Rajput Policy of Akbar

Rajput Policy of Akbar

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• The Mughal policy towards the Rajputs was a major factor in the expansion and consolidation of the Mughal Empire; it was, above all, designed to serve the political needs of the state rather than the personal whims of any one ruler.
• The Mughal-Rajput alliance was not shaped merely by the individual religious beliefs of successive emperors. It was instead governed by a combination of forces — the struggle of aristocratic elements for supremacy or autonomy, socio-cultural factors, and the geo-strategic context of the country.
• The idea of forging a special relationship with the Rajputs matured fully under Akbar, and it went on to become one of the most abiding features of Mughal rule in India — even though the relationship came under strain in later reigns.

Background: Mughal-Rajput Relations Before Akbar

• The relationship between local rulers and the central authority saw many ups and downs through the Sultanate period.
  • The Turkish rulers constantly sought to curb the power and influence of local rulers or rais, many of whom were Rajputs.
  • In general, they demanded formal submission from these rais, a promise of military assistance when required, and payment of peshkash.
• Alauddin Khalji was the first Sultanate ruler to forge an active alliance with an autonomous raja, Ram Deo of Deogir.
  • After Ram Deo’s submission, he was invited to Delhi, showered with gifts, and not only was his kingdom restored to him but Navsari, a district in Gujarat, was also granted to him.
  • Alauddin further cemented the alliance through marriage: he married Ram Deo’s daughter, Jhatyapali, while his son and heir-apparent, Khizr Khan, was married to Dewal Devi, daughter of the former ruler of Gujarat.
  • However, this policy collapsed with the successive deaths of Ram Deo, Alauddin Khalji, and Khizr Khan.
• Bahlul Lodi and Sikandar Lodi later tried to build friendly ties with some Rajput rajas of the Gangetic doab, even elevating a few of them to the rank of amir.
  • This groundwork helped establish friendly relations between the Afghans and Hindu rajas — ties that persisted long after the Mughal conquest of India.

Babur and the Rajputs

• Rana Sanga had initially negotiated with Babur against the Lodis; as Babur advanced in keeping with this understanding, Sanga withdrew his forces, only to be caught off guard when Babur pushed deeper into the Gangetic valley.
• Sanga then allied with Afghan forces in an attempt to check Babur’s advance towards Delhi.
• The conflict between Sanga and Babur was not religious in character, a fact underscored by the very composition of Sanga’s coalition.
  • Although Babur proclaimed his campaign against Sanga a jihad, this was largely a rhetorical device to rouse the religious sentiments of his soldiers rather than a reflection of the conflict’s true nature.
  • Rana Sanga was ultimately defeated by Babur at Khanwa and Chanderi.
• During Babur’s reign, Mughal-Rajput relations did not follow any definite or positive trajectory; they remained purely a function of immediate political necessity.

Rajput Policy Under Humayun

• Humayun’s approach to Rajasthan was essentially defence-oriented, with any offensive policy deliberately postponed.
  • He recognised that internecine warfare had weakened Mewar considerably, reducing its value to him as a military ally.
• After returning to India, Humayun pursued a policy of conciliating and winning over the zamindars — a term used in official records for autonomous rajas, both Hindu and Muslim.
  • According to Abul Fazl, Humayun sought to soothe the zamindars’ concerns by entering into matrimonial alliances with them while he was at Delhi.
    • Thus, in 1556, when Hasan Khan of Mewat, one of India’s great zamindars, came to pay homage with his two daughters, one was married to Humayun and the other to Bairam Khan.
  • This pursuit of ties with the Rajputs was, therefore, only one strand of a broader Mughal policy towards India’s indigenous ruling sections.
• Shaikh Fakhruddin Bhakkari, writing in the mid-17th century, records an illuminating exchange:
  • When Humayun was at the court of Shah Tahmasp of Iran, the latter asked him why the Mughals had been expelled from India, and which Indian community was the most outstanding and martial.
  • On being told that these were the Rajputs and Afghans, Shah Tahmasp advised Humayun to cultivate the Rajputs, since no one could rule Hindustan without winning over its zamindars.
  • On his deathbed, Humayun in turn advised Akbar to nurture this qaum (the Rajputs), describing them as a people inclined to obedience and service rather than transgression.
• Thus, the Mughal desire to conciliate the zamindars, combined with the Rajputs’ reputation for loyalty and service, formed the very foundation of the later Mughal-Rajput alliance.
• Under both Babur and Humayun, however, the persistent Afghan problem prevented any sustained or friendly relationship with the Rajputs from taking shape.

Akbar’s Rajput Policy

• Akbar’s Rajput policy began as a political coalition but gradually evolved into an instrument for closer Hindu-Muslim relations, laying the foundation for a broader, liberal, and tolerant policy towards all faiths.
• Akbar’s Rajput policy can be understood in three distinct phases:
  • In the first phase, Akbar largely continued the approach already followed by the Delhi Sultans.
  • In the second phase, he sought to develop and extend the Rajput alliance, though certain elements of the earlier policy were retained.
  • The third and final phase is marked by Akbar’s decisive break with Muslim orthodoxy.

The First Phase (Till 1572)

• The Rajputs had already impressed Akbar favourably in 1557, when he was riding an elephant that went out of control — everyone fled except a band of Rajputs under Bharmal, ruler of the small principality of Amber, who stood firm.
• During this first phase, Rajput rajas who submitted to Akbar were treated as loyal allies expected to render military service in or around their own principalities, but not beyond.
  • Raja Bharmal, along with his son Bhagwant Das, was a constant companion of Akbar during the Uzbek rebellions, though there is no record of his taking part in actual military operations.
  • Similarly, Man Singh was not required to take an active part in the siege of Chittor, though he remained present in the Imperial camp throughout.
  • Within Rajasthan itself, a Kachhawaha contingent served on the Mughal side during the siege of Merta (1562).
  • The following year, when the Mughals besieged Jodhpur, Ram Rai — elder brother of Chandrasen — actively aided them.

Matrimonial Alliances

• In a feudalised polity, personal ties were seen as a stronger guarantee of loyalty than any formal treaty; marriages between royal houses thus served as both a bond of alliance and a mark of submission.
• After marrying Bharmal’s daughter, Akbar repeatedly emphasised his special relationship with the Kachhawaha family.
  • Bhagwant Das remained in constant attendance on Akbar during the Uzbek rebellion and was later entrusted with guarding the Imperial camp, including the royal ladies — a responsibility reserved only for nobles related to the emperor or enjoying his deepest trust.
  • The birth of Prince Salim to the Kachhawahi princess in 1569 filled Akbar with gratitude and drew him even closer to the Kachhawaha house.
  • In 1572, when Akbar left for the Gujarat campaign, Bharmal was entrusted with the charge of the capital, Agra, where the royal ladies resided.
• In 1570, at Nagor, Rai Kalyan Mal of Bikaner presented himself before Akbar along with his son, Rai Singh; a daughter of Kalyan Mal’s brother, Kahan, was married to Akbar.
  • Rawal Har Rai of Jaisalmer also submitted and offered a daughter in marriage to the emperor.
  • The kingdoms of these rajas were restored to them, and both Kalyan Mal and Rai Singh were admitted into Imperial service.
• Chandrasen of Jodhpur likewise submitted to Akbar, and one of his daughters was apparently married to the emperor around this time.
  • However, due to opposition from his elder brother Ram Rai and younger brother Uday Singh, Jodhpur — under Imperial control since 1563 — was not restored to him, leading to a long-drawn conflict during which the kingdom remained part of the khalisa (crown land).
• Several misconceptions surround Akbar’s matrimonial alliances with the Rajput rajas:
  • These marriages were essentially political compromises and did not involve conversion to Islam or any break with Hindu tradition.
  • Nor did they forge any exceptional bond between Rajputs and Mughals, or serve as tools to counter recalcitrant elements or secure military advantage.
  • There is little evidence that these alliances — including Bharmal’s earlier marriage — were forced upon the Rajputs; rather, they emerged from circumstance and the rajas’ own recognition of the benefits such ties could bring.
  • Akbar also did not treat matrimonial alliance as a test of loyalty: no such relations were established with the Hadas of Ranthambhor, even though Surjan Hada served the Mughals in Gujarat and elsewhere, rising to the rank of 2000. Likewise, the rulers of Sirohi and Banswara submitted without any matrimonial ties being formed.
  • In fact, matrimonial alliance as a political tool was not unique to Akbar’s reign — it was a well-established practice in Indian statecraft.
    • The Allahabad pillar inscription of Samudragupta (5th century CE) records that subordinate rajas were required to send a daughter to the Imperial household.
    • This tradition persisted even though the early Turkish rulers did not initially demand matrimonial ties from subordinate Hindu rajas; over time, however, several marriages between Muslim and Hindu ruling houses did take place — such as Alauddin Khalji’s marriage to Ram Deo’s daughter, and Firuz Shah Bahmani’s marriage to the daughter of Deva Raya of Vijayanagar in 1406.
    • Most such marriages, though, arose from specific circumstances — an invasion or the need for military help — and rarely produced any lasting relationship between the two sides.
• Akbar’s reign also ushered in an era of personal fidelity, as he sought intimate ties with chieftains who submitted to him directly, believing personal loyalty offered the surest guarantee of political allegiance.
  • Akbar backed this with liberal measures — forbidding the enslavement of women and children of rebellious villagers, remitting pilgrim taxes, and finally abolishing jizyah in 1564.
  • Yet these measures did not translate into complete peace between Mughals and Rajputs: during the siege of Chittor, the Rajputs put up fierce resistance despite Bhagwant Das’s presence in Akbar’s camp, and Akbar himself proclaimed the conflict a jihad — again chiefly to stir the religious zeal of his troops rather than out of genuine sectarian animus.
• By the end of this first phase, Akbar’s attitude towards the Rajputs had clearly softened:
  • Rajputs such as Rao Dalpat Rai were inducted into Imperial service and granted jagirs.
  • Marriage alliances further eased relations, and a few Rajputs — such as Bharmal, entrusted with Agra during the Gujarat campaign — became close confidants of the emperor.
  • Even so, Akbar’s evolving religious outlook, his public policies, and his attitude towards the Rajputs still developed along largely separate tracks, converging only at a later stage.

The Second Phase (1572–1578)

• This phase may be dated from Akbar’s Gujarat campaign of 1572, an important landmark in the evolution of Mughal-Rajput relations — Rajputs were now enlisted as soldiers in a systematic manner, with their salaries fixed for the first time.
• Beyond being loyal allies, the Rajputs now began emerging as the sword-arm of the empire.
  • At the outset, Man Singh was given a well-equipped force to chase down Sher Khan Fuladi and his sons, earning praise from Akbar.
  • The Kachhawahas were not alone in this — before leaving for Gujarat, Akbar entrusted Rai Singh of Bikaner with the charge of Jodhpur and Sirohi, to guard against incursions from the Rana and keep the Gujarat road open.
  • In 1576, Man Singh was appointed to lead the Mughal army against Rana Pratap — marking the first time Rajputs were deployed outside Rajasthan on significant assignments.
  • During the Gujarat insurrection of the Mirzas, Akbar relied heavily on the Kachhawaha nobles Man Singh and Bhagwant Das.
• The Rana of Mewar, however, refused personal submission and sought to regain Chittor, while Akbar remained firm on insisting upon it.
• By the close of this second phase, Akbar’s Rajput policy had not yet taken a shape that Muslim orthodox elements could object to, nor one that threatened the Islamic character of the state.

The Third Phase (From 1578)

• This phase may be dated from 1578, when Raja Bhagwant Das and Man Singh arrived at the Imperial camp at Bhera in western Punjab, in preparation for campaigns in the north-west, including Kashmir.
• This development coincided with Akbar’s break with the orthodox clergy:
  • The expulsion of the sadr, Shaikh Abdun Nabi.
  • The issuance of the Mahzar, granting Akbar the right to choose between different schools of Islamic law upholding the sharia.
  • Yet the reimposition of jizyah in 1575, as a preparatory measure for the war with Mewar, shows that Akbar still leaned on religion to serve political ends.
  • Until this point, Akbar had not fully broken from the orthodox framework — an orthodox mullah like Badayuni could still remark that although Man Singh commanded both Hindu and Muslim troops at Haldighati, it remained a case of “a Hindu wielding the sword of Islam.”
• In this final phase:
  • The Rajputs emerged as genuine partners in the kingdom — a counterweight in the nobility against the Turani nobles, whose loyalty Akbar increasingly doubted after his break with the ulema.
  • They became the true sword-arm of the empire, actively involved in Mughal administration — a shift accelerated by Mirza Hakim’s invasion, during which the Rajputs displayed such valour and loyalty that they were even deployed against Mirza Hakim, Akbar’s own half-brother.
    • Akbar rewarded this trust by making Bhagwant Das governor of Lahore and Man Singh commander of the Indus region.
    • The Rajputs thus proved themselves dependable allies who could be deployed anywhere — even against princes of the blood — while also taking on tasks of governance.
  • Akbar further strengthened ties through the marriages of his sons Salim and Daniyal into Rajput ruling houses:
    • Salim married the daughter of Bhagwant Singh in 1583, and later daughters of the ruling houses of Bikaner and Jaisalmer.
    • Daniyal was married to a daughter of Raimal, son of Rai Maldeo.
    • These alliances reveal Akbar’s intent to bind his successors to the continued policy of close Rajput ties.
  • In 1583–84, Akbar initiated a policy of appointing loyal Muslim and Hindu nobles to key administrative posts:
    • Raja Birbal became a close associate responsible for justice.
    • Rai Durga Sisodia of Rampura and Raja Todar Mal were assigned to the revenue department.
    • In 1585–86, when two sipahsalars or subahdars were appointed to each subah, Rajputs were made joint-governors of four provinces — Lahore, Kabul, Agra, and Ajmer — with the appointment of Man Singh and Bhagwant Das to the strategically vital Kabul and Lahore standing out as most significant.
    • Rajputs were also appointed as faujdars and fort commanders; Man Singh later became governor of Bihar and Bengal, holding the rank of 7000 — a rank shared only with Mirza Aziz Koka.
  • The Kachhawahas remained the most powerful Rajput clan under Akbar: of the 27 Rajput nobles listed in the Ain-i-Akbari (1593–94), 13 belonged to this clan.
    • Other Rajputs did rise too — Rai Singh of Bikaner became governor of Lahore in 1590–91, and his son Suraj Singh effectively governed Gujarat.
    • The Kachhawahas’ disproportionate representation was corrected only after Jahangir ascended the throne.
  • It is difficult to say how successfully this policy of Rajput administrative deployment was actually implemented — Abul Fazl’s own account suggests it fell short in practice.
• By 1585–86, Akbar’s Rajput policy had matured fully: the alliance had become steady and stable, with the Rajputs functioning as true partners of the empire rather than mere allies.
  • Under the concept of Mughal paramountcy, Akbar asserted that the grant of tika (the right to nominate a successor) was the emperor’s prerogative and could not be claimed as a matter of right by any Rajput house.
  • Akbar also encouraged nobles to maintain heterogeneous contingents — mixing Mughals, Rajputs, and other ethnic groups — in an effort to cut across ethnic-religious divisions, though this yielded little lasting result, and such ties could not ultimately be weakened.

Conclusion

• Akbar’s alliance with the Rajputs began as a political coalition but matured into an instrument for closer Hindu-Muslim relations, forming the bedrock of a broader liberal and tolerant policy towards all faiths.
  • Akbar’s attempts to build heterogeneous, mixed-ethnicity contingents achieved little lasting success, and ethnic-religious loyalties among the nobility remained largely intact.
  • The Rajput soldier, notably, was paid less than his Mughal counterpart, though it is unclear how far this discouraged nobles from recruiting Rajputs.
• Mughal-Rajput relations are sometimes viewed as the seed of a secular, non-sectarian state in which every section of society had a stake — but this reading does not fully match the social and political reality of the time.
  • The Rajputs remained largely orthodox in social and religious outlook: they refused to join Akbar’s Tauhid-i-Ilahi and did not support his opposition to sati.
  • Similarly, the Mughal elite and the ulema were themselves generally orthodox and feared that a broad liberal policy would erode their dominant position.
• This orthodox opposition could be countered only through powerful non-sectarian movements emphasising common ground between the two faiths — but such movements remained limited in influence, leaving the Mughal-Rajput alliance without a strong ideological bulwark. It eventually grew strained and collapsed.

The Mughal-Rajput Alliance Was Mutually Beneficial

• The alliance secured for the Mughals the services of some of India’s bravest warriors; the steadfast loyalty of the Rajputs was a key factor in both the consolidation and further expansion of the empire.
• In turn, Mughal service allowed Rajput rajas to serve in distant provinces far from home and to hold important administrative posts, considerably raising their prestige and social standing.
• This service was also financially rewarding: Rajput rajas held jagirs outside Rajasthan in accordance with their mansab, in addition to their ancestral holdings.
  • The Kachhawahas, for instance, first held jagirs in Gujarat, then in Punjab once Bhagwant Das and Man Singh were posted there, and later in Bihar and Bengal during Man Singh’s governorship.
  • While such jagirs were transferable like any other, the Rajput rajas’ own homelands were granted as watan jagirs — non-transferable during a ruler’s lifetime and expanding in step with his rising mansab.
• As Abul Fazl notes, rajas who entered into such alliances were considered distinguished among the other zamindars of the empire.

Pax Mughalica

• The Mughal concept of paramountcy established a kind of pax Mughalica (Mughal peace), enabling peaceful development across the region and allowing rajas to serve at distant posts without worrying about unrest in their own territories.
  • This meant, above all, regulation of inter-state disputes and conflicts among Rajput rajas and sardars — no subordinate raja could extend his territory without the Mughal emperor’s consent.
  • The Mughal practice of conferring honours also served to weaken the traditional aristocracy, since minor Rajput feudatories were themselves enlisted into Imperial service, encouraging the middle and lower strata to assert independence from their overlords.
• This claimed paramountcy carried two key implications:
  • Rajput rajas could no longer raid each other’s territories or resolve disputes through war — a marked shift, given the long history of territorial conflict among Rajput states.
  • It also meant controlling succession to the throne in Rajput states.
    • Neither Hindu nor Muslim tradition upheld strict primogeniture (succession of the eldest son); the poet Tulsidas, a contemporary of Akbar, held that both scripture and tradition sanctioned the right of tika — the choice of successor — though this was not always accepted, and disputes over succession repeatedly triggered fratricidal civil wars in Rajput states.
    • As sovereign, the Mughal emperor claimed the right to approve any succession. Thus, when Rao Maldeo died, Akbar rejected his nominee, the younger son Chandrasen, in favour of the elder Rao Ram, and later gave the throne to Ram’s younger brother, Mota Raja Udai Singh, after his death.
    • Succession was thus treated as a matter of Imperial grace rather than right, though controlling it was never straightforward and depended heavily on the reigning emperor’s strength.
    • While Mughal intervention could favour a raja’s son, brother, or nephew — and occasionally sparked fresh conflict — it also allowed succession disputes to be settled without a civil war. This right of regulation, however, carried within it the seeds of future conflict whenever a Mughal ruler’s authority was itself in question.

Concept of Watan Jagir

• When a Rajput raja entered Imperial service, he was granted a jagir against his mansab, comprising mahals or tappas where his clan members resided.
  • These mahals formed part of one or more parganas centred on a fort or garhi where the raja lived with his family — this was the raja’s true watan, though the term was sometimes extended to cover his entire ancestral tract. Jahangir referred to this as riyasat, and the term watan jagir itself came into use only towards the end of Akbar’s reign.
• Watan jagirs were granted for life within Rajasthan and were not transferable except in cases of rebellion, unlike jagirs outside Rajasthan, which remained transferable as usual.
  • The term does not appear in Abul Fazl’s writings; its earliest recorded use is in a farman of Akbar addressed to Rai Singh of Bikaner. Rajput chronicles use the term utan, likely a corruption of watan.

How Watan Jagir Advanced a Stable, Centralised State Structure

• The shift in Rajasthan’s state structure, marked by the evolution of the watan jagir system replacing the earlier bhaibant arrangement, was a significant development.
  • By Jahangir’s reign, the concept of watan jagir was firmly established, bringing areas held by clan members and other lineages under the raja’s direct control.
  • This allowed rajas to consolidate their position against the pattayats (clan-holders) — a genuine step towards a stable and centralised state structure.
• When a raja died, his watan jagir parganas were not automatically inherited in full by his successor; the new raja typically received fewer parganas, in proportion to his own (usually lower) mansab, meaning that jagir rights within a pargana were often partitioned. This served as a means of exercising Mughal control over the Rajput rajas.
  • The Mughals did not actively engineer dissensions among the Rajputs, but they were well aware of existing clan and personal rivalries and exploited these to their advantage — for instance, by transferring disputed parganas between claimants.
• Beyond their watan, Rajput rajas were granted jagirs in neighbouring subas or wherever they served, often in either productive regions or zortalab (rebellious) areas requiring a firm hand.
• Within their own principalities, Rajput rajas enjoyed considerable autonomy, though they were barred from levying prohibited taxes such as rahdari (road tax) — the Mughals were keen to keep trade routes across Rajasthan to the coast unhindered.
  • The Mughals also sought to extend their zabt system of revenue measurement to Rajasthan, with limited success; the Rajputs continued to use their own assessment method, rekh, distinct from the Mughal jama.

Akbar and Mewar: The Unresolved Relationship

• Akbar managed to settle his relations with almost every Rajasthani state — Mewar remained the sole exception.
  • Its size, dense forests, and hilly terrain made Mewar uniquely suited to resist Mughal authority, unlike other Rajput states, and its self-image as Rajasthan’s leading state reinforced this resistance — which is why it was the first to feel the weight of Mughal power, at Chittor.
  • After the Mughal conquest of Gujarat, securing Mughal communication lines across Mewar’s territory became even more pressing.
• In 1572, when Maharana Pratap succeeded to the gaddi of Mewar, Akbar sent a series of diplomatic missions to resolve outstanding issues:
  • The first embassy, led by Jalal Khan Qurchi, a favourite of Akbar, achieved little.
  • This was followed by Raja Man Singh, received courteously by the Rana but without any diplomatic breakthrough — the Rana still refused to visit Akbar’s darbar.
  • The next mission, led by Raja Bhagwant Das, fared better: the Rana wore the robe sent by Akbar, and his son Amar Singh accompanied Bhagwant Das to the Mughal court. Still, no final agreement was reached, as the Rana refused Akbar’s insistence on personal submission — differences over Chittor may also have played a role.
  • A final mission by Todar Mal likewise failed to resolve matters.
• With negotiations broken down, war between Mewar and the Mughals became inevitable — though Akbar first turned his attention to conquering Bihar and Bengal, meanwhile setting up new administrative machinery and beginning his search for religious unity, first within Islam and then across faiths.
  • Akbar also addressed unrest in Marwar caused by Chandrasen, operating from Siwana; Chandrasen was relentlessly pursued and eventually took shelter in Mewar, while the powerful fort of Siwana fell to the Mughals in 1575.
• Early in 1576, Akbar moved to Ajmer and deputed Raja Man Singh with a force of 5,000 Mughal and Rajput soldiers to campaign against Rana Pratap.
  • Anticipating the Mughal advance, the Rana had devastated the region up to Chittor to deny the Mughals food and fodder, and fortified the hill passes.
  • He advanced with 3,000 men from his capital, Kumbhalgarh, taking up a position near Haldighati, at the entrance to the defile leading to his capital — supported by an Afghan contingent under Hakim Khan Sur and a small band of Bhils whose loyalty proved invaluable.

The Battle of Haldighati (18 February 1576)

• The battle was fought largely in the traditional manner, between cavalry and elephants, since the rough terrain made it difficult for the Mughals to bring up artillery beyond light pieces.
  • The Rana appears to have had no firearms, whether by choice or for want of the means to procure them.
• In this traditional style of combat, the Rajputs held the advantage — their fierce attack shattered the Mughal left and right wings and put heavy pressure on the centre, until Mughal reserves and a rumour of Akbar’s own arrival turned the tide.
  • Rajput valour, the intense heat, and Mughal fear of ambush in the hills prevented any effective pursuit, allowing the Rana to retreat into the hills and continue his resistance. The battle thus failed to break the existing stalemate.
• On the Mewar side, the Rana was supported mainly by subordinate contingents, with Ram Shah, an ex-ruler of Gwalior, and an Afghan contingent under Hakim Sur playing a particularly notable role; the Mughal forces were commanded by Man Singh.
• With both Hindus and Muslims fighting on either side, Haldighati can hardly be read as a Hindu-Muslim struggle, nor even as a fight for Rajput independence, since influential Rajput sections had already thrown in their lot with the Mughals.
  • At best, it represented an assertion of local political independence — sentiments of regional patriotism ran strong in 16th-century India and could always draw on tradition and custom for legitimacy, though such appeals could not be sustained indefinitely. Rajasthan’s own history showed that, absent a dominant regional power, the region remained prone to internecine warfare.
• Akbar followed up Haldighati by returning to Ajmer and personally leading the campaign against Rana Pratap, occupying Gogunda, Udaipur, and Kumbhalgarh and pushing the Rana deeper into the mountains of southern Mewar.
  • Mughal pressure was also brought to bear on the Afghan chief of Jalor and the Rajput chiefs of Idar, Sirohi, Banswara, Dungarpur, and Bundi — border states that, despite close marriage and clan ties with Mewar, had traditionally deferred to whichever power was regionally dominant, leaving them with little option but to submit.
  • Rana Pratap was thus increasingly isolated; though he continued a valiant, unequal struggle and performed notable feats of resistance, he was marginalised within wider Rajput politics.
• Mughal pressure on Mewar eased after 1579, owing to rebellion in Bihar and Bengal and Mirza Hakim’s incursion into Punjab.
  • Akbar moved to Lahore in 1585 and remained there for the next twelve years, monitoring the north-west frontier, and no further expedition was sent against Rana Pratap during this period.
  • Taking advantage of this respite, Rana Pratap recovered much of his territory, including Kumbhalgarh and the areas near Chittor — though Chittor itself remained beyond his reach — and built a new capital, Chavand, near modern Dungarpur.
• Rana Pratap died in 1597, at the age of 51, from an internal injury sustained while drawing a stiff bow.
  • By this point, the Mughal empire had been firmly consolidated under centralised control, and the Rajputs had become established allies and partners within it — raising the question of whether a more flexible Mughal stance on personal submission might have spared considerable bloodshed. Yet Akbar continued to insist on personal submission in comparable cases, such as Kashmir and Sindh (then ruled by the Timurid Mirza Jani Beg), sending armies whenever rulers refused.
• Rana Pratap was succeeded by his son, Amar Singh, against whom Akbar launched a series of expeditions between 1598 and 1605.
  • Prince Salim was deputed against the Rana in 1599, achieving little, and again in 1603, though reportedly with little enthusiasm for the campaign.

Mewar Under Jahangir

• After his accession, Jahangir pursued the Mewar campaign with greater energy.
  • Successive expeditions under Prince Parvez, Mahabat Khan, and Abdullah Khan failed to make headway against the Rana.
  • In 1613, Jahangir himself arrived at Ajmer to direct the campaign, placing a large army under Prince Khurram to invade the hill tracts of Mewar.
• Sustained Mughal pressure, heavy Rajput casualties, depopulation, and the ruin of agriculture eventually forced the Mewar sardars to seek peace, opening negotiations through Prince Khurram; the Rana reluctantly agreed to a settlement.
  • Jahangir’s mild, statesmanlike approach eased the negotiations — he authorised Khurram to treat with the Rana and sent him a most gracious farman.
  • The Rana himself waited upon Khurram, while deputing his son Karan Singh to attend upon Jahangir at Ajmer; to protect the Rana’s prestige, Jahangir — unlike Akbar — did not insist on his personal submission.
  • Karan Singh received a cordial welcome, lavish gifts, and a mansab of 5,000 zat/5,000 sawar along with a jagir.
  • Sagar, son of Rana Udai Singh, who had earlier sided with Akbar during Rana Pratap’s rule and been installed by Jahangir as Rana at Chittor, was set aside, and all Mewar’s parganas — including Chittor — were restored to the Rana; the previously independent status granted to Dungarpur, Banswara, and similar principalities under Akbar was also withdrawn, placing them once more under Mewar’s overlordship.
• Jahangir established two lasting traditions in Mughal-Mewar relations:
  • The Rana of Mewar would be exempted from personal attendance at the Mughal court, though a son or brother would be required to serve the emperor in his place — as seen when Prince Bhim, Amar Singh’s younger son, served under Khurram in the Deccan.
  • Jahangir also did not insist on matrimonial ties between the Rana and the Mughal emperor. Both traditions were upheld for the remainder of Mughal rule.
• The only condition Jahangir imposed was that the walls of the Chittor fort would never be repaired — reflecting Mughal reluctance to see so powerful a bastion restored to a state capable of defying Imperial authority again, and perhaps a wish to preserve its ruined ramparts as a symbol of Mughal victory over Mewar’s long claim to independence.
• Jahangir also continued Akbar’s practice of establishing personal ties with Rajput rajas through matrimonial alliances, though all such marriages were contracted while Mewar still held out against the Mughals; once Mewar submitted and the wider Mughal-Rajput alliance achieved stability, matrimonial ties between the Mughals and the leading Rajput states became increasingly rare.