How far do regional groupings pose a threat to the stability of Indian political system?

How far do regional groupings pose a threat to the stability of Indian political system? (1994)

“Regional groupings” covers three actors: regional parties, territorial movements for autonomy or statehood, and blocs of states bargaining with the Union. Samuel P. Huntington (Political Order in Changing Societies, 1968) measured stability not by the absence of conflict but by the capacity of institutions to absorb rising participation. On that test, regional groupings threaten India’s stability only at its edges; at the centre of the system they have become part of what keeps it stable.

Where the threat is real

  • Armed secession on the periphery. Punjab in the 1980s and Kashmir after 1989 show regional mobilisation turning into claims to leave the Union, sustained by sanctuary across the border. Gurharpal Singh’s core–periphery distinction fits the record: every dangerous movement arose on a frontier, none in the heartland.
  • Conflict between states. When the Cauvery dispute flared in September 2016, Bengaluru saw arson and curfew. In July 2021 the police forces of Assam and Mizoram exchanged fire at Vairengte, and six Assam policemen died.
  • Nativism against fellow citizens. Haryana’s 75% quota for local residents in private jobs was struck down by the Punjab and Haryana High Court on 17 November 2023 as unconstitutional.
  • Ethnic war inside a region. Manipur’s Meitei–Kuki-Zo conflict since May 2023 has killed over 200 people and brought President’s Rule (February 2025–February 2026).
  • Dependent Union governments. In April 1999 the AIADMK’s withdrawal of support cost the Vajpayee government a confidence vote by one vote.

Why the threat stays bounded

  • Cross-cutting identities. James Manor argues that Indians belong to a caste, a language, a faith, a region and a class at once. Because these loyalties overlap, no single line can harden into a fault on which the country splits.
  • Rules of the game. Paul R. Brass traced consistent Union rules: no secession, no religiously framed demands, and no concession without broad support or at another group’s expense. Articles 3 and 371 and the Sixth Schedule then turn territorial grievance into constitutional status.
  • Co-option into national power. The DMK, Trinamool Congress and National Conference all held Union office under the NDA of 1999–2004, and a party that governs India cannot easily treat India as an imposition. Coalition dependence, together with S. R. Bommai (1994), sharply reduced the misuse of Article 356.
  • Pessimism proved wrong. Selig S. Harrison’s India: The Most Dangerous Decades (1960) predicted balkanisation or authoritarian rule. No state has seceded since.
  • Bargaining, not breakdown. The ministry formed in June 2024 rests on the TDP (16 seats) and JD(U) (12). The allies have won concessions: the lateral-entry advertisement was withdrawn in August 2024, and the Waqf Bill was sent to a Joint Parliamentary Committee. Yet the government has lasted beyond two years.

Degree of threat

Dimension of stabilityThreat from regional groupings
Regime and constitutional orderLow
Territorial integrityLow, except the periphery
Government durabilityModerate, and falling
Social peace between citizensHighest

Conclusion

Regional groupings threaten the system far less than critics feared. The real danger is nativism and ethnic conflict between groups inside a region, not secession or regime collapse. Federal bargaining has turned most regional assertion into routine politics. Where a threat persists, it comes from accommodation arriving late, not from regional identity itself.