“Write short note: Bureaucracy in developing societies.” (1986)
In most new states of Asia and Africa, bureaucracy was the strongest institution inherited from colonial rule, older and better organised than parties, legislatures or local bodies. It was expected to lead planned development. Yet its character departs from Max Weber’s ideal type because of its colonial origin, its social environment and its relationship with dominant classes.
Distinctive features
- Colonial legacy. It was built for revenue collection and law and order, not welfare. It was centralised, distant from the people, and staffed by a generalist elite. India’s “steel frame”, the Indian Civil Service, continued as the IAS with its prestige and procedures intact.
- Overdeveloped state. Hamza Alavi (“The State in Post-Colonial Societies”, 1972) argued that the colonial apparatus, designed to dominate all indigenous classes, was overdeveloped relative to the weak societies it ruled. After independence in Pakistan and Bangladesh, a bureaucratic-military oligarchy gained relative autonomy and mediated among landlords, the indigenous bourgeoisie and metropolitan capital.
- Prismatic formalism. Fred W. Riggs (1964) observed that in transitional societies formally modern offices coexist with kinship, caste and patronage. The resulting gap between rule and practice he called formalism. His prismatic office, the sala, applies universal rules selectively, favouring “clects”: kin, caste and communal cliques. Around it lies a “bazaar-canteen” economy in which the price of a public service varies with who is asking.
- Bureaucratic dominance. Joseph LaPalombara (ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development, 1963) warned that a powerful bureaucracy in a weak political system can stunt the growth of parties and representative institutions.
- Class character. Pranab Bardhan (1984) included the bureaucratic-professional stratum among India’s dominant proprietary classes, holding power over licences and permits.
- State as employer. Where private jobs are scarce, a public post means security and status. Recruitment and transfers become objects of patronage and intense group competition.
- Representativeness. In plural societies legitimacy also depends on who staffs the state. J. Donald Kingsley’s idea of representative bureaucracy (1944) informs India’s reservations in public employment.
The Indian present
- A capable head, weak limbs. Lant Pritchett (“Is India a Flailing State?”, 2009) argued that India’s elite institutions design sound policy. The field agencies meant to implement it (schools, clinics, police stations) do not reliably respond, so the state “flails”.
- Thin capacity at the top. As on 1 January 2025, 5,577 IAS officers were in position against a sanctioned strength of 6,877. That left about 1,300 posts, or 19%, vacant.
Evaluation
- Judging these bureaucracies only against a Western ideal type mislabels difference as failure. The same Indian administration conducts the world’s largest elections and runs a national food distribution system.
- Critics from the left see the problem as class capture. Liberal critics stress over-regulation. Institutionalists point to weak accountability and low frontline capacity.
Conclusion
Bureaucracy in developing societies is a hybrid: Weberian in form, shaped in practice by colonial legacies, social particularism and class coalitions. It can be a developmental asset when political leadership sets clear goals and citizens can hold frontline offices to account. Without these, Alavi’s autonomous oligarchy or Pritchett’s flailing state is the likely result.