Ethnic conflicts and insurgencies in NorthEast India can be better managed by improving relations with the neighbouring countries. Substantiate the statement with suitable examples.

Ethnic conflicts and insurgencies in NorthEast India can be better managed by improving relations with the neighbouring countries. Substantiate the statement with suitable examples. (2015, 10 Marks)

Almost all of the North-East’s boundary is international, shared with Bangladesh, Myanmar, Bhutan, China and Nepal. No insurgency there has lasted without a rear base across a frontier supplying shelter, money, weapons and escape. How neighbours behaved has therefore decided how strong each insurgency became.

When neighbours were hostile, insurgency thrived

  • China trained and armed Naga cadres from the late 1960s and later helped Mizo rebels.
  • The Mizo National Front, born of anger at relief failures in the mautam famine of 1959, operated from East Pakistan and the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
  • Under Dhaka’s 2001–06 coalition, ULFA and the NDFB ran camps in Bangladesh; the Chittagong arms haul of April 2004 exposed official complicity.

When relations improved, insurgent capacity collapsed

  • Bhutan: in December 2003 Operation All Clear destroyed some thirty camps of ULFA, the NDFB and the KLO while India sealed the border.
  • Bangladesh after 2009: ULFA chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa (December 2009), NDFB chief Ranjan Daimary (2010) and Anup Chetia (November 2015) were handed over. The 2013 Extradition Treaty and the 2015 Land Boundary Agreement made this durable, and pro-talks ULFA signed a settlement in December 2023.
  • Myanmar: the coordinated Operation Sunrise (2019) hit NSCN-K, ULFA and NDFB camps, and Myanmar handed over 22 insurgents in 2020.
  • The Mizo precedent: 1971 removed the MNF’s East Pakistani base, and the Mizo Accord of 30 June 1986 has held since.

Limits of the claim

  • Party-bound cooperation: Dhaka’s help rested on one government. After the 2024 uprising, the BNP’s February 2026 victory and Sheikh Hasina’s presence in India, it must be rebuilt with Tarique Rahman’s administration.
  • Incapable neighbours: Myanmar’s regime controls little of its frontier, ULFA-I still operates from Sagaing, and civil-war arms reach Manipur. Good relations with Naypyidaw are not enough; India has also engaged the Arakan Army, Chin groups and the National Unity Government, inviting them to New Delhi in November 2024.
  • Internal roots: the Meitei–Kuki-Zo conflict from May 2023 grew from land, identity and reservation disputes no neighbour can settle, and the Naga talks remain unconcluded. Sanjib Baruah’s Durable Disorder (2005) warns that security cooperation without political accommodation only manages violence.

Conclusion

The statement holds for capability: friendly neighbours deny sanctuary and turn insurgency into policing. Lasting management also needs accommodation at home (the Bodo Accord of 2020, the ULFA settlement of 2023, the 2024 Tripura accord) and Act East connectivity that gives border communities a stake in peace.