“Realism as an approach to international relations helps to explain why states fight are threaten each other, but it is less effective in explaining much of the cooperative behaviour we see … ” Comment. (1996)
The statement sums up the neoliberal institutionalist critique of realism that gained ground in the 1980s and 1990s, as the Cold War ended peacefully and the WTO, an expanding European Union and a web of regimes seemed to make cooperation, not conflict, the normal state of affairs. It is broadly correct, though realism has more to say about cooperation than the statement allows.
Why realism explains conflict well
- Anarchy, self-help and the security dilemma (Kenneth N. Waltz, John H. Herz) show why even defensive states arm, threaten and fight.
- Hans J. Morgenthau’s struggle for power and John J. Mearsheimer’s power maximisation account for great-power rivalry, arms races and wars of expansion.
- The record since 2022 bears this out: war in Ukraine, US–China rivalry, and the lapse of New START on 5 February 2026 with no successor.
Where the statement is right
- Institutionalised cooperation. The European Union pools sovereignty instead of balancing, and states have built and largely obeyed trade and arms-control regimes.
- Absolute gains. Robert O. Keohane (After Hegemony, 1984) argues that regimes lower transaction costs, supply information and make cheating visible, so cooperation is rational in anarchy. Robert Axelrod (The Evolution of Cooperation, 1984) shows that reciprocity in repeated games breeds cooperation without a central authority.
- Complex interdependence (Keohane and Joseph S. Nye) and the democratic peace explain zones where force has lost its utility, such as the long Anglo-American accommodation.
- Constructivists such as Alexander Wendt show that shared identities, not structure alone, create security communities. Amitav Acharya (Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, 2001) traces ASEAN’s long peace to norms of non-interference and consultation rather than balancing.
Realism’s rejoinder
- Realism does explain much cooperation. Alliances and balancing coalitions are cooperation against a threat, and Charles L. Glaser (“Realists as Optimists”, 1994) describes cooperation as a form of self-help.
- Hegemonic stability (Charles P. Kindleberger, Robert Gilpin, Stephen D. Krasner): open orders rest on a dominant power willing to bear their costs.
- Joseph M. Grieco (1988): fear of cheating and relative gains make cooperation possible but fragile. Mearsheimer (“The False Promise of International Institutions”, 1994) holds that institutions reflect the distribution of power.
- Recent evidence favours this reading. The WTO’s Appellate Body has been paralysed since 2019; export controls on semiconductors and critical minerals treat interdependence as a vulnerability; India–US trade moved from a 50% tariff in August 2025 to an 18% rate in February 2026 through bargaining backed by leverage.
- India’s own conduct is hedged cooperation: the Quad without an alliance treaty and BRICS without a common currency (the New Delhi Declaration, September 2026).
Assessment
Realism explains why cooperation is limited, conditional and reversible, but not why it is sometimes deep, institutionalised and durable, as in the EU or the post-war nuclear taboo. Liberalism explains the latter but underrates how quickly cooperation collapses when security is at stake, as India’s placing of the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance after the Pahalgam attack (April 2025) showed.
Conclusion
The statement is largely valid but overstated. Realism is a theory of conflict that also explains the limits of cooperation. A fuller account needs the liberal and constructivist explanation of when, and why, cooperation becomes habit rather than calculation.