Wavell Plan and Shimla Conference (1945)

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Background: The War’s End and the Continuing Deadlock

By 1945, the Second World War was drawing to a close, though Japan had yet to surrender, and the wartime activities of the Indian National Army (INA) were nearing their end.
A political deadlock with the Congress had persisted since the resignation of Congress ministries in 1939, following the British declaration of war on India’s behalf without consultation.
In October 1943, Lord Wavell, who succeeded Lord Linlithgow as Viceroy and Governor-General, took charge with the aim of resolving this stalemate.
- He travelled to England for consultations in March 1945.
- On 14 June 1945, Wavell broadcast the British government’s proposals for breaking the deadlock — proposals that came to be known as the Wavell Plan. L.S. Amery, the Secretary of State for India, made a corresponding statement in the House of Commons the same day.

The Wavell Plan (1945)

The plan proposed the following:
- the reconstitution of the Governor-General’s Executive Council, pending the preparation of a new constitution;
  - apart from the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief, all other members of the Council would be nominated from among leaders of Indian political life;
- a Council with what Wavell described as “a balanced representation of the main communities, including equal proportions of Muslims and caste Hindus,” functioning under the existing constitutional framework;
  - the Scheduled Castes would receive separate representation, and the door would remain open for discussions on a new constitution;
- retention of the Governor-General’s veto, though it would not be exercised unnecessarily;
- the transfer of the External Affairs portfolio from the Governor-General to an Indian member of the Council; and
- a Conference of representatives, chosen by the Viceroy, to obtain from party leaders a joint list — or, failing that, separate lists — of suitable candidates for the new Executive Council.
It was also expected that provincial ministries would resume office, with coalition governments formed where necessary.
To enable participation, Congress leaders were released in time for the Shimla Conference of June 1945 — marking the end of the phase of confrontation that had persisted since the Quit India Movement of August 1942.

The “Breakdown Plan”

The Wavell Plan was also referred to as the “Breakdown Plan,” since the British considered it dishonourable to withdraw from India without a universally agreed settlement.
Under this contingency, in case of disagreement among Indian parties, the British proposed withdrawing to the six Muslim-majority provinces envisaged as Pakistan, leaving the Congress to administer the rest of India.

The Shimla Conference (1945)

To discuss the provisions of the Wavell Plan, a conference of 21 Indian political leaders was convened at Shimla, the summer capital of British India.
- Attendees included Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, then President of the Congress, and Mohammad Ali Jinnah, representing the Muslim League.
The conference aimed to secure agreement on the Wavell Plan for Indian self-government, and appeared close to a settlement that would have provided separate representation for Muslims while moderating majority-community powers within their respective regions.
Talks ultimately stalled over the selection of Muslim representatives:
- Jinnah insisted that no non-League Muslim be nominated to the Executive Council, arguing that the Muslim League alone had the right to represent India’s Muslims — effectively denying the Congress the right to nominate any Muslim member.
- He further demanded that any objection raised by Muslim members on a matter be overruled only by a two-thirds majority vote.
Although Wavell had already allotted 6 of 14 seats to Muslims on the Executive Council — along with a British veto over any constitutional proposal deemed contrary to British interests — Muslims made up only around 25 per cent of India’s population; the Congress accordingly rejected these demands as unreasonable.
With the Muslim League unwilling to relent, Wavell dropped the plan and formally declared the conference a failure — closing what would prove to be perhaps the last viable opportunity for a united, independent India.

Responsibility for the Failure

The Core Disagreement

At its heart, the Wavell Plan envisaged the complete Indianisation of the Executive Council, with caste Hindus and Muslims represented on a basis of parity.
- Mahatma Gandhi objected to the very use of the term “caste Hindus.”
While the Muslim League pressed for exclusive control over Muslim representation on the Council, the Congress, as a national organisation, insisted on its right to nominate representatives from all communities.
The conference collapsed because neither the Congress nor the League was willing to move from its stated position; responsibility for the breakdown is generally attributed partly to Lord Wavell and partly to Jinnah.
- For the Congress, India remained a single nation; for the Muslim League, Muslims constituted not merely a minority but a nation in themselves — and the Viceroy’s course of action depended on how this fundamental disagreement was managed, since a wider disagreement offered greater scope for an extension of British rule.

Wavell’s Role in the Outcome

It was Lord Wavell who, in effect, handed Jinnah a final veto over constitutional progress in India, cementing his position as the sole representative of India’s Muslims — the Muslim League’s answer to Gandhi’s standing within the Congress.
At the same time, Wavell reversed a key principle of the earlier Cripps Mission, which had recognised the Congress as the sole platform for negotiations with the government; by convening the Shimla Conference, he effectively created two rival platforms, elevating Jinnah to Gandhi’s level and making the League the sole arbiter of Muslim political fate in India.
The result was that the Muslim League emerged as the principal beneficiary of the conference’s failure, moving significantly closer to its goal of a separate nation.
Wavell has been faulted for not taking Indian leaders into confidence over the composition of his own list of Executive Council members — Congress leaders might otherwise have accepted this list, whole or with minor, mutually agreed modifications — and for allowing the League to effectively veto the entire plan and single-handedly block progress.
- This is notable given that the Viceroy had assured the Congress President that “no party to the conference could be allowed to obstruct settlement out of wilfulness,” yet, much as in the earlier case of the Cripps Mission, Wavell’s hands appear to have been stayed at the final moment.

Aftermath

The tangible outcome of the Shimla Conference’s failure was a marked strengthening of Jinnah’s and the Muslim League’s political standing, clearly reflected in the elections of 1945–46.
Maulana Azad, the Congress President, placed the blame for the breakdown squarely on Jinnah.
When the Congress and the Muslim League reconvened the following year under the Cabinet Mission, the Congress proved considerably less accommodating towards the League’s demands — despite Jinnah’s acceptance of the British plan at that stage.