Non-proliferation has now acquired the status of a vested interest with the nuclear weapon states which, in the name of political stability, are trying to perpetuate a global order which will preserve their hegemonic position. Discuss. (1994)
The statement restates the classic critique from the global South, voiced most consistently by India. In Antonio Gramsci‘s sense, as carried into international relations by Robert W. Cox (1981), hegemony is domination secured through institutions that present the interests of the powerful as everyone’s interest; for Cox, theory is always for someone and for some purpose. The charge holds substantially. Non-proliferation is also a real collective good, however, and not merely a disguise.
The case for the statement
- Hierarchy written into law: Article IX(3) of the NPT recognises only states that tested before 1 January 1967. These are the five permanent members of the Security Council, so nuclear status is fused with institutional power. Jaswant Singh called the result nuclear apartheid.
- “Stability” applied selectively: the five say that more nuclear states would mean accidents, weak command and arms races. Kenneth N. Waltz replied that deterrence stabilises new possessors as it stabilised the old. The double standard holds that deterrence is safe for us and dangerous for you.
- Article VI neglected: no timetable for disarmament exists, all nine possessors are modernising, China has about 620 warheads (SIPRI 2026), and New START lapsed in February 2026 with nothing to replace it.
- Technology monopoly: the Nuclear Suppliers Group (1975), the MTCR and dual-use lists restrict the South’s access to technology. India’s delegate M. A. Husain had attacked the NPT’s peaceful-explosion clause as an atomic commercial super-monopoly (1967).
- Selective enforcement: Israel’s arsenal goes unaddressed, the 2008 NSG waiver bent the rules for a strategic partner, and force was used against safeguarded Iranian facilities in June 2025 and again from February 2026. The rules follow alignment, which is what a hegemonic order looks like.
- Great-power management: Hedley Bull (The Anarchical Society, 1977) justified the special responsibilities of great powers. Critics answer that management by the strong is still rule by the strong.
The case against
- A shared good: most non-weapon states want their neighbours to stay non-nuclear. They built the Tlatelolco and Pelindaba zones themselves, and Argentina and Brazil created mutual inspection through ABACC (1991).
- Real reductions: warheads fell from about 70,000 in 1986 to 12,187 in 2026, and the five are not a bloc. France and China joined the NPT only in 1992.
- Genuine dangers: the A. Q. Khan network and the risk of nuclear terrorism show that stability is not purely a pretext. Robert O. Keohane‘s regime theory explains why even unequal regimes reduce uncertainty for all.
- India’s own trajectory: India moved from embargo after 1974 to the 2008 waiver and to membership of three supplier regimes by 2018. That suggests the order bends to accommodate rising powers rather than simply excluding them.
The present balance
- The TPNW (in force 2021, 74 parties), which every possessor rejects, is a revolt of the non-nuclear majority against the hierarchy.
- The 11th NPT Review Conference (April–May 2026) collapsed for the third time in a row, partly over disarmament. The vested interest is now openly contested inside the regime itself.
Conclusion
The hierarchy is real and tends to perpetuate itself, and “stability” often serves as its vocabulary. Yet the danger it guards against is also real. Non-proliferation stays legitimate only if the five treat their privilege as a transitional trust to be wound down through disarmament, not as a permanent title.