Discuss the prospects of peace in West Asia in view of the changes in the US and Israeli policy and attitudes in this regard. (1992)
Peace in West Asia has always depended on two actors more than any others: the United States, the only power with leverage over Israel, and Israel, the party whose consent any territorial settlement needs. Robert D. Putnam‘s two-level game (1988) explains why: a deal must be acceptable both at the international table and to each side’s domestic coalition. In 1992 both levels shifted in favour of peace. By 2026 both had shifted the other way.
The changes of 1991–92
- A US willing to press its ally: after the Gulf War and the Soviet collapse, President George H. W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker convened the Madrid Conference (October 1991). They delayed $10 billion in loan guarantees to Israel over settlement building, a rare instance of Washington using material leverage over settlements.
- A changed Israeli government: in June 1992 Yitzhak Rabin‘s Labour defeated Yitzhak Shamir‘s Likud. Rabin curbed “political” settlements, gave priority to Palestinian autonomy, and the Knesset lifted its ban on contacts with the PLO in January 1993.
- The structural change: with no Soviet patron left, the Arab states and the PLO had no alternative to US mediation.
- Prospects then: good, and partly realised in Oslo (1993) and the Israel–Jordan treaty (1994). They then stalled on settlements, spoiler violence and Rabin’s assassination (1995).
How the attitudes have changed since
| 1992 | 2026 | |
|---|---|---|
| US approach | Even-handed leverage; land for peace | Strong backing for Israel: embassy moved to Jerusalem (2018), Abraham Accords (2020), the 20-point Gaza plan and Board of Peace (2025); opposed the New York Declaration, yet Trump ruled out West Bank annexation (September 2025) |
| Israeli approach | Rabin’s territorial compromise | Conflict management; the Knesset’s July 2024 resolution opposing a Palestinian state; approval of the E1 settlement plan (2025) |
| Regional setting | Arab states weak and seeking US protection | Gulf states normalising but demanding a path to statehood; US–Israeli war on Iran since February 2026 |
Prospects today
- Grounds for pessimism: the ceasefire of October 2025 halted the Gaza war, but Israeli withdrawal is incomplete. A staged Hamas disarmament deal (July 2026) stalled in August, Israeli forces still hold over half of Gaza, and the war with Iran has put security ahead of settlement. Realists such as John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt (The Israel Lobby, 2007) argue that American domestic politics limit Washington’s willingness to press Israel again as Baker did.
- Grounds for cautious hope: about 157 states now recognise Palestine, Saudi normalisation remains conditional on statehood, and UNSC Resolution 2803 gives the US a direct stake in stabilising Gaza. Israel’s election on 27 October 2026 could reopen the domestic level of the game.
- India’s position: India favours a negotiated two-State solution. It voted for the New York Declaration, skipped signing the Board of Peace charter (January 2026) and attended its first meeting only as an observer, while its de-hyphenated ties with Israel and the Arab world give it a stake in regional calm.
Conclusion
The 1992 experience shows that peace becomes possible when US leverage and an Israeli government willing to compromise coincide. Neither condition holds in 2026. Prospects are therefore good for managed ceasefires and poor for a comprehensive settlement until a future Israeli government and a US administration again treat Palestinian statehood as a goal rather than a reward.