Comment: Technology and state sovereignty over water resources. (1996, 20 Marks)

Water is claimed as a sovereign resource, but it flows across borders: there are some 310 transboundary river basins covering nearly half the earth’s land surface. Technology in the form of dams, barrages, diversions, inter-basin transfers and hydropower turns geographical position into control. It has therefore changed what sovereignty over water means in practice, enlarging the power of upstream states while also creating the tools for shared management.

Competing doctrines of sovereignty

DoctrineClaimTypical advocate
Absolute territorial sovereignty (Harmon Doctrine, 1895)A state may use the waters in its territory regardless of downstream effectsUpstream states
Absolute territorial integrityA downstream state is entitled to the natural flowDownstream states
Limited sovereigntyEquitable and reasonable utilisation and no significant harmHelsinki Rules (1966); UN Watercourses Convention (1997)
Community of interestsThe basin is managed as one unitIntegrated basin bodies

The 1997 Convention entered into force only in 2014 and has few parties. China voted against it, and India is not a party, so technology runs ahead of law.

How technology reshapes sovereignty

  • It amplifies upstream power: Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner (2006) call this hydro-hegemony, control that rests on position, power and the capacity to exploit. Turkey’s Atatürk Dam on the Euphrates affected Syria and Iraq, and China’s cascade of dams on the Mekong alters flows into Southeast Asia. Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam was inaugurated in September 2025 over Egyptian and Sudanese objections.
  • The Brahmaputra: China began work on the Medog project on the lower Yarlung Tsangpo in July 2025, planned at about 60 GW. India seeks transparency and data and has proposed its own Upper Siang storage project as a buffer: technology answering technology. Brahma Chellaney (Water: Asia’s New Battleground, 2011) treats China’s hold on the Tibetan headwaters as Asia’s decisive water lever.
  • It is constrained by treaty: the Indus Waters Treaty (1960) allows India run-of-river hydropower on the western rivers within design limits. In the Kishenganga award (2013), a Court of Arbitration let India divert water but required a minimum downstream flow. Since 23 April 2025, India has held the treaty in abeyance after the Pahalgam attack. It rejects the competence of the Court of Arbitration, whose award of 31 August 2026 held the treaty fully in force, and links restoration to an end to cross-border terrorism.
  • Bargaining in 1996 and now: the year of the question produced the Mahakali Treaty with Nepal, whose Pancheshwar dam is still unbuilt, and the Ganga Waters Treaty on Farakka flows. The latter expires on 12 December 2026, and Bangladesh’s new government wants a fresh treaty with dry-season guarantees.
  • It erodes secrecy: satellite altimetry, such as the SWOT mission launched in 2022, makes upstream storage visible, eroding sovereignty’s informational advantage.
  • It loosens dependence: desalination, efficient irrigation and “virtual water” imported as food, a concept developed by J. A. (Tony) Allan, reduce reliance on shared flows.

Assessment

Realists treat water as a power resource and predict “water wars”. Yet Aaron T. Wolf’s studies of basins found that cooperative events far outnumber conflictive ones, and the Indus treaty survived three wars. Liberal institutionalists therefore see technology pushing states towards shared sovereignty: joint commissions, data exchange and benefit-sharing. Glacial retreat and erratic monsoons raise the stakes for both.

Conclusion

Technology has made sovereignty over water more assertable but less absolute. It gives upstream states leverage, yet the interdependence it exposes can be managed only through equitable utilisation, data sharing and basin-wide cooperation. For India, both an upstream and a downstream state, consistency between its Indus and Brahmaputra positions is the test.