Critically analyze the different phases of India’s foreign policy since independence. How justified, do you think, is S. Jaishankar’s classification of the current phase as the phase of ‘energetic diplomacy’? (2025, 20 Marks)
India entered independence materially weak, so its early policy was idealist in voice and non-aligned in method; as capability grew it became assertive and interest-led. S. Jaishankar’s six-phase scheme (Ramnath Goenka Lecture, 14 November 2019; The India Way, 2020) treats each period as “the overlay on the previous one, rather than either a negation or just an extrapolation”. Each turn followed a shock; the goal of strategic autonomy held.
The phases, critically read
| Phase | Defining choices | Critical assessment |
|---|---|---|
| 1946–62: optimistic non-alignment | Panchsheel, Bandung (1955), Korea | Standing far beyond material base, but China misread and defence starved |
| 1962–71: realism and recovery | Defence build-up, arms from both blocs, NPT refused (1968) | Non-alignment run as a bargaining position under scarcity |
| 1971–91: regional assertion | Indo-Soviet Treaty, Bangladesh, Pokhran-I, IPKF | Primacy won, but silence on Afghanistan (1979) and reach exceeding resources |
| 1991–98: safeguarding autonomy | Liberalisation, Look East, Israel (1992), CTBT refused (1996) | The most successful adaptation, forced by the Soviet collapse and the payments crisis |
| 1998–2014: balancing power | Pokhran-II, nuclear deal and NSG waiver (2008), BRICS | A swing state courted by all: leverage rather than strength |
| 2014 onward: energetic diplomacy | Multi-alignment, Act East, the Gulf turn, Quad with BRICS | Contested (below) |
Kenneth N. Waltz’s structural realism explains why turns came in 1991 and after 2008, when American primacy eroded, but misses agency: Pokhran-I and the IPKF were domestic choices. Jaishankar himself concedes that reverses (1962, 1991) drove the big changes of course.
What “energetic diplomacy” claims
In the lecture, Jaishankar argues that by 2014 a harder China, an uncertain America and an inward Europe had made multipolarity real, so India “chose to turn to more energetic diplomacy” in a world of “convergences and issue-based arrangements”. The ambition is to move from balancing power to leading power.
The case for the label
- Rule-shaping: the 2023 G20 presidency won a consensus declaration and admitted the African Union; India founded the International Solar Alliance and the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure.
- Formally inconsistent memberships: the Quad alongside BRICS and the SCO; India hosted the 18th BRICS summit in New Delhi (12–13 September 2026), where Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping met.
- Appetite for risk: Jaishankar’s lesson that “a low-risk foreign policy is only likely to produce limited rewards” shows in Operation Sindoor (May 2025) and in an FTA wave, with the UK CETA in force since July 2026.
The case against
- Continuity of purpose: the objective is still Jawaharlal Nehru’s autonomy. Ian Hall (Modi and the Reinvention of Indian Foreign Policy, 2019) finds the reinvention bolder in Hindu-nationalist framing than in policy’s basic settings; Rajesh Rajagopalan asks why so little of that setting changed.
- Outcomes lag energy: electoral turnover in Dhaka (February 2026) and Kathmandu (March 2026) reset ties again; SAARC has not met since 2014; the LAC is disengaged but not de-escalated.
- Exposure: US tariffs reached 50% in August 2025 before an interim deal cut them to 18% (February 2026), and the US Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act (September 2026) authorises tariffs of up to 100% on buyers of Russian oil.
- Capability gap with China caps what activism can deliver, and a serving minister’s label is a claim, not an independent finding.
Conclusion
The label is justified as a description of style and tempo, overstated as a description of strategy. What is new is not energy but India’s capacity to sustain simultaneous, formally inconsistent alignments, better named multi-alignment. The phase will be judged on outputs, a stable neighbourhood and a settled China boundary, and neither is yet delivered.