Given the recent developments in the region, do you think that there is a need to change India’s ‘No First Use (NFU)’ nuclear policy? (2019, 15 Marks)
India faces two nuclear-armed neighbours that are close partners and both claim its territory. In 2019 the debate was sharpened by Pulwama and the Balakot strikes (February) and by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s remark at Pokhran in August that India had strictly adhered to NFU but its future “depends on the circumstances”. Galwan (2020), Operation Sindoor (May 2025) and China’s growth to about 620 warheads have renewed it. The better view is that the pledge should stay and the force behind it should be strengthened.
The case for change
- Strategic passivity. Critics say NFU lets Pakistan wage proxy war without nuclear cost, Glenn H. Snyder’s stability–instability paradox; deterrence did not prevent Kargil (1999).
- Asymmetry. Vipin Narang (Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, 2014) shows that Pakistan’s asymmetric escalation posture uses its weapons to deter India’s conventional strength, while India’s assured retaliation deters only a Pakistani nuclear strike.
- Lost options. Some urge nuclear pre-emption of Pakistani forces; Narang and Christopher Clary (International Security, 2018–19) detect this “counterforce temptation” in canisterised and MIRVed missiles.
- Ambiguity as deterrent. Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar (November 2016) asked why India should bind itself; the BJP’s 2014 manifesto promised to revise the doctrine.
- New pressures. Pakistan’s Saudi defence pact (September 2025) and army-centred strategic command (November 2025) raise its risk appetite.
The case against change
- No existential threat. Rajesh Rajagopalan (2019) calls NFU “deep realism”: India fears neither annihilation, as Israel does, nor a disarming surprise attack, as the superpowers did, so an assured threat of retaliation suffices.
- Credibility. Threatening first use against a terror attack would not be believed. Shyam Saran’s 2013 warning that a weapon’s label, tactical or strategic, is irrelevant already answers the Nasr.
- The record. Balakot and Sindoor (7–10 May 2025) showed conventional punishment below the threshold; Pakistan’s 10 May hint of a National Command Authority meeting was denied within hours, and Narendra Modi declared India would not tolerate “nuclear blackmail”.
- Costs of first use. It needs alert forces, pre-delegation and a much larger arsenal, would spur a race with Pakistan, and would squander the standing behind the 2008 NSG waiver. It could also push smaller neighbours towards China.
- China’s example. Beijing’s white paper of 27 November 2025 reaffirmed unconditional NFU while expanding, showing that credibility comes from survivability, not first-use threats.
What should change instead
The real weaknesses lie in capability and command: putting a long-range missile on the three SSBNs now in service (INS Aridhaman, April 2026; the K-4 is not confirmed as deployed), securing command against decapitation, and replacing “massive” with “assured” retaliation. Shivshankar Menon’s “potential grey area” (Choices, 2016) shows ambiguity already exists; periodic, published review is a better signal than abandonment.
Conclusion
Recent developments argue for a stronger second strike, not a different pledge. Dropping NFU would buy a threat no one believes against Pakistan and cost diplomatic capital everywhere else. The doctrine’s gaps are in capability and crisis management, and should be fixed there.