What is the realist prescription to the States to ensure their survival in an anarchical world? (2022, 15 Marks)
For realists, anarchy means the absence of any authority above sovereign states, not chaos. Since no one is obliged to rescue a state in trouble, survival becomes the first national interest and the precondition of every other goal. From this premise realism derives a consistent prescription, though classical, defensive and offensive realists disagree on how far a state should go.
The core prescriptions
- Practise self-help. Kenneth N. Waltz (Theory of International Politics, 1979) holds that in an anarchic order self-help is necessarily the principle of action, and that the first concern of states is not to maximize power but to maintain their positions.
- Internal balancing. Build economic, military and technological strength. Hans J. Morgenthau (Politics Among Nations, 1948) lists geography, resources, industrial capacity, preparedness, population, national morale, the quality of government and, as the most important, the quality of diplomacy.
- External balancing. Form alliances against the stronger or more threatening side. Stephen M. Walt (The Origins of Alliances, 1987) shows that states balance against threat: aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability and aggressive intentions. Alliances are instruments of convenience, made across ideologies and dropped when the threat passes.
- Deterrence. Make attack unacceptably costly; in the nuclear age this is the form the balance of power takes.
- Mind relative gains. Joseph M. Grieco (1988) warns that today’s partner may be tomorrow’s adversary, so states ask whether rivals gain more, and guard against cheating.
- Prudence over crusade. Morgenthau’s first rule of diplomacy is that it must be divested of the crusading spirit: judge actions by consequences and seek accommodation wherever interests can be reconciled.
How much power is enough?
| Defensive realism (Waltz, Robert Jervis) | Offensive realism (John J. Mearsheimer, 2001) | |
|---|---|---|
| Goal | An appropriate amount of security | Maximum relative power, regional hegemony |
| Reason | Excess power provokes counter-coalitions | Intentions are unknowable and can change |
| Tools | Restraint, defensive postures | Balancing, buck-passing, denying rivals hegemony |
Indian and current illustrations
- Kautilya’s mandala and shadgunya offered the same menu (treaty, war, neutrality, shelter, dual policy) chosen by relative strength.
- India’s credible minimum deterrence with no first use applies self-help without power maximisation. Rajesh Rajagopalan (India’s Strategic Choices, 2017) argues that against China’s rise, balancing serves India better than hedging.
- The Quad without a defence treaty, beside Russian ties and BRICS, is external balancing without entrapment.
- New START expired on 5 February 2026 with no successor, and NATO’s Hague target of 5% of GDP by 2035 shows allies returning to internal balancing.
Limits of the prescription
It carries the security dilemma inside it: arming for defence alarms neighbours, and both end poorer and no safer. Robert O. Keohane argues that institutions reduce cheating and make cooperation rational; Alexander Wendt replies that anarchy is what states make of it.
Conclusion
Realism prescribes self-reliant strength, flexible alignment, deterrence and prudent diplomacy: sound insurance in a world without a guarantor. Survival is best secured when power is joined with institutions and restraint, close to how India’s multi-alignment pairs strategic autonomy with partnerships.