Foreign Policy of Akbar: Introduction

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The foreign policy of Akbar largely refers to the steps taken to secure India’s north-western frontiers, alongside managing relations with the other major ruling powers within the Indian subcontinent. On the frontier, Akbar had to navigate a complex triangular relationship with the Sunni Uzbegs of Central Asia, the Shia Safavids of Iran, and the Sunni Ottomans, while also containing the various Afghan tribes — such as the Afridis, Yusufzais, and Gilzais — periodically provoked against the Mughals by the Uzbegs. Within the subcontinent, Akbar pursued a parallel policy of asserting Mughal overlordship over the Deccan states, driven by strategic, commercial, and political considerations rather than religious zeal. This article examines the guiding principles behind Akbar’s north-western frontier policy, the evolving phases of Mughal relations with the Uzbegs and the Safavids, and finally, Akbar’s approach towards the Deccan states and the Rajput kingdoms.

The Three Major Powers on the North-Western Frontier

There were three major powers with which the Mughals had to deal while executing their North-West frontier policy:

The Uzbegs in Central Asia, who were Sunnis.
The Safavids of Iran, who were Shias.
The Ottomans, who were Turk Sunnis.

Apart from these three, the Mughals had to deal with several Afghan tribes — such as the Afridis, Yusufzais, and Gilzais — who were provoked by the Uzbegs against the Mughals.

Main Considerations of Mughal Foreign Policy Regarding the North-West Frontier

The Emotional Dimension

Many historians, such as Abdur Rahim and Riazul Islam, have argued that Babur, from the very beginning, harboured the idea of conquering his ancestral land.
- This influenced the vision of his successors, shaping Mughal foreign policy more broadly.

Strategic and Defensive Considerations

Maintenance of a safe frontier in the North-West.
Maintenance of the Kabul-Kandahar line as the natural frontier of the Mughal Empire.
The overarching defence of India, pursued through both diplomatic and military means.

Checks on Uzbeg Aggression

The Uzbegs and Mughals were old contestants — the Uzbegs were natural enemies of the Mughals, having been responsible for the expulsion of Babur from Samarqand.
Annoyed at the Mughal alliance with Iran, the Uzbegs used to provoke Afghan and Baluchi tribes against the Mughals.

Friendly Relations with Safavid Iran

The Mughals maintained friendly relations with the Safavids of Iran, except on the issue of Kandahar.
Both the Safavids and the Mughals aspired towards friendly relations, mainly because of the shared threat from the Uzbegs.

Commercial Considerations

Promotion of commercial and trade interests — Kabul and Kandahar served as twin gateways of trade, linking Kabul to Central Asia, and Kandahar to Iran.

Frontier Control and Diplomatic Principles

Subjugation of rebellious tribes along the North-West frontiers.
Equality of status among all powers — for instance, the Mughals did not accept the claims of superiority made by the Ottomans, as successors of the Caliph.
The Mughals refused the Uzbeg proposal for a tripartite Sunni alliance (Ottoman-Mughal-Uzbeg) against the Iranians, as this would have upset the Asian balance of power.

The Foreign Policy of Akbar with the North-West Frontier

There were three phases of Mughal-Uzbeg relations under Akbar.

Phase I: 1572–1577

With his designs on territories such as Badakhshan and Qandahar, Abdullah (the Uzbeg ruler) strove to develop friendly relations with Akbar, sending two embassies in 1572 and 1577.
The dangers threatening Akbar on his North-Western frontier included:
- The rebellious attitude of Mirza Hakim (ruler of Kabul), and his friendship with Shah Ismail II of Persia.
- The possibility of a triple alliance between Abdullah, Mirza Hakim, and Ismail II.
- Akbar’s own inability to become involved in external affairs, which necessitated a friendly attitude towards Abdullah Khan.
Hence, an embassy was sent in 1578 to Akbar; Akbar rejected the proposal for a joint attack on Persia.
- For Akbar, a strong Iran was necessary to keep the Uzbegs in check.
- It seems Abdullah’s reaction to this letter was not quite favourable, since no further embassies were sent to Akbar for about a decade.
From 1577 onwards, a shift is noticeable in the respective positions of Abdullah Khan and Akbar, which also changed their policies towards each other.
- While Abdullah had improved his position, and was now adopting a bolder and more demanding attitude towards Akbar, Akbar himself had become more conciliatory.
The great Uzbeg king Abdullah Khan conquered Balkh in 1570, then Khurasan, then Badakhshan — now quite near the Mughal Empire, posing a threat to Kabul. He also encouraged Afghan and Baluchi tribes against the Mughals.
Akbar’s difficulties had increased further — there were troubles in Kashmir and Gujarat, as well as tribal commotions in Kabul, Sawad, and Bajaur.
- The frontier for Akbar became even more insecure after the death of Mirza Hakim (1585).
- The Persian Empire had also become weak, now under the incompetent and half-blind ruler Khudabanda (1577–1588).
Akbar had no desire to get embroiled with the Uzbegs, unless Kabul was threatened — this was the key to Akbar’s foreign policy.

Phase II: 1583–1589

Abdullah sent another embassy to Akbar in 1586. Akbar responded by sending Hakim Humeim in 1586 as his envoy.
- The purpose of this embassy from Abdullah was to prevent Akbar from sending any assistance to the Persian ruler, in case of an attack on Persia.

Phase III: 1589–1598

The dispatch of Ahmad Ali Ataliq from Abdullah’s court marks the beginning of the third phase in Uzbeg-Mughal relations.
- Through the letter sent with this envoy, Abdullah sought friendship, and counselled “exerting ourselves to strengthen the foundations of concord and make this Hindukush the boundary between us.”
Nevertheless, the formal acceptance of this offer of peace was confirmed by Akbar only in 1596, after the conquest of Qandahar.
Akbar stayed in Lahore from 1586 to 1598 (Abdullah Uzbeg died in 1598), to tackle the Uzbeg danger, and suppress revolting tribes, apart from thwarting Uzbeg aggressive moves.
- Akbar’s designs upon Qandahar were finally successful, and he was also successful in persuading the Mirzas to come to India.
After the conquest of Qandahar, Akbar felt the need to revive his contacts with Abdullah Khan.
- The Uzbegs asked Akbar for a tripartite alliance of Sunni powers (Mughal, Uzbeg, and Ottoman), to which Akbar replied that “Difference in law and religion is not a sufficient ground for conquest.”
The fear of the Uzbegs continued, particularly since Abdullah Khan had opened correspondence with the new Ottoman ruler, Mohammad, and had even proposed a joint attack on Persia.
After the occupation of Qandahar, Akbar realised the urgency of sending an embassy to Abdullah, through Khwaja Ashraf Naqshbandi, and showed his willingness to accept the Hindukush as the boundary between the two kingdoms.

Mughal-Persia Relations Under Akbar

The seizure of Qandahar by Shah Tahmasp had strained Persian relations.
- It was because of this that Tahmasp’s embassy in 1562, under Said Beg Safavi to Akbar — sent to condole Humayun’s death and congratulate him on his accession — remained unanswered.
With the accession of Khudabanda in November 1577, Persia was plunged into turmoil.
- In 1583, Prince Abbas sent Murshid Tabrizi to Akbar, to ensure the consolidation of his position in his province of Khurasan.
- Akbar was unhappy with the Persians over the loss of Qandahar — he ignored, in the words of Abul Fazl, “the petition of a rebel son against his father.”
In 1591, Shah Abbas again sent an embassy, under Yadgar Rumlu, as he faced a major threat from the Uzbegs.
- In November 1594, another envoy, Ziauddin, arrived — nevertheless, the silence, suggestive of a cold and stiff relationship, continued till March 1594–1595, when the Mughal forces finally entered Qandahar, and conquered Zamindawar and Qarmsir.
- Akbar acquired Kabul in 1585, and Kandahar in 1595.
In 1596, Akbar sent his first embassy to Shah Abbas, through Khwaja Ashraf Naqshbandi.
- In the letter, he justified his conquest of Qandahar, citing the suspected loyalty of the Mirzas towards the Shah, and explained away his complete silence, owing to his inability to offer timely help to the Shah, because of the Uzbeg embassies.
Overall, Qandahar remained the most important point of contention between the Mughals and the Persian kings.

Overall Frontier Consolidation

Akbar conquered Sindh in 1591, Kashmir in 1585, and Baluchistan in 1595, in order to consolidate power in the North-West.
He maintained Kabul-Kashmir-Kandahar as a natural line of defence.
He promoted commercial interests.
He maintained cordial relations with the Safavids, despite the Kandahar issue — claimed by both the Mughals and the Safavids — owing to strategic and commercial interests.

Akbar’s Policy Towards the Deccan States

Akbar wanted the Deccan rulers to accept his overlordship.
It was during the campaigns in Gujarat during 1572–73 that Akbar, after being fully secured in the North, made up his mind for the conquest of the Deccan states — because rebels driven out of Gujarat used to take refuge in Khandesh, Ahmadnagar, and Bijapur.
Moreover, with the conquest of Gujarat, Akbar wished to assume the rights which previous rulers of Gujarat had enjoyed in relation to the Deccan states — that is, the rights of overlordship.
Internal conflict among the Deccan states also motivated the Mughal ruler to intervene in their affairs.
Akbar’s desire to protect the trade route towards the Gujarat sea-ports, and to establish his domination there, was one of the important factors guiding his Deccan policy.
- Besides, Akbar wanted to assert Mughal suzerainty over the Deccan states, in order to drive the Portuguese away from the western coast of India.

Early Contact and Diplomatic Missions

The first contact between Akbar and the Deccan states was established after 1561, when Akbar, following the conquest of Malwa, ordered its governor, Pir Muhammad, to subdue Asirgarh and Burhanpur, where the former ruler of Malwa, Baz Bahadur, had taken refuge.
In 1591, Akbar sent four diplomatic missions to the four rulers of the Deccan, in order to find out the real state of affairs there, and to see whether they were willing to acknowledge his suzerainty.
- Only Raja Ali Khan (the Sultan of Khandesh) reaffirmed the acknowledgement of Akbar’s supremacy.

The Siege of Ahmadnagar

The Mughals besieged the Ahmadnagar fort in 1595.
- As Bijapur had sent reinforcements to Ahmadnagar, and the Mughal forces had become worried about the siege, they opened negotiations with the besieged.
- A treaty was signed between the Mughals and Chand Bibi. The treaty, however, failed to bring peace, and the Mughal attack against Ahmadnagar continued.
- In 1600, Chand Bibi ultimately decided to surrender the fort.
Overall, Khandesh was annexed and became a Mughal province; parts of Ahmadnagar were also annexed.

Aftermath and Shift to Diplomacy

The fall of Ahmadnagar and Asirgarh frightened the other Deccani rulers.
- The rulers of Bijapur, Golconda, and Bidar sent envoys to Akbar, who were graciously received by him. Akbar also sent his own envoys to them.
Later, the challenge posed by Malik Ambar and Raju Deccani, mutual bickerings and rivalries among the Mughal generals, as well as the prevailing situation in the North, persuaded Akbar to adopt diplomatic manoeuvres rather than military might, to consolidate Mughal authority in the Deccan.

Relations with the Rajputs

Apart from the conflict with the Rana of Mewar, Akbar’s relationship with the other ruling Rajput houses was cordial in nature.
His suzerainty was recognised by almost all the Rajput kingdoms.

Conclusion

To conclude, Akbar’s foreign policy was mostly guided by considerations of securing boundaries, and by strategic and commercial perspectives — religious and sectarian factors hardly played any role in shaping it. This is evident throughout: from his refusal to join a Sunni tripartite alliance against Shia Persia on grounds that “difference in law and religion is not a sufficient ground for conquest,” to his consistent prioritisation of a strong Iran as a check on Uzbeg power, even at the cost of straining ties with a fellow Sunni state. Whether managing the delicate triangular relationship with the Uzbegs and Safavids along the Kabul-Kandahar-Kashmir frontier, or asserting Mughal suzerainty over the Deccan — through a careful mix of military campaigns (Ahmadnagar, Khandesh) and diplomatic outreach (to Bijapur, Golconda, and Bidar) — Akbar consistently prioritised pragmatic statecraft over sectarian solidarity. The result was an emperor who not only successfully maintained India’s natural north-western frontier, but also substantially expanded Mughal territory, laying the geopolitical foundations that his successors would inherit and build upon.