Discuss the present state of Indo-Russian relations. (2006, 60 Marks)
When the question was set, the relationship looked settled: Russia supplied most of India’s arms, Kudankulam was rising and annual summits ran like clockwork. By late 2026 it is busier but narrower: summitry and energy trade are at record levels, but the strategic convergence that anchored it has thinned. Neoclassical realism explains the shift: a partnership built by a threat environment changes when that environment does.
Then and now
| Dimension | Mid-2000s | 2026 |
|---|---|---|
| Summitry | Annual since 2000; Putin in Delhi, December 2004 | Lapses in 2020, 2022 and 2023, then restored; 23rd summit, December 2025 |
| Defence | Dominant supplier; Gorshkov carrier deal (January 2004) | 40% of Indian arms imports (2021–25, SIPRI) |
| Energy | ONGC Videsh in Sakhalin-1 (2001) | Russia a leading crude supplier |
| Trade | A few billion dollars | About $69 billion (2024–25), Indian exports under $5 billion |
| China factor | Russia–India–China forum emerging | Russia–China “no limits” partnership (2022) |
Political and diplomatic
- Summitry restored: Narendra Modi went to Moscow in July 2024; Vladimir Putin came to New Delhi for the 23rd Annual Summit (5 December 2025), which called the tie “time-tested”, and again for the BRICS summit (September 2026), where he invited Modi to the 24th.
- Ukraine: India abstains on the main resolutions, including the General Assembly vote of February 2026 (107–12–51), while urging dialogue; Modi’s “today’s era is not an era of war” (Samarkand, 2022) marks the limit of its criticism.
- Multilateral convergence: at the New Delhi BRICS summit China and Russia reiterated support for India’s aspiration to a greater UN role, including in the Security Council.
Defence: legacy over new deals
- France and Israel have gained, though the installed base remains mostly Russian.
- The final S-400 squadron is due by end-2026. The 2025 summit agreed joint manufacture of spares under Make in India; the RELOS logistics pact (February 2025) awaits Indian ratification; Su-57 offers remain uncontracted.
Economy and energy
- US sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil (October 2025) cut Indian purchases to a multi-year low by January 2026. The Iran war and the Hormuz closure from March 2026 reversed that: India turned back to Russian crude under temporary US waivers.
- New agenda: the Programme for Strategic Areas of Economic Cooperation till 2030, a $100 billion trade target, India–EAEU free trade talks, labour mobility, the Northern Sea Route, the first INNOPROM India fair (September 2026), and nuclear projects eased by the SHANTI Act (December 2025), which replaced the 2010 liability law.
Strategic frame and strains
- The China factor: Moscow’s wartime dependence on Beijing means it cannot balance China for India.
- Regional divergence: Russia recognised the Taliban government (July 2025) and stayed even-handed during the May 2025 India–Pakistan hostilities.
- American pressure: the 50% US tariff of August 2025, half of it an oil penalty, fell to 18% in February 2026; the White House claim that India pledged to stop buying Russian oil remains disputed. On 18 September 2026 the Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act authorised tariffs of up to 100% on major buyers of Russian energy.
Competing readings
S. Jaishankar calls the tie “one constant in world politics” (December 2023); Chietigj Bajpaee describes a managed decline (2024); C. Raja Mohan (2021) sees interest replacing sentiment.
Conclusion
The relationship is stable in form and shrinking in strategic content. It now works as an insurance policy: against over-dependence on the West, against Russia’s full absorption by China, and against an oil market without a non-Gulf discounted supplier. Its renewal depends on balanced trade and co-production rather than purchase.