Comment: Potentials of Non-conventional energy sources. (2000, 20 Marks)
Non-conventional energy sources are the renewable, non-fossil sources (solar, wind, biomass, small hydro, geothermal, tidal and wave energy, and now green hydrogen) that were marginal when grids were built around coal, oil and large dams. Amory B. Lovins called them the “soft energy path” (1976): renewable, decentralised and matched to end use. E. F. Schumacher’s Small Is Beautiful (1973) gave them a developmental ethic. India institutionalised the idea early, with a Commission for Additional Sources of Energy (1981), a separate ministry in 1992, and the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy from 2006.
The scale of the potential in India
| Source | Assessed potential | Installed (31 Aug 2026) |
|---|---|---|
| Solar | about 748 GW (3% of wasteland); some 5,000 trillion kWh falls on India each year | 168 GW |
| Wind | 1,164 GW at 150 m hub height (onshore) | 58.5 GW |
| Small hydro | about 21 GW | 5.2 GW |
| Bio-energy | crop residue, bagasse and urban waste | about 11.7 GW |
Geothermal potential is put at about 10,600 MW across 381 hot springs (Puga in Ladakh among them), and a national geothermal policy followed in September 2025; tidal (the Gulfs of Khambhat and Kutch) and offshore wind remain at the pilot stage. The National Green Hydrogen Mission (2023) targets 5 million tonnes a year by 2030 to carry renewables into steel, fertiliser and shipping.
Why the potential matters
- Energy security. India imports about 85% of its crude. The 2026 Hormuz crisis, when LPG ran short, showed that domestic sun and wind cannot be blockaded.
- Climate commitments. Non-fossil sources reached 52.57% of installed capacity in February 2026, beating the 2030 target, and over 54% (about 300 GW) by July 2026. The NDC for 2031–35 (March 2026) raises the goal to 60% by 2035, alongside net zero by 2070.
- Decentralised development. Rooftop solar (PM Surya Ghar) and solar pumps (PM-KUSUM) bring power to households and farms, fulfilling Schumacher’s idea of technology on a human scale.
- Industry and diplomacy. Solar module manufacturing capacity grew from 2.3 GW in 2014 to about 172 GW by March 2026. The International Solar Alliance (2015) and the Global Biofuels Alliance (2023) let India lead institutions in the Global South, and India now ranks third in the world in installed renewable capacity (2026).
Limits to realising it
- Intermittency. Installed capacity is not generation; coal still supports over 70% of electricity generation, and storage, flexible grids and green-energy corridors lag behind capacity additions.
- Land and ecology. Large parks compete with farmland and habitats; in M. K. Ranjitsinh v. Union of India (2024) the Supreme Court weighed transmission lines against the great Indian bustard while recognising a right against climate change’s adverse effects.
- Finance. Weak distribution companies, high capital costs and unmet Northern finance pledges slow investment.
- New dependencies. China dominates polysilicon, batteries and processed critical minerals. The transition replaces oil chokepoints with mineral chokepoints, a new terrain of geopolitics.
Rival readings
Liberals see renewables as a positive-sum field for regimes and technology sharing. Realists read them as a way to reduce strategic vulnerability. Dependency and post-colonial critics warn that Northern control of finance, patents and border carbon taxes such as the EU’s CBAM could make the transition a new form of unequal exchange.
Conclusion
When the question was set, wind, at about one gigawatt, was the only new source at any scale. A quarter-century on, the potential is proven: solar alone has grown about sixtyfold since 2014, from 2.8 GW to 168 GW. The constraint is no longer resource or cost but systems: storage, grids, finance and supply-chain autonomy. Realised fully, non-conventional energy is India’s surest route to energy sovereignty and climate credibility at once.