Vision of a new world order has emerged as the major objective of India’s foreign policy. Discuss the policy initiative taken by India in this regard and the challenges faced by it.

Vision of a new world order has emerged as the major objective of India’s foreign policy. Discuss the policy initiative taken by India in this regard and the challenges faced by it. (2015, 20 Marks)

India’s demand for a new order descends from Jawaharlal Nehru’s non-alignment and the 1970s call for a New International Economic Order. It now takes the form of reformed multilateralism, a multipolar world and a development-first agenda for the Global South. Its initiatives are real, but each meets structural limits.

Policy initiatives

Reforming global institutions

  • A campaign with the G4 (Brazil, Germany, Japan) for Security Council expansion in both categories, revived at the first G4 leaders’ summit since 2004 (New York, September 2015), and for realigned quotas in the IMF and World Bank.
  • G20 presidency 2023 under Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam: the African Union became a permanent member, and the Global Biofuels Alliance was launched.
  • Co-founding the New Development Bank and joining the AIIB; chairing BRICS in 2026, whose New Delhi Declaration called for IMF, World Bank and WTO reform and opposed unilateral tariffs and sanctions.

Voice of the Global South

  • The Third India–Africa Forum Summit (October 2015), the first open to all 54 African states, with US$10 billion of concessional credit.
  • Three Voice of the Global South summits (2023–24), a Global Development Compact (2024) and 600 development projects in 78 countries (cited at the UN General Assembly, September 2026).
  • Vaccine Maitri: about 301 million doses to 99 countries; essential medicines to more than 150 countries in 2020.

Climate leadership

  • The International Solar Alliance, launched with France at COP21 in Paris (November 2015), and the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (2019), both India-founded.
  • The Panchamrit at Glasgow (2021), including 500 GW of non-fossil capacity by 2030 and net zero by 2070; half of installed power capacity became non-fossil in June 2025.

Resilient economy and connectivity

  • Atmanirbhar Bharat and the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative with Japan and Australia (2021) present India as a trusted supply-chain hub; PM Gati Shakti builds the infrastructure behind it.

Maritime and minilateral order

  • SAGAR (2015), widened into MAHASAGAR (2025); the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (2019); the Quad; the Information Fusion Centre at Gurugram.
  • The AI Impact Summit (February 2026), endorsed by 89 countries, stakes a claim on frontier rules.

Challenges

  • Resistance to reform. Some permanent members and the Uniting for Consensus group resist Council expansion; negotiations had completed 17 cycles by mid-2026 without a text. The 2023 IMF quota increase left every share unchanged.
  • China. It backs only a “greater role” for India in the UN (BRICS, 2026), never a permanent seat, out-finances India across the South and anchors an Asia India wants multipolar.
  • An inconsistent hegemon. The United States imposed 50% tariffs on India in 2025 (18% after the February 2026 interim deal), left 66 bodies including the ISA and the UNFCCC in January 2026, and in September 2026 authorised tariffs of up to 100% on buyers of Russian oil.
  • Weaponised interdependence. Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman show how control of network hubs becomes coercive power; China’s rare-earth curbs of 2025 hit Indian industry.
  • Order versus justice. Hedley Bull warned that pursuing justice for the excluded can cost order. India argues for justice at the UN and for stability in the Indian Ocean, and established powers use that tension to delay change.
  • Contested leadership and capability. Brazil, South Africa and China also court the South; India was sixth by nominal GDP in the IMF’s April 2026 outlook, and delivery of credit lines is slow.
  • Consistency. India criticises exclusive clubs while building minilaterals, and its exit from RCEP and wide ICJ reservations weaken its rules argument.

Conclusion

India’s initiatives have produced real gains: an enlarged G20, new climate institutions and a convening role in the South. Yet India remains a reformer of the existing order, not its architect; its vision depends on whether its economic capability and neighbourhood stability can keep pace with its ambition.