“How is terrorism a new form of asymmetrical warfare? What are some of the challenges in trying to win the war on terrorism?” (2019)
Asymmetrical warfare is conflict between actors with very unequal power, in which the weaker side avoids direct battle and attacks the stronger side’s weak points. Andrew Mack (“Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars”, 1975) showed that the weak can win because they have more at stake and are more willing to bear costs. Terrorism takes this logic further.
Why terrorism is a new form of asymmetric war
- Non-state networks against states. Terrorist groups are dispersed and have no fixed territory, so conventional military superiority has little to strike. Mary Kaldor (New and Old Wars, 1999) described such “new wars” fought by networks, organised around identity and financed through global flows.
- Civilians and symbols as targets. The aim is psychological rather than territorial: to spread fear and provoke the state into overreacting. The Pahalgam killings of April 2025, a low-technology attack on tourists, set off a military crisis between two nuclear-armed states.
- Cost imbalance. Cheap weapons, vehicles, drones and online propaganda force states into very expensive security spending.
- Global and deterritorialised. Ulrich Beck placed terrorism within world risk society, where threats cross borders and spread insecurity everywhere.
- Sacred motives. Mark Juergensmeyer (Terror in the Mind of God, 2000) showed that religious militants imagine a “cosmic war“, which makes ordinary bargaining and deterrence ineffective.
- Changing pattern. The Global Terrorism Index 2026 recorded 5,582 deaths in 2025, the lowest since 2007. Yet over 93% of fatal attacks in the West over five years were by lone actors. India ranked 13th.
Challenges in winning the “war”
- No agreed definition. “One person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.” India proposed the UN Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism in 1996, and it remains stalled.
- No clear enemy and no end point. Networks regenerate after leaders are killed. The Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in 2021 after twenty years of war.
- State sponsorship and safe havens. Cross-border sanctuaries protect groups from pursuit.
- Finance and technology. Hawala, cryptocurrency, encrypted apps and online radicalisation are hard to police.
- Liberty versus security. Tough laws risk rights violations. UAPA cases rose to 1,005 in 2022 (MHA), while long trials delay justice and damage legitimacy.
- Blowback. Heavy-handed operations and Islamophobia can confirm militant narratives and help recruitment.
- Root causes. Relative deprivation, identity grievances and alienation, as in Robert K. Merton’s “rebellion”, need political and social answers.
Conclusion
The military metaphor of a “war” misleads. Terrorism is a contest over legitimacy and meaning, so it is won less on battlefields than by denying militants their narrative: through the rule of law, inclusion and international cooperation.