Revolts against Aurangzeb

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During his long reign, Aurangzeb had to contend with a wide array of revolts across the empire — the Marathas in the Deccan, the Jats and Rajputs in North India, and the Afghans and Sikhs in the North-West. Several of these challenges were not entirely new, having already been faced in some form by Aurangzeb’s predecessors — but under his rule, each of them acquired a distinctly different character. Understanding the pattern, causes, and consequences of the revolts against Aurangzeb is essential for grasping the structural pressures that would ultimately contribute to the decline of the Mughal Empire in the 18th century.

Major Revolts against Aurangzeb

Jats

The Jats of the Agra–Delhi region, settled on both banks of the river Yamuna, were the first community to come into open conflict with the Mughal government.

The Jats were predominantly peasant cultivators, with only a small number holding zamindari rights. Bound together by a strong sense of brotherhood and a keen concern for justice, they had repeatedly come into friction with the Mughals — conflicts that had already surfaced during the reigns of Jahangir and Shah Jahan, chiefly over the collection of land revenue.
Since all the principal imperial roads to the Deccan and the western seaports passed directly through Jat territory, the Mughals were compelled to respond firmly to any Jat unrest.
In 1669, under the leadership of the local zamindar Gokla, the Jats of Mathura rose in rebellion — a revolt that spread rapidly among the peasantry of the region and forced Aurangzeb to personally intervene. The Jats were ultimately defeated, and Gokla was captured and executed.
- This uprising was, at its core, a peasant revolt, with religion playing little role in the struggle. Nevertheless, the temple of Bir Singh Deo Bundela at Mathura was destroyed following the Jats’ defeat.
A second Jat rebellion broke out in 1685 under the leadership of Rajaram. This time, the Jats were considerably better organised, combining guerrilla warfare with plunder.
- The rebellion continued until 1691, when Rajaram and his successor, Churaman, were finally compelled to surrender. Even so, unrest persisted among the Jat peasantry, and their continued plundering made the Delhi–Agra road unsafe for travellers.
- During the 18th century, taking advantage of the Mughal civil wars and the empire’s growing weakness, Churaman carved out a separate Jat principality in the region, displacing the Rajput zamindars who had previously held sway there.

Satnamis

In 1672, at Narnaul (near Mathura), another armed conflict erupted between the peasantry and the Mughal state — this time involving a distinct religious body known as the Satnamis.

Originally a militant sect of Hindu worshippers, the Satnamis were founded by Saint Birbhan at Narnaul, Haryana, in 1657. Their central religious practice involved the chanting and meditation of the “true name” (Sat-Nam) of God.
Historians have described the Satnamis as a monotheistic sect that followed neither orthodox Hinduism nor Islam, and whose scriptures emphasised a life of good conduct over ritual and dogma. The sect is thought to have emerged as an offshoot of the Ravidasi tradition, drawing its membership largely from the lower strata of society — peasants, artisans, and low-caste groups including goldsmiths, carpenters, sweepers, and tanners.
The Satnamis harboured deep sympathy for the poor and pronounced hostility towards authority and wealth, which gave their movement particular appeal among the lower classes.
The immediate spark for the revolt came when a Mughal soldier killed a Satnami, who was subsequently avenged by his fellow sect members. However, the deeper roots of the rebellion lay in the sect’s rapid growth: the rigid caste structure of the era pushed marginalised groups towards the Satnami fold, while the sect itself protested against oppressive taxation policies. Their rising influence was viewed as a direct threat by the upper castes and by supporters of Mughal authority more broadly.
The conflict soon escalated into open rebellion. The Satnamis plundered numerous villages, defeated the local faujdar, and seized the towns of Narnaul and Bairat, even establishing their own rudimentary administration.
- They then marched towards Shahjahanabad (Old Delhi), armed with European-designed muskets that their leader had personally taught them to manufacture. Though the rebels fought bravely, they ultimately could not prevail against the large, well-organised force that Aurangzeb deployed against them.

Afghan Revolt

Conflicts with the Afghans, who inhabited the mountainous frontier regions, were a recurring feature of Mughal rule, and most Mughal emperors found themselves engaged with them at one point or another — Akbar himself lost his close friend, the brilliant and loyal noble Raja Birbal, in one such campaign.

These conflicts were partly economic and partly political and religious in character. With few means of livelihood available in the rugged mountains, the Afghans had little choice but to prey on passing caravans or enrol in the Mughal armies — yet their fierce love of independence made sustained service under Mughal command genuinely difficult.
To clear the strategically vital Khyber Pass and suppress the resulting uprising, Aurangzeb deputed his Chief Bakhshi, Amir Khan. After a series of hard-fought battles, Afghan resistance was eventually broken.
A second Afghan uprising occurred in 1672, led by Akmal Khan, who proclaimed himself king and had the khutba read and coinage struck in his own name.
- Near the Khyber Pass, the Afghans suffered a disastrous defeat, though Akmal Khan himself managed to escape.
In 1674, the Mughal noble Shujaat Khan suffered a severe defeat in the Khyber, and was rescued only through the heroic intervention of a band of Rathors sent by Jaswant Singh.
In the middle of 1674, Aurangzeb himself travelled to Peshawar, remaining there until the end of 1675. Through a careful combination of military force and diplomacy, the united Afghan front was gradually broken, and peace was eventually restored.

Sikhs

Though there had already been isolated clashes between the Sikh gurus and the Mughals under Shah Jahan, there was no direct confrontation between the Sikhs and Aurangzeb until 1675.

In 1675, Guru Tegh Bahadur was arrested along with five of his followers and brought to Delhi. A range of accusations were levelled against him, and he was ordered to recant his faith — a demand he firmly refused. As punishment, he was executed.
Historians have offered varying explanations for Aurangzeb’s action: some sources suggest the Guru sacrificed his life specifically in defence of the Hindu faith, while others frame his execution primarily as a law-and-order matter. Some historians have further suggested that Aurangzeb was particularly angered by Tegh Bahadur’s conversion of a few Muslims to Sikhism, and by his protest against the religious persecution of Kashmiris carried out by the local governor.
The broader atmosphere of heightened religious tension at the time — fuelled by Aurangzeb’s emphasis on the sharia, his destruction of temples at Mathura and Varanasi as punishment for local rebellions, and complaints by qazis about non-Muslims teaching openly to Muslims — meant that any confrontation with a figure as prominent as the Guru was almost bound to have far-reaching repercussions.
Whatever the precise motivation, Aurangzeb’s action was, by any reasonable measure, unjustified, and reflected a narrow and short-sighted approach.

Consequences for the Sikh movement:

The execution of Guru Tegh Bahadur forced the Sikhs to retreat into the Punjab hills, and set in motion the gradual transformation of the Sikh movement into a military brotherhood. The principal architect of this transformation was Guru Gobind Singh, who demonstrated considerable organisational ability in founding the Khalsa in 1699.
By the close of the 17th century, the Guru had grown into a formidable regional power, waging and winning a series of wars against the local Hindu hill rajas.
- In 1704, an open breach occurred between the Guru and these hill rajas, when their combined forces attacked him at Anandpur. Forced to retreat once more, the rajas subsequently persuaded the Mughal government to intervene directly on their behalf.
- The resulting Mughal assault on Anandpur was bravely repelled by the Sikhs, who beat off every attempt. Later, however, two of the Guru’s sons were captured and, upon refusing to embrace Islam, were beheaded at Sirhind; the Guru subsequently lost his two remaining sons in another engagement.

Rajputs

In the early years of his reign, Aurangzeb attached considerable value to his alliance with the Rajputs.

He worked to secure the active support of the Maharana of Mewar, raising his mansab from 5,000/5,000 to 6,000/6,000.
Although Jaswant Singh had fought against Aurangzeb during the war of succession, he was subsequently pardoned and restored to his former mansab.
Jai Singh remained a close friend and trusted confidant of Aurangzeb right up until his death in 1667.

Conflict with Marwar and Mewar

Following the death of Jaswant Singh, the question of succession to the gaddi of Marwar arose. There was a longstanding Mughal convention that, in the case of a disputed succession, a state would first be brought under direct Mughal administration (khalisa) to preserve law and order, before eventually being handed over to the chosen successor.
- A further reason for placing Marwar under khalisa administration was that the late Maharaja, like many Mughal nobles, owed the state a considerable sum of money that he had never repaid.
- Rani Hadi, Jaswant Singh’s widowed queen, strongly objected to surrendering charge of Jodhpur to the Mughals, since it was the ancestral watan of the Rathors — but ultimately had no choice but to submit.
The Mughals thereafter behaved as outright conquerors, treating Marwar as hostile territory. A diligent search was conducted for any hidden treasure Jaswant Singh might have left behind, Mughal officials were stationed across Marwar, and large numbers of temples — including several old, previously untouched temples — were demolished.
Aurangzeb’s subsequent scheme to divide the state of Marwar between two branches of the ruling family was flatly rejected by the Rathor sardars, led by Durgadas.
- Durgadas, together with Ajit Singh (one of the claimants to the gaddi, then still a minor), took refuge in Mewar, where the Rana provided him a secret hideout. This marked the point at which Mewar entered the conflict.

Mewar’s grievances:

Rana Raj Singh, who had initially supported Aurangzeb, had by this point grown steadily alienated. He sent a force of 5,000 men, under one of his leading commanders, to Jodhpur to back Rani Hadi’s claim.
- He was, by all accounts, deeply opposed to Mughal interference in internal Rajput matters such as questions of succession.
- He also nursed a longstanding grievance over Mughal efforts to detach Dungarpur and Banswara — states to Mewar’s south and west that had traditionally been tribute-paying dependencies of Mewar — from its sphere of influence.
- The immediate trigger for his involvement, however, was his unease at the outright Mughal military occupation of Marwar.
The ensuing war soon reached a stalemate: the Mughals could neither penetrate the hills of Mewar nor effectively counter the guerrilla tactics of the Rajputs.
The Mewar campaign gradually became secondary to Aurangzeb’s broader concerns, and he eventually patched together a treaty with the Rana.
The Mughals, however, retained their hold over Marwar, and low-intensity, desultory warfare continued until 1698, when Ajit Singh was finally recognised as the ruler of Marwar. Even so, the rulers of both Marwar and Mewar remained fundamentally dissatisfied, and this uneasy situation persisted without change until Aurangzeb’s death in 1707.

Rebellion by Prince Akbar

The war against the Rajputs grew steadily more unpopular across the empire, and Aurangzeb’s repeated admonitions and warnings to his commanders did little to change the course of events. Eventually, Aurangzeb’s own eldest son, Prince Akbar, sought to exploit this discontent by turning his arms against his father.

In alliance with the Rathor chief Durgadas, Akbar marched on Ajmer (January 1681), at a moment when Aurangzeb was genuinely vulnerable, with most of his best troops engaged elsewhere.
However, Prince Akbar hesitated and delayed, giving Aurangzeb the opportunity to sow dissension within his son’s camp through a fabricated letter. Prince Akbar was forced to flee to Maharashtra, and Aurangzeb was left to breathe a considerable sigh of relief.

Ahom

In 1661, Mir Jumla led a major campaign against the Ahoms, compelling them to accept Mughal suzerainty, surrender territory, and pay a heavy indemnity.
However, in 1667, the Ahoms recaptured Guwahati. Aurangzeb responded by sending Raja Ram Singh of Amber to lead a fresh invasion.
- The resulting engagement, known as the Battle of Saraighat, ended in a decisive Ahom victory under the leadership of Lachit Borphukan.
- The Mughals were defeated again at the Battle of Itakhuli in 1682, after which Mughal control over Kamrup was permanently lost.
A weak navy and exceptionally difficult terrain were the principal reasons behind the ultimate Mughal failure to establish lasting control over the North-East.

Maratha

During Shivaji’s Lifetime

Shivaji had already begun his career of conquest, largely at the expense of Bijapur and rival Maratha chieftains, even before Aurangzeb’s own accession.
Aurangzeb distrusted Shivaji from the very outset, and, anxious about the rapid rise of Maratha power so close to the Mughal frontier, deputed Shaista Khan to invade Shivaji’s territories.
- Shaista Khan occupied Poona, making it his headquarters. In a daring move, Shivaji infiltrated his camp there, killing his son and wounding the Khan himself — an audacious strike that so angered Aurangzeb that Shaista Khan was subsequently recalled.
Shivaji soon followed this up by attacking Surat, the premier Mughal port, plundering it thoroughly before returning home laden with treasure.
Aurangzeb next deputed Raja Jai Singh of Amber to deal with Shivaji. The siege of Purandar (1665) led to negotiations between the two, resulting in a settlement:
- 23 of the 35 forts held by Shivaji were surrendered to the Mughals.
- Bijapuri territory worth 9 lakh huns a year was to be granted to Shivaji, in exchange for 40 lakh huns payable to the Mughals in instalments.
- Jai Singh shrewdly created a bone of contention between Shivaji and the Bijapuri ruler in the process.
- Shivaji requested to be excused from personal service at court; in his place, a mansab of 5,000 was instead granted to his minor son, Sambhaji, while Shivaji himself promised to personally join any future Mughal campaign in the Deccan.
The ultimate success of Jai Singh’s scheme, however, depended on Mughal support in helping Shivaji recover, from Bijapuri territory, the value he had surrendered to the Mughals — and this proved to be a fatal flaw. When the joint Mughal-Maratha expedition against Bijapur failed, Jai Singh’s entire scheme collapsed.
Jai Singh subsequently persuaded Shivaji to visit the Emperor at Agra, but the visit proved disastrous — Aurangzeb did not even find time to speak with him. Shivaji, feeling deeply insulted, walked out angrily, refused imperial service, and was placed under detention, from which he escaped within a few months.
Unlike Jai Singh, Aurangzeb himself attached little real value to an alliance with Shivaji, and effectively goaded him back into a renewed career of conquest.
- Shivaji could never reconcile himself to the loss of 23 forts and territory worth four lakh huns a year to the Mughals, without any compensating gain from Bijapur.
- He renewed his contest with the Mughals, sacking Surat a second time in 1670.
- Over the following four years, he recovered a large number of his forts — including Purandar — from the Mughals, and made further inroads into Mughal territory. Mughal preoccupation with the ongoing Afghan uprising in the North-West considerably assisted his efforts during this period.
- In 1674, Shivaji formally crowned himself at Raigarh. This coronation elevated him to a status far above that of any other Maratha chief and strengthened his social standing considerably — and, as an independent sovereign ruler, it now became possible for him to enter into treaties with the Deccan sultans on a footing of equality, rather than as a rebel.
The Marathas continued to raid Mughal territory in the years that followed.

Post-Shivaji

Aurangzeb himself reached the Deccan in 1681, in pursuit of his rebel son, Prince Akbar, who had by then taken shelter with Sambhaji.
Aurangzeb attempted to detach Bijapur and Golconda from their alignment with the Marathas, but could not realise this goal — the Marathas remained the essential shield protecting both Deccani states from the Mughals, and neither was willing to discard that protection.
Ultimately, Aurangzeb chose to force the issue militarily, leading to open war. Both Bijapur and Golconda fell and were formally annexed — but this proved only the beginning of Aurangzeb’s difficulties, not their resolution.
In 1689, Sambhaji was captured and executed as a rebel and infidel — a decision that, in retrospect, proved to be a serious strategic mistake.
- His execution provided the Marathas with a powerful new rallying cause. At the same time, in the absence of a single central leader, individual Maratha sardars were left free to plunder Mughal territory at will, melting away at the approach of Mughal forces only to regroup and strike again elsewhere.
- Rather than destroying the Maratha state, Aurangzeb had, in effect, made Maratha resistance an all-pervasive feature of the Deccan landscape — a resistance that soon spread from the west coast all the way to the east.
Aurangzeb next turned his attention to annexing the rich Karnataka tract to the empire, but his dangerously overextended lines of communication left him increasingly vulnerable to Maratha attack.
Between 1690 and 1703, Aurangzeb stubbornly refused to negotiate with the Marathas; from 1700 to 1705, he instead set out on a determined campaign to capture every Maratha fort. The Mughal army continued to suffer repeated reverses throughout this period, with flood, disease, and roving Maratha bands exacting a fearful toll.
- Weariness and disaffection steadily spread among the nobility and the army alike. Demoralisation set in, and a growing number of jagirdars began making secret pacts with the Marathas, agreeing to pay chauth in exchange for their jagirs being left undisturbed.
In 1703, Aurangzeb finally opened negotiations with the Marathas, offering to release Shahu, Sambhaji’s captured son, and to grant him Shivaji’s swarajya along with the right of sardeshmukhi over the Deccan — a settlement that would have recognised Shahu’s special standing.
- Aurangzeb, however, cancelled these arrangements at the last minute, remaining uncertain of Maratha intentions.
By 1706, Aurangzeb had become convinced of the ultimate futility of his effort to capture every Maratha fort.
Aurangzeb breathed his last at Aurangabad in 1707, leaving behind an empire beset with numerous unresolved internal problems.

Nature of These Revolts

The underlying nature of these various uprisings differed considerably from one another:

In the case of the Rajputs, the conflict was, at its core, a problem of contested succession.
In the case of the Marathas and Ahoms, the driving issue was one of local independence.
In the case of the Jats, the revolt reflected a fundamentally peasant-agrarian clash with the state.
In the case of the Afghans, the conflict was primarily a tribal issue, with a strong underlying sentiment favouring the establishment of a separate Afghan state.
- The Afghan uprising, in particular, demonstrates that sentiments of resistance to Mughal rule and aspirations for regional freedom were not confined solely to Hindu communities such as the Jats and Marathas.

The only movement in which religion played a genuinely powerful role was the Sikh movement — though even here, the struggle involving Guru Gobind Singh was not, at its core, a primarily religious conflict. It was, in part, an offshoot of local rivalries between the Hindu hill rajas and the Sikhs, and in part a natural outcome of the internal evolution of the Sikh movement itself.

Indeed, it appears that Aurangzeb was not particularly keen to destroy the Guru — he had written to the Governor of Lahore instructing him to conciliate the Guru, and even invited him to a personal meeting in the Deccan. Towards the end of 1706, the Guru set out for the Deccan and was en route when Aurangzeb died. According to some accounts, he had hoped to persuade Aurangzeb to restore Anandpur to him.

Taken together, economic and social factors, alongside a persistent sentiment of regional independence, emerge as the major forces shaping these movements — with religion playing an undoubted, but distinctly secondary, role.

It has sometimes been argued that all these movements, with the exception of the Afghan uprising, represented a broadly Hindu reaction against Aurangzeb’s narrow religious policies. In a country where the overwhelming majority of the population was Hindu, however, virtually any movement that came into conflict with the predominantly Muslim central government could easily be characterised as a challenge to Islam.
- Similarly, the leaders of these “rebel” movements often found it useful to invoke religious slogans or symbols in order to broaden their popular appeal. Religion, therefore, is best understood as one component woven into broader societal and political movements, rather than their sole or primary cause.

Consequences of These Revolts

Role in the Decline of the Mughals

The Mughal Empire declined rapidly following Aurangzeb’s death, and the imperial court soon became the arena for intense factional fighting among the nobility.

Aurangzeb’s prolonged attempt to extend Mughal administration over Golconda, Bijapur, and Karnataka stretched the imperial machinery to breaking point. It also left Mughal lines of communication dangerously exposed to Maratha attack — so much so that Mughal nobles posted in the region often found it impossible to collect their dues from assigned jagirs, and sometimes resorted to private pacts with the Marathas instead.
- This, in turn, raised the power and prestige of the Marathas, contributed to growing demoralisation within the Mughal nobility, and dealt a lasting setback to imperial prestige more broadly. Maratha depredations gradually extended from the Deccan into the very heartland of the empire — the Gangetic plains.
Aurangzeb’s policy towards Marwar and Mewar proved clumsy and blundering, yielding no genuine advantage to the Mughals — while the empire’s repeated failures against these states inflicted real damage on Mughal military prestige.
- The consequences, however, cannot be judged solely on military grounds. The breach with Marwar and Mewar weakened the crucial Mughal-Rajput alliance at a pivotal moment in imperial history, and, above all, it sowed lasting doubts — both among old allies and observers — about the firmness of Mughal support for its traditional partners, and about Aurangzeb’s own underlying motives.
The prolonged anarchy and continuous warfare brought trade, industry, and agriculture to a virtual standstill in the regions directly affected by revolt.
- The historian Chetan Singh, in his study of the Punjab region, argues that the Afghan uprising and the Sikh rebellion together had grave social and economic consequences for Punjab — disrupting trade and gradually eroding an economy built substantially on commercialised agriculture. According to Chetan Singh, this progressive loosening of Punjab’s socio-economic structure led directly to social unrest, and eventually to the province’s effective dissociation from the empire.
In the long run, the Jat, Maratha, and Sikh movements all culminated in attempts to establish independent regional states.
- Although Guru Gobind Singh was ultimately unable to withstand Mughal power for long, or to establish a lasting, separate Sikh state during his own lifetime, he nonetheless created an enduring tradition and forged the essential instrument — the Khalsa — for its eventual realisation. His movement also demonstrated how an originally egalitarian religious movement could, under the right circumstances, gradually transform into a political and militaristic force, and, in doing so, move subtly towards the goal of regional independence.

These Revolts Also Fuelled Each Other

The various revolts against Aurangzeb frequently created favourable conditions for one another, compounding the empire’s difficulties:

The Afghan uprising helped relieve Mughal military pressure on Shivaji during a genuinely crucial period, and made a forward Mughal policy in the Deccan effectively impossible until 1676 — by which time Shivaji had already crowned himself and secured an alliance with both Bijapur and Golconda.
Had there been no breach with the Rajputs, it is plausible that Rathor forces might otherwise have assisted the Mughals in their Deccan campaign.
It is true that the fighting in Marwar after 1681 involved relatively few troops and carried limited direct military consequence, and that Hada, Kachhwaha, and other Rajput contingents did continue to serve the Mughal cause elsewhere. Even so, the results of Aurangzeb’s Marwar policy cannot be judged by these narrower military facts alone — the broader breach with the Rajputs at this critical juncture had far more lasting political consequences than its immediate battlefield impact would suggest.
Overall, these episodes revealed the genuinely rigid and obstinate streak in Aurangzeb’s character. This did not, however, amount to a fixed, systematic determination to subvert Hinduism as such — as is sometimes alleged — since, in the period after 1679, large numbers of Marathas continued to be inducted into the Mughal nobility.

These Impacts Should Not Be Overestimated

Despite these policy missteps and Aurangzeb’s undeniable shortcomings, the Mughal Empire, for most of his reign, remained a genuinely powerful and vigorous military and administrative machine.

The Mughal army struggled against the elusive, highly mobile Maratha bands operating in the mountainous terrain of the Deccan — but across the plains of North India and the vast plateau extending up to Karnataka, Mughal artillery remained master of the field.
In Northern India, the true heart of the empire and its centre of decisive economic and political importance, Mughal administration retained much of its underlying vigour, and trade and industry not only continued to flourish but, in several respects, actually expanded.
Politically, despite the military reverses and Aurangzeb’s own missteps, the Mughal dynasty still retained a powerful hold over the imagination and loyalty of the wider population.
As far as the Rajputs were concerned, their core demands — the restoration of high mansabs and of their traditional homelands — were largely met within half a dozen years of Aurangzeb’s death, and the “Rajput problem” effectively ceased to trouble the Mughals thereafter. Notably, the Rajputs themselves played little active role in the empire’s subsequent 18th-century disintegration, nor did they meaningfully assist in arresting its eventual decline.

In sum, these revolts undeniably carried significant socio-economic and political consequences — but they were not, by themselves, solely responsible for the weakening and eventual decline of the Mughal Empire. A wide range of additional factors would go on to shape the turbulent course of 18th-century Indian history.