Examine the trends in India’s relations with the European Union. (2002, 2007, 20 Marks)
India was among the first states to establish relations with the European Economic Community, in 1962. For six decades the relationship had large economic weight and slight political content. Its main trend is a slow move from commerce to politics to strategy, driven less by shared values than by external shocks.
The phases
| Phase | Character | Landmarks |
|---|---|---|
| 1962–1993 | Commercial | Britain’s 1973 accession ends Imperial Preference; Brussels classes South Asia as “non-associable”; the Commercial Cooperation Agreement (1973), negotiated under ambassador K. B. Lall |
| 1994–2004 | Political | Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development (1994); first summit, Lisbon 2000; Strategic Partnership, The Hague 2004 |
| 2005–2017 | Institutional drift | Joint Action Plan (2005); BTIA launched 2007, suspended 2013; no summit 2012–2016 |
| 2018–2026 | Strategic turn | EU Strategy on India (2018); Indo-Pacific Strategy (2021); Trade and Technology Council (2023); FTA concluded and Security and Defence Partnership signed, 27 January 2026 |
The trend lines
- Economic deepening: goods trade reached about €118bn in 2025, up 84% in a decade; the EU accounts for 11.1% of India’s trade and is its largest investor, with an FDI stock of about €133bn (2024).
- From aid to partnership: Europe moved from treating India as a development case to a market and, after 2018, a political actor; bilateral aid gave way to trade, technology and climate partnerships.
- Institutions outpacing substance: over thirty dialogue mechanisms produced few decisions. Gauri Khandekar (2011) called the relationship “a loveless arranged marriage”.
- Persistent normative friction: Europe condemned the 1998 tests, and its conditionality on labour, environment, patents and now CBAM reads in Delhi as protectionism. This is Ian Manners’s “normative power Europe” meeting a state jealous of its strategic autonomy.
- Two tracks: trade goes through Brussels, security through capitals. The France strategic partnership of January 1998 survived Pokhran II and has delivered more than the Union, through Rafale and Scorpène.
- People and mobility: the 2026 Comprehensive Framework on Mobility and Germany’s pledge of 90,000 skilled-worker visas a year make migration a new pillar.
- Shock-driven convergence: China’s coercion, Russia’s war on Ukraine and American tariffs did in five years what values had not done in fifty. Defence and security became a pillar of the Joint Comprehensive Strategic Agenda Towards 2030.
Assessment
Ummu Salma Bava (2008) explains the lag: partnerships between unequal actors rest on power and interdependence, so affinity alone does not produce shared interests. S. Jaishankar’s jibe at GLOBSEC (June 2022), that Europe must outgrow the mindset that “Europe’s problems are the world’s problems”, showed the residual distance; in January 2026 the same minister signed a security partnership with Brussels. Lizza Bomassi (EUISS, 2026) sees the remaining gap as structural: Europe fears Russia, India’s pacing threat is China, so cooperation works best module by module.
The limits remain. The FTA, sent to the EU Council only on 11 September 2026, awaits signature and ratification. EU sanctions on Nayara Energy (July 2025) show the two still differ on Russia, and data adequacy is unresolved.
Conclusion
The trends of 2002 and 2007 (growing trade, a thin strategic layer and stalled talks) have given way to a relationship with real content. The trajectory points to partnership, not alliance: two sovereign actors hedging against the same pressures. Ratification and implementation will show whether convergence outlasts those pressures.