Is the rise of social movement a sign of opening up of popular space in political process or decline of representative politics? Examine. (2013, 20 Marks)
Charles Tilly (Social Movements, 1768–2004, 2004) defined a social movement as a sustained series of campaigns, performances and displays through which ordinary people press shared claims on authorities. He also showed that movements grew alongside democratisation, feeding on rights of association, assembly and speech. Their rise therefore admits two readings, and the evidence supports both in part.
The case for an opening of popular space
- Democratic rights in use. Movements flourish where civil liberties exist; their spread reflects wider political competence, not only discontent.
- Participation has changed form, not declined. Pippa Norris (Democratic Phoenix, 2002) found party membership falling while petitioning, boycotts and protest rose. David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow (1998) called this the social movement society.
- Counter-democracy. Pierre Rosanvallon (Counter-Democracy, 2008) treats vigilance, denunciation and evaluation by citizens as democracy’s second circuit, complementing elections rather than replacing them.
- Inclusion. Movements bring in the young, informal workers, Dalits, Adivasis and women, whom parties underrepresent. Rajni Kothari read India’s non-party political process (1984) as democracy deepening from below.
- Issues and accountability. Movements raise long-horizon issues such as climate and gender violence. India’s RTI Act (2005) and MGNREGA (2005) began as grassroots campaigns.
- Lower entry costs. W. Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg (The Logic of Connective Action, 2013) show digital platforms letting citizens mobilise without formal organisations.
- Defending the lifeworld. Jürgen Habermas reads new movements as resisting state and market encroachment, a widening of the public sphere.
The case for a decline of representative politics
- Hollowed-out parties. Peter Mair (Ruling the Void, 2013) described parties retreating from society into the state; Colin Crouch (Post-Democracy, 2004) saw elections persisting as spectacle while decisions move to elites. Movements fill that void.
- Institutional lag. Samuel P. Huntington (Political Order in Changing Societies, 1968) warned that when participation outpaces institutionalisation, demands spill into the street.
- Unprocessed inputs. In David Easton‘s systems terms, movements are demands institutions failed to convert into outputs.
- Closed channels. The Arab Spring (2011), Hong Kong (2019–20) and Bangladesh (2024) were explosions of dissent where representative channels were closed or captured.
- Anti-politics. Leaderless movements cannot be voted out and are better at blocking than building; their hostility to institutions can be appropriated by populists.
Weighing the two
- The readings are complementary: movements open popular space because representative space has narrowed.
- Conversion shows the link. India Against Corruption (2011) produced the Aam Aadmi Party; Nepal’s Gen Z protests of September 2025 ended in elections on 5 March 2026, won by the Rastriya Swatantra Party with 182 of 275 seats.
- Receiving institutions decide the outcome. The farmers’ movement won repeal of three farm laws in 2021; youth protests over the NEET-UG 2026 paper leak forced Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan to resign on 25 July 2026, accountability working between elections.
- Where institutions are absent, as in Myanmar after 2021, mobilisation turns into armed conflict, and shrinking civic space (CIVICUS found only 7% of humanity living in open or narrowed civic space in 2025) can close the opening again.
Conclusion
The rise of social movements signals a crisis of representation and an expansion of participation at once. The critical variable is whether parliaments, parties and courts can absorb and translate mobilisation: where they can, movements renew representative democracy rather than replace it; where they cannot, popular space opens only to be filled by instability.