Mughal Empire, First Phase: Humayun

Mughal Empire, First Phase: Humayun

History Optional Notes {PDF}

Complete Notes Package (Paper I & II) | 4500+ Pages | Instant Download

Discounted Price | Buy Now @ ₹1,180 →

The first phase of the Mughal Empire under Humayun (r. 1530–1540, 1555–1556) is one of the most eventful and debated episodes in medieval Indian history. Succeeding Babur at the young age of 23 in December 1530, Humayun inherited an empire that was militarily new, administratively unsettled, and surrounded by ambitious rivals — the Afghans, the Timurid princes, his own brothers, and Bahadur Shah of Gujarat. His reign is remembered both for his early triumphs in Malwa, Chittor, and Gujarat, and for his eventual defeat at the hands of Sher Khan (Sher Shah Suri), which forced him into fifteen years of exile before the Mughal Empire was finally restored in 1555. This article traces the problems Humayun faced at accession, the historiographical debate over his character and chronology, his campaigns against Bahadur Shah and the Afghans of the east, his defeats at Chausa and Kannauj, his years of exile in Persia, and the eventual restoration of Mughal rule — a sequence essential for understanding the consolidation of the Mughal Empire in India.

Problems for Humayun

Humayun, who succeeded Babur at the young age of 23, had to grapple with several serious problems — some inherited from Babur, and others that arose following his death in December 1530.

• Unsettled administration: A major problem was the unsettled state of the administration and the ambitions of the begs, who wanted to assert themselves independently.
• Afghan ambitions: The Afghans had been militarily weakened but continued to nurse the ambition of setting up independent Afghan kingdoms that could help expel the Mughals from India.
• Restless princes: Humayun’s younger brothers, along with several Timurid princes who had found shelter under Babur, were looking for an opportunity to strike out on their own.
• Bahadur Shah of Gujarat: Bahadur Shah, the ruler of Gujarat, had already brought Malwa under his control and wanted to dominate Rajasthan, posing a direct challenge to the nascent Mughal empire.

Babur’s Administrative Legacy and Financial Strain

• Babur had little inclination — and no time — to design a new system of administration in India. In both Afghanistan and India, he tried to continue the established system, leaving day-to-day administration largely in the hands of his begs, who were granted large tracts in assignment (wajh).
  • Within these tracts, administration, land revenue collection, and the maintenance of troops for state service were left largely to the begs, although certain tracts or shares of revenue were reserved for the crown.
• Having exhausted the treasures accumulated by the Lodis, Babur faced financial difficulties towards the end of his reign, and ordered that everyone pay thirty per cent of the income of their wajh into the imperial treasury.
  • This suggests that at the time of his accession, Humayun’s finances were already stretched.

The Khalifa Conspiracy

• The begs’ desire to reassert themselves is hinted at by a strange intrigue said to have taken place towards the end of Babur’s reign.
  • Two leading historians of Akbar’s reign, Abul Fazl and Nizamuddin, assert that Babur’s wakil, Khalifa Nizamuddin — a great favourite of Babur — wanted to set aside Humayun and his brothers and place Mehdi Khwaja on the throne. Mehdi Khwaja belonged to a distinguished family and was married to Babur’s elder sister, Khanazadah Begum.
  • The scheme could hardly have succeeded, since Mehdi Khwaja was not a Timurid, and the begs were unlikely to accept a non-Timurid ruler.
  • Some accounts suggest it was Babur himself who proposed this, being dissatisfied with Humayun for his failure in the last Samarqand campaign and for leaving Badakhshan for Agra without notice. However, even if Babur was displeased with Humayun, he would hardly have agreed to supersede all his other sons as well.
  • Soon after his return, Humayun was reconciled with Babur, who posted him to Sambhal and then nominated him as his successor.
  • Notably, Khalifa Nizamuddin remained high in favour with Humayun even after his accession.

The Problem of Partition Among Timurid Princes

• A more serious issue was the desire of some of Babur’s brothers and Timurid princes to revive, in India, the Central Asian Timurid tradition of partitioning the empire.
  • Babur himself had faced this problem earlier: after his conquest of Samarqand, his begs had assigned Farghana to his half-brother Jahangir Mirza, so that when Babur later lost Samarqand, he was left without a kingdom.
• At Babur’s death, Humayun’s younger brother Kamran was in charge of Kabul and Qandahar, while Badakhshan was under Sulaiman Mirza. It was natural for Kamran to retain these areas when Humayun succeeded at Agra.
  • However, not satisfied with Kabul and Qandahar, Kamran advanced on Lahore, occupied the fort, and established control over Punjab up to the river Sutlej.
• Kamran then sought Humayun’s confirmation of the territories he had seized. Given the simultaneous threats from the Afghans of eastern U.P. and Bahadur Shah of Gujarat, Humayun graciously confirmed Kamran’s possession of Punjab and additionally granted him Hissar-Firuza in jagir.
  • In return, Kamran observed outward forms of loyalty, allowing the khutba and sikka to remain in Humayun’s name.
  • Abul Fazl ascribes Humayun’s leniency to his benevolent spirit and his desire to follow Babur’s advice to be kind to his brothers — Babur had once written to Humayun, “As thou knowest, the rule has always been that when thou hadst six parts, Kamran had five.” This was not a call for partition, but guidance on the allotment of jagirs; in the same letter, Babur advised Humayun to summon his brothers and begs twice daily, implying that no special favours were meant for the brothers beyond the loyalty expected of any beg.
  • It has been argued that by leaving the recruiting grounds of Afghanistan and Punjab in Kamran’s hands, Humayun cut himself off from hardy, loyal soldiers. However, in that era, no state restricted the movement of soldiers or people, and Humayun did not face any shortage of trained soldiers until his defeat at Chausa in 1539. Kamran’s control over Afghanistan and Punjab in fact spared Humayun the burden of defending Qandahar and Badakhshan, which Kamran successfully protected on two occasions when threatened by the Iranian Shah.
• Nevertheless, Kamran’s action amounted to a de facto partition of the empire, and Humayun’s response has been interpreted as weakness rather than generosity — a sign of his lack of boldness and self-confidence.
  • This encouraged the expectation that Humayun’s other brothers, Askari and Hindal (allotted Sambhal and Mewat in jagir), could also stake claims to sovereignty.
  • It further emboldened other Timurids who had joined Babur after being expelled by the Uzbeks to defy Humayun and press their own claims to dominion — most notably Muhammad Zaman Mirza and his cousin Muhammad Sultan Mirza, grandsons of Sultan Husain Baiqara, who had served Babur in important military commands, including the governorship of Bihar, and had each married one of Babur’s daughters.
  • Since the Mughals had not yet struck roots in Indian soil, adventurous elements of all types could easily rally in opposition to them.

Alongside these internal difficulties, Humayun’s most serious external problems were the Afghans of eastern U.P. and Bihar, and Bahadur Shah of Gujarat. Tackling these two effectively would have placed him in a strong position to handle the internal challenges as well.

Interpreting Humayun’s Reign

Historians differ sharply on how Humayun tackled these difficulties. Part of the problem stems from the absence of a reliable chronology of events and Humayun’s own movements, leading to long apparent periods of inactivity.

The “Opium Addict” Debate

• Some historians have portrayed Humayun as an opium addict who remained in a drug-induced stupor for long stretches. This view draws support from Mirza Haider Dughlat, a noble from Mughalistan appointed governor of Lahore by Kamran, who states in his work Tarikh-i-Rashidi that Humayun had contracted bad habits — including eating opium — under the influence of evil companions, and that this caused his downfall.
• This assessment is questionable: opium eating and wine drinking were widespread across Central Asia at the time, and Babur himself records that he and many of his begs indulged in both without it hampering sustained campaigning.
  • However, unlike Babur, Humayun had not been schooled in adversity, and was prone to spells of merry-making between campaigns.

The Chronology Problem

• A critical study of events shows that Humayun’s so-called periods of inactivity were shorter than often assumed. Much depends on whether one follows the chronology of Abul Fazl or that of his contemporary Nizamuddin Ahmad (later copied by Ferishta).
  • Nizamuddin Ahmad, whose father held important positions at court since Babur’s time, completed his work Tabaqat-i-Akbari after Abul Fazl’s Akbar Nama, and even drew upon it. His account should therefore have been more reliable, but is in fact briefer and deficient in chronology.
  • In his 32nd regnal year, Akbar ordered everyone who had lived through the times of Babur and Humayun to record their memoirs. These were carefully utilised by Abul Fazl but were perhaps unavailable to Nizamuddin Ahmad.
  • For this reason, the chronology adopted by Abul Fazl is generally preferred.

Early Activities of Humayun and the Tussle with Bahadur Shah

Siege of Kalinjar

• Six months after his accession, Humayun besieged the powerful fort of Kalinjar in Bundelkhand. Along with Bayana, Gwaliyar, and Dholpur, this fort formed the chain protecting Agra from the south, and had been contested by earlier Delhi rulers on several occasions.
  • The Chandela ruler, though known for his bravery, surrendered Kalinjar to Humayun after a siege, and was allowed to retain the fort in return for accepting Humayun’s suzerainty — enhancing Humayun’s reputation.
  • The conquest may also have been intended to counter the growing influence of Bahadur Shah of Gujarat, who had captured Mandu around this time.

Siege of Chunar

• Humayun’s main challenge at this stage came from the Afghans of eastern U.P. and Bihar. He learnt that Sher Khan — an Afghan sardar once in Babur’s service who had since defected — had gained control of the powerful fort of Chunar, considered the gateway to Bihar and earlier held by the Lodis.
  • To reassert his claim to the Lodi legacy, Humayun marched from Kalinjar to Chunar and invested it, but Sher Khan had already slipped away, leaving the fort under his son Jalal Khan (later Islam Khan).
  • Negotiations followed: Sher Khan offered to serve the emperor with a contingent of 500 troops under his son Qutb Khan, pay peshkash in gold, and pledge loyalty. Humayun accepted, largely because he did not then contemplate an attack on Bihar and did not see Sher Khan as a threat — a judgment that events would later prove wrong.
  • A further advantage of this agreement was that Sher Khan did not side with Biban and Bayazid, who were regaining ground in eastern U.P.
• Humayun’s willingness to compromise — both when Kamran seized Lahore and when he came to terms with Sher Khan at Chunar — created an impression of a lack of grit and determination, which encouraged Bahadur Shah in his own ambitions.

Activities at Agra

• After Chunar, Humayun spent nearly a year at Agra, watching the situation and attempting to organise government and court society on a somewhat fanciful model.
  • He divided court society into administrative, ecclesiastical, and cultural sections, awarding arrows of different quality and number to form grades, and distributing rewards and titles to bind nobles more closely to the new regime.
  • He also found time to plan buildings and approve new inventions, notably instituting the drum of justice (tabl-i-adl) so that grievances could be brought directly to the king — an early step toward earning public support for the new Mughal state.
  • He tried to relieve the burden on village folk, cultivators, artisans, and merchants, and encouraged foreign traders by remitting the tamgha and certain other cesses — in the words of Abul Fazl, he thereby “unfurled the banner of protection for the people,” though the effects of such measures would take time to be felt.

Battle of Dadrah

• Meanwhile, under Biban and Bayazid, the Afghans had re-established themselves in Jaunpur, expelling the Mughal governor Junaid Barlas.
  • Humayun crossed the Ganges with a large army and met the Afghans at Dadrah (or Daurah) on the river Gomti in 1532, inflicting a crushing defeat; Shaikh Bayazid was killed, breaking the back of Afghan resistance.
  • The Afghan king Sultan Mahmud retreated to Bhatta (Rewa). Sher Khan did not join the Afghans of eastern U.P. — an act later branded as “betrayal” — while several defeated Afghan sardars fled to seek refuge at the court of Bahadur Shah.

Bahadur Shah of Gujarat

• Having spent his first two years consolidating his position, Humayun was now free to turn his attention to Malwa, eastern Rajasthan, and Gujarat, where Bahadur Shah was emerging as a serious challenge.
• Bahadur Shah, son of Muzaffar Shah II of Gujarat and roughly Humayun’s contemporary, had ascended the throne of Gujarat in 1526 after a period of wandering during which he had approached both Ibrahim Lodi and Babur.
  • After the Battle of Panipat, some Afghans had even approached him to become king of Jaunpur. Following his father’s death at Ahmadabad and the assassination of his successor Sikandar by the wazir Imadul Mulk, a group of nobles invited Bahadur Shah to the throne amid the ensuing confusion.
  • Bahadur Shah proved a ruthless but capable and ambitious ruler, killing all six of his surviving brothers except one who took shelter with the ruler of Malwa — providing him a pretext to attack and conquer Malwa. He had earlier also forced the Nizam Shahi ruler of Ahmadnagar to accept his suzerainty and read the khutba in his name.

Why Was Conflict Between Bahadur Shah and Humayun Inevitable?

• Having witnessed Babur’s decisive victories at Panipat and Khanua, Bahadur Shah initially believed a conflict with the Mughals should be avoided. His views changed with his own successes and under the influence of Afghan sardars and Timurid princes at his court, who argued that the Mughals had grown soft and were no longer the formidable force they had once been.
  • Bahadur Shah had also taken into service two Ottoman master gunners, Rumi Khan (Amir Mustafa) and Khwaja Safar, with whose help he built a powerful park of artillery and adopted the Ottoman defensive method of stringing carts together, behind which cannon and matchlocks could be fired.
  • Convinced by these advantages, Bahadur Shah considered Humayun inexperienced and ineffective, later writing to him that Humayun had no achievements comparable to his own, having faced only a few Afghan sardars.
• Even without Bahadur Shah’s personal conviction, a clash between the Mughals and a power based in western India was rooted in the logic of the political situation: any power consolidated in the Indo-Gangetic plains was bound to seek control over the fertile tracts of Malwa and the flourishing ports and treasures of Gujarat, with Rajasthan forming the essential link between them — a contest for Malwa and eastern Rajasthan had, in fact, begun as early as the Lodi period.

Precursors to the Conflict

• Humayun himself was not initially keen on conflict; it was Bahadur Shah who effectively provoked him.
  • The first provocative act was Bahadur Shah’s siege of Chittor in 1532, undertaken to “punish” the Rana, who had annoyed him by aiding Salhadi, a powerful sardar of eastern Malwa.
  • Aware that Bahadur Shah’s control of eastern Rajasthan would threaten the Mughal position at Agra and Delhi, Humayun moved to Gwaliyar (February 1533) as a warning. A mid-seventeenth-century Rajasthani account claims Rani Karnavati, the Rana’s mother, sent Humayun a rakhi seeking his help — though this finds no support in contemporary sources.
  • Humayun’s presence at Gwaliyar made Bahadur Shah nervous, prompting a hasty treaty with the Rana, who ceded portions of Malwa earlier granted to him and paid a heavy indemnity, including the jewelled crown and belt captured from the Khalji ruler by Rana Sanga.
• Though this treaty strengthened Bahadur Shah, Humayun was satisfied that Chittor had not fallen, and returned to Delhi, spending a year constructing a new capital, Din Panah, on the banks of the Jamuna.
  • Given that Agra was essentially the capital of a fallen Afghan dynasty while Delhi had been the seat of imperial power for centuries, Humayun’s decision to build his capital there was not, as often claimed, a “fevered” or defensive whim — Bahadur Shah in fact congratulated him a year later on Din Panah’s completion, and Humayun’s return embassy merely requested that no refugees from Delhi (a reference to Alam Khan, brother of Sikandar Lodi) be sheltered by Gujarat.
• From this exchange, it appears Humayun was prepared to recognise Bahadur Shah’s conquests in Malwa provided hostile elements were expelled — a willingness for compromise that Bahadur Shah interpreted as weakness. He now took several steps that made conflict inevitable:
  • Towards the end of 1534, he marched on Chittor a second time.
  • He honoured and granted important jagirs to Muhammad Zaman Mirza, the Timurid prince who had long intrigued against Humayun. When Humayun, fearing rebellion, defeated and imprisoned him at Bayana (he escaped before he could be blinded, in collusion with his jailor), Bahadur Shah welcomed him at Chittor as a weapon to divide and confuse the Mughals.
  • Bahadur Shah also tried to prop up Sher Khan against the Mughals by sending him large sums of money.
• Finally, at the urging of some hot-headed advisers, Bahadur Shah launched a three-pronged attack on the Mughals, led by Tatar Khan, son of Alam Khan, who received twenty crores to recruit a mercenary army to attack Agra, while two other forces moved against Kalinjar and Delhi/Punjab.
  • Tatar Khan captured Bayana, but on the advance of a Mughal force under Mirza Askari and Hindal, his forces melted away and he was killed in battle. The other two prongs proved equally ineffective. Since Tatar Khan had been asked to await Bahadur Shah’s arrival rather than engage independently, it was difficult for Bahadur Shah to disown these hostile acts.

Humayun now resolved to campaign against Bahadur Shah and conquer Gujarat.

The Gujarat Campaign

• After due military preparation, Humayun marched out of Agra in early 1535. Instead of marching directly on Chittor, which Bahadur Shah was besieging, he advanced via Raisen and Sarangpur to Ujjain, bringing eastern Malwa under control and placing himself strategically to intercept Bahadur Shah should he retreat to Mandu or Ahmadabad.

Defeat of Bahadur Shah at Chittor and Mandsor

• Humayun’s movement unsettled Bahadur Shah’s camp, though his master-gunner Rumi Khan remained confident of forcing Chittor’s surrender through superior artillery. Some of Bahadur Shah’s advisers argued that attacking a Muslim king engaged in jihad against a “kafir” (the Rana) would be improper — though if Humayun attacked first, Bahadur Shah would be justified in retaliating.
  • Some contemporary Mughal historians, missing the strategic logic of Humayun’s position at Ujjain, wrongly attributed his halt there to reluctance to interrupt Bahadur Shah’s jihad.
  • The stout resistance of the now-unified Rajputs delayed Rumi Khan’s operations well beyond expectation. Chittor fell in March 1534, after which Bahadur Shah advanced and met Humayun at Mandsor, 80 miles north of Ujjain.
• Against the advice of nobles urging an immediate attack while his troops were flushed with success, Rumi Khan — proud of his artillery — persuaded Bahadur Shah to adopt the Ottoman defensive device of carts and ditches, with a lake protecting one flank, a formation remarkably similar to Babur’s defence at Panipat.
  • Rumi Khan, however, forgot that Humayun was not an Afghan military leader like Ibrahim Lodi, and would not oblige him with a frontal assault. After an initial attack in which his forces suffered, Humayun instead cut off all food supplies to Bahadur Shah’s camp, enforced so strictly that within two weeks the defenders faced severe shortages — turning Rumi Khan’s defensive strategy against itself.
  • In distress, Bahadur Shah spiked his most powerful guns and fled secretly to Mandu by a circuitous route; his rich camp and most of his dispersed soldiers fell into Humayun’s hands (April 1535).

Sacking of Mandu

• A body of 30,000 lightly equipped troops of Bahadur Shah entered Mandu by a direct route, hotly pursued by Humayun.
  • Humayun took several of Bahadur Shah’s prominent nobles into his service, notably Khudawand Khan, who became a principal adviser in the Gujarat campaign; Rumi Khan too joined Humayun, though the charge that Bahadur Shah’s failure was due to Rumi Khan’s “treachery” appears to be a convenient excuse for defeat rather than fact.
  • On reaching Mandu, Bahadur Shah opened negotiations, offering to surrender Malwa if allowed to retain Gujarat and Chittor. The proposals were tentatively accepted but no formal agreement was concluded; the garrison then relaxed its vigilance, allowing Mughal troops to scale the walls and open the gates. Bahadur Shah escaped with a few attendants, and Humayun permitted his troops to sack Mandu for three days before marching on Champanir, where Bahadur Shah had taken refuge.

Bahadur Shah Expelled from Gujarat

• Champanir, a strong fort surrounded by jungle, was one place Bahadur Shah could have resisted for long, but he had lost heart for the fight.
  • He sent his family and part of the fort’s treasures to Diu, leaving the fort under trusted commanders, while Humayun pursued him up to Cambay. Bahadur Shah then withdrew to Diu, dominated by the Portuguese navy, completing his expulsion from Gujarat.

Conquest of Champaner and North Gujarat

• From Cambay, Humayun returned to Champanir and began a strict siege; the fort fell in August 1535, yielding immense riches. As before, Humayun treated the defending Gujarati nobles well, and several joined Mughal service — completing the conquest of southern Gujarat.
• North Gujarat, including Ahmadabad and Patan, remained under Bahadur Shah’s men. After resting at Champaner through the monsoon, Humayun turned to its conquest.
  • Meanwhile, the Mughals had not even collected land revenue, allowing Bahadur Shah’s agent Imad-ul-Mulk to gather funds and raise a force amid prevailing anti-Mughal sentiment. This force clashed with Humayun’s army at Mahmudabad, near Ahmadabad; the Mughals triumphed in a fiercely contested battle, and Ahmadabad was occupied in October 1535.
• Thus, within ten months of leaving Agra, Humayun had overrun both Malwa and Gujarat, displaying great drive, determination, and personal courage — an achievement for which he deserves full credit.

Arrangements in Gujarat

• Humayun’s nobles were divided on what to do with the conquered territory: many, having shifted from Afghanistan to the Agra-Delhi region under Babur, were unwilling to be uprooted again, and with Bahadur Shah’s treasures already distributed, felt the campaign’s objectives had been met.
  • Hindu Beg and other nobles suggested returning the kingdom to Bahadur Shah — now militarily incapable — after paying the soldiers advance salary and retaining some treasure. According to Jauhar, Humayun’s ewer-bearer, this angered Humayun, who, echoing Babur after Panipat, insisted that “the empire which has been conquered with the strength of the sword is not to be thrown away” and that it must be properly organised under direct administration from Delhi.
  • Humayun placed Askari in overall charge of Gujarat, assisted by Hindu Beg, dividing the rest of the province into five divisions, each under a prominent noble — modelled on Babur’s administration of the Doab, where large iqtas were held by begs responsible for law, order, and revenue collection, part of which was remitted to the imperial treasury. This may explain why Humayun reserved no territory as khalisa in Gujarat.
  • Humayun then moved slowly to Mandu, fixing it as his headquarters for its salubrious climate and central location — even summoning the inmates of his haram, signalling plans for a long stay.

Collapse of the Arrangement

• Within months, the administrative arrangement collapsed. Askari proved unequal to the task and failed to coordinate with the divisional nobles; more fundamentally, the nobles were unwilling to remain in what they saw as a foreign land.
  • Simultaneously, a spirit of regional independence reasserted itself in Gujarat, alongside a revival of Bahadur Shah’s power.
  • In desperation, Hindu Beg suggested Askari declare independence to rally local support — a suggestion Askari, to his credit, rejected, though rumours of such intent persisted (he had reportedly declared, while drunk, that he was king), further demoralising the Mughal nobility. Only vigorous intervention from Humayun could have saved the situation, but he showed no initiative, whether from over-confidence or fatigue.
• Meanwhile, Bahadur Shah, operating from Surat, recovered Cambay and Broach and advanced on Ahmadabad. Despite his small force, divided counsel and lack of nerve led Askari to retreat to Champaner.
  • The commandant of Champaner, Tardi Beg, fearing Askari intended independence, refused him entry or assistance without direct orders from Humayun, forcing Askari to withdraw toward Agra — most Mughals followed him, abandoning Gujarat.
  • Fearing Askari might declare independence at Agra, Humayun hastened after him; the two were reconciled at Chittor. Malwa too was lost by February 1537.

Evaluation of the Gujarat Campaign

• Despite this setback to his prestige, the campaign was not a total waste: it showcased Humayun as a vigorous leader and destroyed the immediate threat from Bahadur Shah, who was soon after killed in a clash with the Portuguese, and it freed Humayun to focus on Sher Khan in Bihar.
  • In hindsight, once Humayun had rejected compromise and opted for direct Mughal administration, it would have been wiser to remain at Ahmadabad long enough to settle the administration and win over local elements — neither Malwa nor the eastern situation was so pressing as to demand his immediate return, as shown by the fact that after returning from Mandu, he stayed nearly a year at Agra before marching east against Sher Khan.
  • Humayun failed to grasp the tactical ground realities in Gujarat and misjudged the motivations of his nobles — being both overconfident of Askari’s capacity initially, and excessively suspicious of him later.
  • It should be noted that there was little genuine popular reaction to the Mughal conquest; the uprising of the Kolis and villagers (gawaran) at Cambay was more opportunistic plunder than resistance, though Humayun’s retaliatory sacking of Cambay was itself unwarranted.
• Thus, once again, the perennial clash between imperial unity and regional independence — an abiding feature of Indian history — came to the fore.

The Bengal Campaign and the Struggle with Sher Khan

• After his return from Gujarat, Humayun was uncertain of his next course. According to Abul Fazl, he had resolved on another Gujarat campaign, planning to entrust its administration to more reliable men and return once satisfied with the settlement.
  • However, on hearing of Sher Khan’s growing assertiveness in the east, Humayun resolved instead to capture Bengal — a project begun earlier (he had advanced up to Kalpi) but abandoned due to the threat from Bahadur Shah. As Abul Fazl records, “It was decided that Sher Khan should be put down and the territories of Bengal subdued.”
  • It appears the primary motive of the eastern campaign was the conquest of Bengal itself rather than merely punishing Sher Khan — a reading that explains much of Humayun’s subsequent, and often criticised, conduct.
• Leaving Agra in July 1537, Humayun marched leisurely to Chunar, deciding to besiege it since so powerful a fort could not be left in hostile hands. The siege took far longer than expected despite the efforts of his master-gunner Rumi Khan.
  • By the time Chunar fell (June 1538), Sher Khan had already captured Gaur, the capital of Bengal. Even then, Humayun offered Sher Khan any jagir he wished — in Chunar, Jaunpur, or elsewhere — if he submitted, abandoned Bengal, and surrendered the royal insignia captured from its ruler. This offer reveals how little Humayun grasped the scale of the Afghan challenge: Sher Khan had already resolved to expel the Mughals from India and was seeking to unify the Afghans under his banner.

The Real Bone of Contention: Bengal

• The dispute was ultimately over Bengal, not Chunar or even Bihar. Sher Khan’s ambition to conquer Bengal was rooted in the long-standing clashes between Bihar and Bengal — Nusrat Shah of Bengal had once dominated Bihar and parts of eastern U.P. before Babur intervened. After establishing dominance over Bihar, Sher Khan had to repel several Bengali invasions, and following Nusrat Shah’s death and the usurpation of the throne by Sultan Ahmad Shah, he carried the fight into Bengal itself — seeking to expand his power without provoking direct Mughal hostility.
  • Humayun’s demand for Bengal surprised Sher Khan, who replied that he had not shed blood to conquer Bengal only to surrender it, offering instead to leave Bihar to Humayun and pay an annual peshkash of ten lakh rupees from Bengal in return for confirmation of his possession.
  • The tone of these negotiations makes clear that Sher Khan no longer considered himself Humayun’s subordinate. Following his victory at Surajgarh (1534) against Nusrat Shah’s forces, he had begun to be styled “Hazrat-i-Ala” (His High Majesty), and his son Qutb Khan had already withdrawn his 500 horsemen from Humayun’s service during the Gujarat campaign — signalling that the earlier Chunar agreement had lapsed.
• Humayun initially accepted Sher Khan’s offer of Bihar but withdrew from it when the deposed king of Bengal, Mahmud Shah, appealed to him to continue the campaign, as resistance to Sher Khan persisted despite Gaur’s fall — Abul Fazl calls this “an additional reason” for the conquest, alongside reports of Bengal’s immense hoarded treasures (though these were more a reason to displace Mahmud Shah than to reinstate him; in any case, he died before Humayun entered Bengal).
  • It should be noted that Mahmud Shah had himself usurped the throne by killing Nusrat Shah’s son, and was regarded by many as a usurper — which may explain the absence of local resistance to Humayun’s advance into Bengal.
• Why was Humayun so keen to conquer an independent, long-established kingdom like Bengal? Beyond the lure of treasure, it appears he was consciously or unconsciously seeking to recreate the Delhi Sultanate at its height, which had stretched from Bengal to the north-west and the Arabian Sea. Had he succeeded, reconquering Gujarat and Malwa would likely have followed with little difficulty.
  • The clash between Humayun and Sher Khan was thus a contest between two highly ambitious men, each envisioning a north India united under a single political authority — the question being whether that authority would be Mughal or Afghan.

Conquest and Stay of Humayun in Bengal

• Sher Khan detained Humayun at Sikrigalli, the entrance to Bengal, only until he had removed the bulk of Bengal’s treasures to his new refuge, fort Rohtas. Humayun thereafter had an easy passage to Gaur, but governance proved as difficult as in Gujarat.
  • Unlike Gujarat, Humayun decided that stability required his own prolonged stay, reaching Gaur after the rainy season in September 1538 and leaving in early 1539.
  • He was not entirely inactive — receiving foreign envoys and sending Shaikh Bahlol to mediate with Hindal upon hearing of his rebellion at Agra — but much time was spent in festivities. As in Gujarat, the underlying problem persisted: the Mughal nobility, now viewing the Agra-Delhi region as home, had little interest in administering a “foreign” Bengal. Per Abul Fazl, the officers granted large jagirs indulged in pleasure and neglected administration, and Humayun — whether from an easy-going temperament or reluctance to displease — did not rein them in.

Hindal’s Rebellion and Humayun’s Departure from Bengal

• On hearing of the spread of Hindal’s rebellion at Agra, Humayun decided to leave Bengal, asking his old servant Zahid Beg to take up its governorship. Zahid Beg sarcastically replied, “Was there no better way for my assassination than to be given Bengal?” — enraging Humayun, who ordered his execution; Zahid Beg fled to Agra along with Haji Muhammad and Dindar Beg.
  • After patching together a caretaker administration, Humayun began his return march under difficult conditions, having lost many horses to Bengal’s climate. Meanwhile, Sher Khan had captured Banaras, besieged Chunar and Jaunpur, devastated Mughal territory up to Kannauj and Sambhal, and taken Mongyr, largely cutting off Humayun’s communications with Agra.
• Humayun’s prolonged absence brought internal rivalries to the surface. Hindal, sent ahead to Tirhut and Purnia to gather provisions, instead returned without permission to Agra, where dissatisfied nobles fleeing Bengal joined him. At their urging, he declared himself independent, had the khutba read in his name, and even marched on Delhi, though the fort’s commander refused him entry, forcing his retreat to Agra.
  • On hearing of the rebellion, Kamran advanced from Lahore and persuaded Hindal to abandon his claim to independence.
• Despite harassing Afghan attacks and demoralisation within his ranks, Humayun succeeded in bringing his army almost intact to Chausa, on the boundary of Bihar and modern U.P. — an achievement for which he deserves credit.

Evaluation of the Bengal Campaign

• The Bengal campaign is generally judged to have been ill-conceived. Humayun should have adhered to Babur’s settlement of the east and not advanced beyond Chunar, or at most the town of Bihar — the Mughals in India were not yet cohesive, nor their nobility disciplined enough, to govern distant regions or obey the emperor implicitly, and they had neither struck roots in the country nor shown interest in cultivating local support.
  • The wiser course would have been to allow distant regions such as Gujarat, Malwa, and Bengal to be governed by local rulers acknowledging broad Mughal suzerainty and loyalty.
  • Instead, Humayun, overconfident of Mughal superiority and underestimating his Afghan opponents even after his disorganised army reached Chausa, chose to give battle rather than fall back on Agra — making it unlikely he would have accepted the peace Sher Khan reportedly offered at this stage (Bengal and Chunar for Sher Khan, in exchange for Bihar and loyalty), since surrendering Bengal at this point would have meant accepting defeat.

Battle of Chausa

• At the Battle of Chausa (26 June 1539), Humayun adopted a faulty strategy, placing the river Karmansa at his back — making retreat difficult — and positioned his soldiers poorly, allowing Sher Khan to catch him unawares. After the defeat, Humayun retreated to Agra.
  • Kamran, who had 10,000 hardened troops at his disposal, refused to place them under Humayun’s command, having lost confidence in his military capacity; he had earlier ignored Humayun’s urgent request for reinforcements at Chausa, apparently fearing that a victorious Humayun would move to oust him from Lahore.
  • Shortly after, Kamran withdrew from Agra to Lahore on the pretext of illness, effectively dooming Humayun’s efforts to confront Sher Khan again.

Battle of Kannauj

• The Battle of Kannauj (17 May 1540) was bitterly fought, but its outcome was hardly in doubt — the Afghans scattered the panicking Mughal army. Humayun again escaped the battlefield, and from that day lived as a wanderer for the next fifteen years.
  • Sher Khan was now positioned to fulfil his ambition of expelling the Mughals from India, and to carry forward — under Afghan rather than Mughal authority — Humayun’s own half-formed project of unifying north India.

Evaluation of Humayun’s Afghan Policy

• Humayun never fully understood the nature of the Afghan challenge and grossly underestimated Sher Khan. The presence of large numbers of warlike Afghan tribesmen across north India meant they could always unite under a capable leader to pose a serious threat.
  • The fractious Mughal nobility, unwilling to serve far from their new home in the Agra-Delhi region, was, alongside this, the second key factor behind Humayun’s failures in both Gujarat and against Sher Khan.
  • The role of Humayun’s brothers, and his personal character flaws, have generally been overemphasised: Askari and Hindal served him loyally until the Bengal expedition, and Kamran offered no active opposition before Chausa — indeed, he helped quell Hindal’s rebellion. It was only after the defeat at Chausa that his brothers lost faith and drifted away or turned against him.
• Despite periods of slothfulness, Humayun proved himself a vigorous ruler and competent general until he met his match in Sher Khan, a superior tactician and general. In some respects, Humayun was ahead of his time: his vague ambition to unify north India under one authority was simply not achievable given the limitations of the Mughal ruling class and its inability to strike roots in Indian soil within so short a period.

Aftermath: Exile and the Road Back

• After retreating from Agra to Lahore, Humayun and his brothers could not agree on a strategy against Sher Khan. Kamran, reconciled to the loss of Punjab, was determined to hold on to Kabul, while Humayun decided to go to Sindh, hoping to conquer Gujarat and renew his struggle from there.
  • Humayun wandered in Sindh for two and a half years; there he fell in love with Hamida, daughter of a sheikh attached to his brother’s household, and on 15 October 1542, Hamida gave birth to the future emperor Akbar.
  • Neither the rulers of Sindh nor Maldeo, the powerful ruler of Marwar (who invited but then rebuffed him on seeing the small size of his following), were willing to support Humayun’s cause.
  • After further wanderings, Humayun took shelter at the court of the Iranian king, Shah Tahmasp, and with his help recaptured Qandahar and then Kabul.

Impact of Humayun’s Persian Exile

• Humayun returned from exile with thousands of Persian soldiers and nobles, whose influx significantly increased Persian cultural and political influence in the Mughal Empire, extending even to administration — Persian methods of governance were introduced in Kashmir during the remainder of his reign, and the system of revenue collection was improved by combining the Persian model with that of the Delhi Sultanate.
  • Persian art became highly influential, with Persian-style miniatures produced at the Mughal (and subsequently Rajput) courts.
  • The Chaghatai language, in which Babur had written his memoirs, almost entirely disappeared from courtly use — Akbar himself could not speak it — while Humayun, later in life, is said to have frequently quoted Persian verse.
• It was during this long period of wandering without a kingdom that the best of Humayun’s character emerged: even during his rule over Afghanistan, he showed no rancour towards his brothers, and was almost forced by his own nobility into blinding Kamran after his repeated rebellions.

Restoration of the Mughal Empire

• Sher Shah Suri died in 1545; his son and successor Islam Shah died in 1554, leaving the Sur dynasty reeling and disintegrating as three rival claimants marched on Delhi and several regional leaders sought independence — creating a perfect opportunity for the Mughals to return to India.
  • Humayun gathered a vast army under the able leadership of Bairam Khan and undertook the challenging task of retaking the throne of Delhi — a wise move, given Humayun’s own record of military missteps, since Bairam Khan proved himself a great tactician.
  • However, Humayun did not live long after this restoration. Descending the staircase of his library with his arms full of books, he knelt in reverence on hearing the muezzin’s call to prayer (Adhan) — as was his custom — caught his foot in his robe, fell down several steps, and struck his temple on a stone edge, dying three days later. As is often remarked, “he tumbled in life and finally tumbled out of it too.”
  • His death marked the end of one phase of Mughal history and the beginning of another, under his son Akbar.

Chronology of Key Events

• 30 December 1530 — Accession of Humayun
• March 1531 — Bahadur Shah annexes Malwa
• July 1531 — Humayun besieges Kalinjar
• August–September 1531 — Humayun’s first siege of Chunar
• October 1531–September 1532 — Humayun at Agra
• October 1532 — Battle of Dadrah
• November–December 1532 — Bahadur Shah’s first attack on Chittor
• February–March 1533 — Humayun at Gwaliyar
• March 1533 — Bahadur Shah raises the siege of Chittor
• July 1533–July 1534 — Humayun at Delhi; foundation of Din Panah
• September 1534 — Humayun leaves for Kalpi
• November 1534 — Humayun returns to Agra
• November 1534 — Bahadur Shah’s second attack on Chittor
• November 1534 — Defeat of Tatar Khan
• January 1535 — Humayun leaves Agra for Sarangpur in Malwa
• March 1535 — Fall of Chittor
• April 1535 — Defeat of Bahadur Shah at Mandsor
• June 1535 — Fall of Mandu
• August 1535 — Capture of Champanir
• October 1535 — Capture of Ahmadabad
• Mid-1536 — Humayun reaches Mandu
• November 1536 — Anti-Mughal revolt in Gujarat
• February 1537 — Humayun returns to Agra
• July 1537 — Humayun leaves for the East
• January–June 1538 — Siege of Chunar
• October 1538 — Humayun at Gaur
• January 1539 — Humayun leaves Gaur
• 26 June 1539 — Battle of Chausa
• 17 May 1540 — Battle of Kannauj

Conclusion

The first phase of the Mughal Empire under Humayun illustrates both the fragility and the resilience of early Mughal rule in India. Humayun’s early campaigns against Kalinjar, Chunar, and Bahadur Shah of Gujarat revealed genuine military talent, drive, and personal courage, yet his failure to grasp the depth of the Afghan challenge under Sher Khan, combined with a fractious nobility unwilling to administer distant provinces like Gujarat and Bengal, ultimately led to his defeats at Chausa and Kannauj and fifteen years of exile. His years in Sindh and Persia, however, were formative — bringing Persian cultural, administrative, and artistic influence into the Mughal court, and revealing the resilient, forgiving side of his character. His eventual restoration of the Mughal Empire in 1555, aided by Bairam Khan, set the stage for the consolidation achieved by his son Akbar, making Humayun’s turbulent reign a crucial, if often underrated, chapter in the making of Mughal India.