Comment: Relevance of Non-Alignment in Post-Cold war era. (1993, 2005, 20 Marks)
Non-alignment, as Jawaharlal Nehru framed it, was not neutrality but an active policy of judging each issue on its merits without joining a military bloc; the Belgrade summit (1961) turned it into a movement. When the Soviet Union collapsed, critics declared it obsolete. The debate turns on separating three things: non-alignment as a doctrine, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as an organisation, and the normative ethos the movement made respectable. They have met different fates.
The case that non-alignment lost its relevance
- No second pole. Leverage came from the ability to tilt between two superpowers; unipolarity left nothing to tilt towards, and most members turned to Western markets and finance.
- Organisational paralysis. With no charter, secretariat or obligations, NAM took no effective position on Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait or Yugoslavia’s break-up, though both involved members. T. P. Sreenivasan (2018) recalls that, but for India, the movement would have been wound up at the Accra ministerial meeting of 1991.
- Indian critics. C. Raja Mohan (2016) calls it a movement “in coma”, dysfunctional even before 1991; Harsh V. Pant (2020) holds that India cannot afford to be non-aligned in the traditional sense; S. Jaishankar calls non-alignment “a term of a particular era”.
- India’s own drift. Liberalisation in 1991, the 1998 nuclear tests, the 2008 civil nuclear deal with the United States, and Prime Ministerial absence from the 2016 and 2019 summits.
The case that it remains relevant
- A doctrine not tied to blocs. P. V. Narasimha Rao restated non-alignment as every nation’s right to independence and development, whether there is one bloc or more. Sreenivasan adds that India argued it stays valid with one bloc or none, since its essence is freedom of thought and action.
- An unfinished agenda. The North–South divide survives in nuclear inequality (New START expired in February 2026 with no successor), export-control regimes, IMF quotas, developing-country debt and coercive sanctions. Shashi Tharoor (2012) notes that NAM still lets developing states stake out their own positions on such issues.
- Multipolarity raises its value. With several powers competing for partners, a state that stays unclaimed is courted by all. Hans Köchler (2024) argues the unipolar moment only temporarily stripped non-alignment of salience, and that NAM can act as a balancing force in a multipolar world.
- Soft balancing. T. V. Paul (2018) sees renewed space for a normative coalition of the weak to restrain great powers.
- Numbers and standing. Some 120 members, and 93 at Kampala (2024); M. K. Narayanan (2016) judged its obituary premature.
Non-alignment reborn in Indian practice
The doctrine has been restated rather than abandoned. NonAlignment 2.0 (2012) recast it as strategic autonomy, and practice since has become multi-alignment: the Quad alongside BRICS and the SCO, and abstentions on Ukraine (most recently in February 2026) while buying Russian oil. The US tariff of 50% (August 2025), cut to 18% under an interim understanding in February 2026, showed its ceiling: autonomy survives while several powers want a state and none will pay to compel it.
| Dimension | Post-Cold War verdict |
|---|---|
| Doctrine (autonomy of judgement) | More relevant in a multipolar world |
| Organisation (NAM) | Weak; a forum, not an actor |
| Ethos (sovereign equality, anti-coercion) | Live idiom of Global South diplomacy |
Conclusion
Non-alignment has lost its Cold War geometry but not its logic. As an institution NAM is a legacy forum in need of reform; as a doctrine of refusing exclusive commitment it has become the common strategy of middle powers. The obituary written in 1991 confused the movement with the idea.