Do you agree with the view that the USA is of late willing to treat India as a partner rather than merely a camp-follower? Give reasons for your answer.

Do you agree with the view that the USA is of late willing to treat India as a partner rather than merely a camp-follower? Give reasons for your answer. (2014, 10 Marks)

For most of the Cold War Washington judged India by whether it would join the Western camp, and non-alignment read as disloyalty. Since about 2000 the United States has accepted an India that keeps its strategic autonomy. I largely agree, though the partnership is asymmetric and, under pressure, Washington still slips into the language of choosing sides.

Reasons to agree

  • A stated goal: in March 2005 the George W. Bush administration declared its aim “to help India become a major world power in the 21st century”, and de-hyphenated India from Pakistan, reasoning that a strong India would balance China.
  • Accommodation of India’s terms: the civil nuclear deal (2005–08) and the NSG waiver (2008) accepted a nuclear-armed state outside the NPT; Major Defence Partner status (2016) and STA-1 (2018) followed.
  • Interoperability without obligation: LEMOA (2016), COMCASA (2018) and BECA (2020) give allied-style cooperation with no defence commitment.
  • Tolerance of divergence: no CAATSA sanctions over India’s S-400 purchase, and acceptance of India’s abstentions on Ukraine and of its continued arms ties with Moscow.
  • Status: Barack Obama endorsed India’s claim to a permanent Security Council seat in November 2010, and Washington accepted a Quad that India keeps non-military.
  • Why Washington courts India: C. Raja Mohan cast India in 2006 as the swing state of the global balance, and Ashley J. Tellis (2025) describes US policy since Bush as “strategic altruism”, building Indian power without demanding specific reciprocity.

Reasons for caution

  • Coercion returns: in August 2025 Washington stacked a 25% penalty for buying Russian oil on a 25% tariff, cut to 18% only under the February 2026 interim deal. The Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act (September 2026) now authorises tariffs of up to 100% on buyers of Russian energy.
  • Re-hyphenation: American claims of mediating the May 2025 India–Pakistan ceasefire cut against India’s bilateralism.
  • Limits of patience: Tellis’s America’s Bad Bet on India (2023) warns that New Delhi will not join Washington in a war with China that does not threaten India directly.

Conclusion

I agree, with qualification. Washington now treats India as a partner it cannot command: the ten-year defence framework signed in October 2025, in the middle of the tariff dispute, rests on shared interest, not deference. Yet the partnership is transactional: India is treated as a partner when interests converge and pressed like a follower when they diverge, as over Russia.