, this episode raised anew the problem of succession — one that would only grow more pronounced as Mughal authority itself became firmer and more deeply rooted.