Comment: Palestine-Israel conflict in the present context. (1998, 20 Marks)
The Palestine-Israel conflict is a dispute between two national movements over one territory, turning on four unresolved questions: borders and settlements, refugees, Jerusalem and Palestinian statehood. In 1998 the “present context” was a peace process losing momentum; in October 2026 it is a ruined Gaza under a fragile, externally supervised ceasefire and a two-State formula that more states endorse but fewer facts support.
The context of 1998: Oslo under strain
- The Oslo Declaration of Principles (13 September 1993) and Oslo II (1995) created a Palestinian Authority with limited self-rule and deferred the core issues to final-status talks due by May 1999.
- Yitzhak Rabin‘s assassination (November 1995) and Hamas bus bombings in 1996 helped Benjamin Netanyahu to power; his government slowed redeployments and approved Har Homa in East Jerusalem (1997).
- The Hebron Protocol (January 1997) and the Wye River Memorandum (October 1998) reduced the process to bargaining over percentages of land. Oslo’s design, gradualism with constructive ambiguity, let each side read the end-state differently.
From process to collapse, 2000–2023
- Camp David (2000) failed on Jerusalem and refugees; the Second Intifada followed.
- Gaza disengagement (2005), Hamas’s election victory (2006) and its seizure of Gaza (2007) split Palestinian politics; Gaza went under blockade.
- Settlement growth, to roughly 700,000 settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, eroded the territorial base of a state. Ian S. Lustick (Paradigm Lost, 2019) argues a “one-state reality” has replaced the two-State paradigm.
- The Abraham Accords (2020) tested whether normalisation could bypass the Palestinians. 7 October 2023, when Hamas killed about 1,200 people in Israel and took 251 hostages, showed it could not.
The present context, 2025–26
- Toll: Gaza’s health ministry counted over 67,000 killed when the ceasefire took effect on 10 October 2025, and more than 1,400 since. Israeli forces still hold over half the Strip behind the “Yellow Line”.
- Law and recognition: the ICJ advisory opinion (19 July 2024) found the occupation unlawful. About 157 of 193 UN members recognise Palestine after the September 2025 wave (UK, France, Canada, Australia), and the General Assembly endorsed the New York Declaration (142–10–12).
- Trusteeship: UNSC Resolution 2803 (17 November 2025) authorised a US-chaired Board of Peace and an International Stabilization Force. A staged disarmament deal agreed by Hamas and other factions in July 2026, tied to Israeli withdrawal, stalled in August; the Board now wants full disarmament first. Its $2.4 billion reconstruction plan (September 2026) excludes UNRWA.
- West Bank and region: Israel approved the E1 settlement plan (2025), the US–Israeli war on Iran from February 2026 subordinated Palestine to a wider contest, and Israel votes on 27 October 2026.
Theoretical reading
- Realists: outcomes track power asymmetry and US patronage, not justice.
- Liberal institutionalists: weak enforcement and absent guarantees, which Resolution 2803 tries, unevenly, to supply.
- Constructivists: identities hardened by 7 October and Gaza shrink the space for compromise.
India’s position
India’s de-hyphenated policy, which P. R. Kumaraswamy calls a redefinition rather than abandonment of the Palestine commitment, pairs a deepening Israel partnership with support for a “sovereign, independent and viable” Palestine. It voted for the New York Declaration, skipped the Board of Peace charter signing (January 2026) and attended its first meeting only as an observer.
Conclusion
Between 1998 and 2026 the conflict moved from a flawed peace process to managed conflict under external trusteeship. Recognition of Palestine has never been wider, nor the conditions for a viable state weaker. A settlement now depends on sequenced security guarantees and withdrawal, a halt to settlement, and a unified, elected Palestinian leadership.