Success of contemporary democracies lies in State limiting its own power. Comment. (2023, 20 Marks)
The statement expresses liberal constitutionalism, which runs back to John Locke: democracy endures when power is bound by rules it cannot easily change. That is largely true, but self-limitation must be built into institutions and joined to a state capable enough to deliver what rights promise.
Why Self-Limitation Sustains Democracy
- Trust and rights. In Locke’s Second Treatise (1689), government is a fiduciary trust, bounded by natural rights to life, liberty and estate. A government that breaches the trust forfeits it. Friedrich A. Hayek (The Constitution of Liberty, 1960) and Robert Nozick (Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 1974) push this to a libertarian limit: rights precede any collective purpose.
- Checks. Montesquieu (Charles-Louis de Secondat; The Spirit of the Laws, 1748) held that power must be checked by power. James Madison (Federalist No. 51, 1788) wanted ambition … to counteract ambition. A government must first control the governed and then be obliged to control itself.
- Precommitment. Jon Elster (Ulysses and the Sirens, 1979) and Stephen Holmes (Passions and Constraint, 1995) liken a constitution to Ulysses tied to the mast: a people binds future majorities against foreseeable temptations. For Holmes such limits are enabling: they protect the opposition, stabilise expectations and allow peaceful alternation.
- Practical gains. Independent courts, election bodies, auditors and a free press prevent concentration and secure accountability and transparency; federalism lets government respond to diverse needs.
The Indian Record
- Kesavananda Bharati (24 April 1973) placed the basic structure beyond Parliament’s amending power, so that even the constituent power is limited.
- The Emergency (1975–77) showed limits failing: the 42nd Amendment curbed judicial review, and ADM Jabalpur (1976) upheld the suspension of habeas corpus. The 44th Amendment (1978) replaced “internal disturbance” with “armed rebellion”, required written Cabinet advice and made Articles 20 and 21 non-suspendable. Puttaswamy (2017) later disowned ADM Jabalpur.
- The Supreme Court struck down electoral bonds (15 February 2024) as a breach of voters’ right to information. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (8 April 2025) it ruled out a gubernatorial pocket veto. The Presidential Reference opinion (20 November 2025) then rejected judicial timelines and deemed assent, while exposing prolonged, unexplained inaction to limited review. The boundaries of power remain contested.
When the Limits Erode
Nancy Bermeo (2016) identified executive aggrandizement: elected leaders dismantle checks through legal means rather than coups. V-Dem‘s 2026 report counts 92 autocracies to 87 democracies. It downgrades the United States to an electoral democracy and still classes India as an electoral autocracy. Freedom House records a twentieth straight year of decline. Elections survive; the limits do not.
The Counter-View: Limits Are Not Enough
- Capacity. Francis Fukuyama (State-Building, 2004) separates a state’s scope from its strength. A weak state fails citizens as surely as a despotic one.
- Rights cost money. Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein (The Cost of Rights, 1999) show that even negative liberties depend on taxation, courts and police. T. H. Marshall‘s social citizenship and India’s Directive Principles demand an active welfare state, not a laissez-faire one.
- Culture. B. R. Ambedkar warned that constitutional morality has to be cultivated. Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt (How Democracies Die, 2018) likewise locate survival in norms of forbearance. Written limits hold only where political actors internalise them.
Conclusion
Contemporary democracy succeeds with a state that is limited in authority but strong in capacity, Madison’s double demand to enable government and then oblige it to control itself. Self-limitation cannot rest on rulers’ goodwill; it lasts only when entrenched in institutions and carried by democratic culture.