“The establishment of South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) has opened the gates of mutual cooperation among the States of South Asia.” In the light of this statement examine India’s role in the South Asian region. (2006, 60 Marks)
SAARC, proposed by Bangladesh’s Ziaur Rahman in 1980 and founded by charter at Dhaka on 8 December 1985, gave South Asia its first regional institution. The gates did open, but only partly, and India’s role explains both the opening and the narrowness of the passage.
How far the gates opened
- Functional cooperation: the Integrated Programme of Action began with agriculture, health, meteorology, telecommunications and rural development; later came a food bank, disaster management and the SAARC Development Fund.
- Trade instruments: SAPTA (1993, in force 1995), SAFTA (2004, in force 2006) and the services agreement (2010).
- Habits of contact: summits let leaders meet on the margins, sometimes the only India–Pakistan channel available.
Why they did not open wider
- Design: unanimity at every level and the exclusion of bilateral and contentious issues (Article X) kept the central dispute both undiscussable and able to block everything.
- Structure: Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver classify South Asia as a conflict formation whose members fear one another, not an outside threat, the unifier ASEAN had.
- Results: intra-regional trade remains barely 5% of the total; no summit has met since Kathmandu (2014), and the 2016 Islamabad summit collapsed after the Uri attack.
India’s role: three readings
Reluctant founder
India feared a caucus of smaller states and the internationalisation of Kashmir. It joined on terms that made the forum safe for it (unanimity, bilateral primacy, an uncontroversial agenda), which also kept it inert. S. D. Muni describes India as long a reluctant participant and hesitant leader in SAARC.
Provider and leader
- India is the principal funder: the entire capital cost of the South Asian University and about 59% of its operating budget, the South Asia Satellite (May 2017), and US$10 million for the COVID-19 fund launched at the March 2020 leaders’ video conference.
- Inder Kumar Gujral’s doctrine (1996–97) made non-reciprocity policy, yielding the Ganga Waters Treaty (December 1996) and preparing the India–Sri Lanka FTA (1998). Duty-free access for least developed members followed in 2011.
- Neighbourhood First (2014) and SAGAR (2015, widened to MAHASAGAR in 2025) put credit lines, connectivity and disaster relief at the centre.
Hegemon in neighbours’ eyes
- The Indira Doctrine rejected extra-regional intervention while justifying Indian ones, from the IPKF in Sri Lanka (1987–90) to the 1989–90 trade and transit disruption with Nepal. Smaller states hedge with China in response.
- Happymon Jacob urges India to shed its zero-sum approach to the neighbourhood.
- Since 2016 India has preferred BIMSTEC and BBIN, which bypass Pakistan’s veto. S. Jaishankar said in March 2025 that SAARC is “on pause”, not ended.
Present position
- Cooperation runs bilaterally and radially, through India rather than across the region: Bhutanese hydropower, Nepali power reaching Bangladesh via India (2024), and the Dhaka–New Delhi talks of 24 August 2026 on reopening land ports and border haats.
- India barred all imports from Pakistan on 2 May 2025, yet revival pressure is real: Bangladesh under Tarique Rahman wants summits back, Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu offered on 26 July 2026 to mediate between India and Pakistan, the 62nd Programming Committee met in Kathmandu in February 2026, and Bhutan nominated Sonam Topgay as the next Secretary-General in August 2026.
Conclusion
SAARC opened the gates of cooperation but left them on a latch, and India built much of that latch. India is indispensable to any regional order, yet it has oscillated between primacy and generosity. Its role will be judged by whether Gujral-style non-reciprocity is matched by reliable delivery, so that leadership is accepted rather than suspected.