The role of Indian Prime Ministers in the federal system was always controversial. Do you agree with this statement? Give reasons for your answer with apt examples. (2000)
The Prime Minister appears nowhere in the federal chapters of the Constitution, yet the advice that drives Governors, Article 356, planning, fiscal transfers and senior appointments flows from that office. K. C. Wheare called the design “quasi-federal”; what it left open was how a Prime Minister would use the Union’s reserve powers. The statement holds broadly, but “always” overstates: the controversy has risen and fallen with the party system.
Why the office invites controversy
- Structural Union bias: Governors hold office at the President’s pleasure (Article 156), so the Union Cabinet decides their appointment and removal, and proclamations under Article 356 issue on its advice.
- Planning as a second executive: the Planning Commission (1950) and National Development Council (1952), both chaired by the Prime Minister and created by executive resolution, controlled discretionary plan grants until the Gadgil formula (1969).
Evidence for the statement
- Jawaharlal Nehru: even the founding era produced the dismissal of E. M. S. Namboodiripad‘s Kerala ministry (1959) while it still held its majority.
- Indira Gandhi: after the 1969 split she replaced autonomous state bosses with pliable Chief Ministers, the deinstitutionalisation that Atul Kohli (Democracy and Discontent, 1990) blames for later ungovernability. She dismissed nine non-Congress governments in 1980, mirroring the Janata government’s 1977 purge, and in 1984 Governor Ram Lal dismissed N. T. Rama Rao in Andhra Pradesh, restored within a month after parading his majority. The backlash forced the Sarkaria Commission (1983–88).
- Post-2014: the NITI Aayog (2015) removed the Planning Commission’s allocative forum; Jammu and Kashmir was reorganised into Union Territories in 2019 with no elected assembly in place; Governors’ delays on bills produced State of Punjab (2023), State of Tamil Nadu (2025) and the November 2025 advisory opinion. Opposition Chief Ministers boycotted the NITI Aayog Governing Council in July 2024 over a “discriminatory” budget.
Why “always” is too strong
| Phase | Prime Minister’s federal posture | Controversy |
|---|---|---|
| 1950–67 | Disputes settled inside Congress (Rajni Kothari‘s “Congress system”); Nehru’s letters to Chief Ministers | Low, episodic |
| 1967–89 | Confrontation, Article 356 as weapon | High |
| 1989–2014 | Coalition bargaining; regional parties in the Cabinet | Low |
| 2014– | Majoritarian centralisation, then coalition since 2024 | High, now moderating |
- Under coalitions the Prime Minister became a broker, the “bargaining federalism” W. H. Morris-Jones identified. The Inter-State Council was set up in 1990, S. R. Bommai (1994) disciplined Article 356, and the Punchhi Commission (2010) proposed further safeguards.
- Cooperative instruments are real: the GST Council (Article 279A) gives states two-thirds of the voting weight.
- Since June 2024, dependence on the TDP and JD(U) has brought special packages for Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. The delimitation-linked 131st Amendment Bill failed in the Lok Sabha on 17 April 2026, arithmetic again setting the federal balance.
Conclusion
I agree that the Prime Minister’s federal role has been contested far more often than not, because the Constitution gives the office centralising tools without any obligation to consult. But the controversy is not constant. It moves along two axes, parliamentary and federal: when a single-party majority makes the parliamentary axis dominant, the Prime Minister becomes a federal superior; when coalitions make the federal axis dominant, the office becomes a negotiator.