“The OBC politics has challenged the nature of dominant caste politics in the states.” Critically examine this statement and bring out your conclusions. (2009)
M. N. Srinivas called a caste dominant when it combines numerical strength, landownership and a ritual rank that is not too low, and with them local political power. After 1947 such castes ran the states: Reddys and Kammas in Andhra, Marathas, Patidars, Jats, Lingayats and Vokkaligas. OBC politics broke the upper-caste hold in the north, but did not end dominance as a form of power.
How OBC Politics Challenged Dominance
- Bihar. Karpoori Thakur, a Nai who became chief minister in 1977, introduced 26% reservation in 1978 on the Mungeri Lal Commission’s report. The scheme had a separate share for the most backward castes. Upper-caste members of the Janata Party had him removed in 1979, which shows how much the step threatened Bhumihar–Rajput–Brahmin control.
- Karnataka. D. Devaraj Urs (1972–80), acting on the Havanur Commission, joined backward classes, Dalits and minorities against the Lingayat–Vokkaliga duopoly. Siddaramaiah later revived this coalition as AHINDA.
- Gujarat. The Congress’s KHAM coalition (Kshatriyas, Harijans, Adivasis, Muslims) won 149 seats in 1985 without the Patidars, and the anti-reservation riots of that year followed.
- Maharashtra and Haryana. The BJP’s MADHAV formula (Malis, Dhangars, Vanjaris) targeted the Maratha hold on power. In Haryana the BJP chose non-Jat chief ministers: Manohar Lal Khattar in 2014 and Nayab Singh Saini, an OBC, in 2024.
- Representation followed. Christophe Jaffrelot and Gilles Verniers show that OBC legislators displaced upper castes in the Hindi-belt assemblies after 1990.
Critical Examination
- New dominance in place of old. The challengers became dominant in turn. Yadavs, Kurmis and Gujjars have supplied over 60% of Hindi-belt OBC MPs since the 1960s. Yadav dominance in the Samajwadi Party and the Rashtriya Janata Dal copied Srinivas’s model: numbers, land and control of the party machine.
- Class stayed the same. The new leaders came from a rich-peasant stratum of land-owning OBC farmers. Their conflicts with Dalit labourers, such as the Belchhi killings of 1977, show that the agrarian order itself went unchallenged.
- Dominant castes now claim backwardness. Jats (2016), Patidars (2015) and Marathas have demanded the OBC label. Manoj Jarange-Patil‘s fast ended on 2 September 2025 with a government resolution allowing Kunbi certificates on the basis of the Hyderabad Gazette, and OBC groups went to court against it.
- Challenge from below. The more serious challenge now comes from the Extremely Backward Classes, who form 36% of Bihar’s population (2023 survey). Nitish Kumar built a coalition of EBCs, and the BJP’s non-Yadav OBC strategy made allies of Kurmi, Nishad and Rajbhar parties in Uttar Pradesh. The Rohini Commission‘s finding that 97% of benefits went to about a quarter of OBC communities shows the same inequality within the OBCs.
- The south. In Andhra and Karnataka dominance has been reshaped rather than broken: Reddy and Kamma leaders still head the YSRCP and the Telugu Desam Party.
Conclusion
OBC politics ended upper-caste monopoly and made numbers, not ritual rank, the basis of power. Dominance itself remained: it moved to the strongest OBC castes, or the old dominant castes adopted the backwardness label. The EBCs and the Census 2027 caste count will decide whether the OBC challenge democratises the states or only changes which caste dominates.