Examine the increasing significance of maritime security in India’s foreign policy. (2019, 20 Marks)
K. M. Panikkar argued in India and the Indian Ocean (1945) that India lost its independence when it lost command of the sea. For decades after 1947, a continental focus on Pakistan, China and the land borders kept the sea at the margins. Since the 1990s, economic opening, energy dependence and China’s arrival in the Indian Ocean have moved maritime security towards the centre of Indian foreign policy, though capability still lags doctrine.
Why its significance has grown
- Geography: a coastline of 11,098.81 km on the National Hydrographic Office’s re-assessment (up from the long-cited 7,516.6 km), over 1,300 islands and an EEZ of about 2.37 million sq km.
- Trade and energy: the sea carries about 95% of India’s trade by volume and 70% by value, and crude import dependence reached 88.7% in 2025-26. Iran’s restriction of Hormuz from March 2026 forced India to draw more crude from its 41-plus other suppliers: a chokepoint became a domestic crisis within weeks.
- Resources: fisheries and the Deep Ocean Mission, which explores polymetallic nodules in the Central Indian Ocean Basin.
- Strategic competition: China’s base at Djibouti (2017), access at Gwadar and Hambantota, and the Malacca dilemma driving its naval presence. C. Raja Mohan’s Samudra Manthan (2012) reads this as Sino-Indian rivalry extended to the sea.
- Non-traditional threats: 26/11 came by sea; Somali piracy resurged from late 2023; Houthi attacks diverted Red Sea shipping; trafficking and illegal fishing persist.
How it is reshaping foreign policy
- Doctrine: in the spirit of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History (1890), India now calls itself a net security provider, a role Manmohan Singh claimed in 2013. Ensuring Secure Seas (2015) codified it, and SAGAR (2015) and MAHASAGAR (2025) gave it diplomatic form.
- Neighbourhood diplomacy: coastal radar chains, patrol vessels and hydrography for Mauritius, Seychelles, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. The Colombo Security Conclave and IORA, which India chairs for 2025–27, institutionalise collective action.
- Partnerships: the Quad’s maritime domain awareness work and its Indo-Pacific Energy Security initiative (May 2026), Malabar, logistics agreements and the IFC-IOR (2018) with partner liaison officers.
- Presence: anti-piracy patrols since 2008, the MV Ruen recapture (March 2024), HADR as first responder, and access at Duqm, Sabang and Agalega.
- Economic statecraft: a ₹69,725 crore shipbuilding and maritime package (September 2025) treats shipyards and shipping finance as strategic assets.
- Normative stance: India backs UNCLOS and accepted the 2014 award on its maritime boundary with Bangladesh, a contrast with China’s rejection of the 2016 South China Sea ruling.
Testing the claim: the limits
- Capability gap: about 140 ships, a submarine arm below requirement, and an unresolved third-carrier debate.
- The continental pull: after the 2020 Ladakh crisis, money and formations moved back to the Himalaya; India cannot fully fund a two-front land posture and a blue-water navy at once.
- Delivery deficit: Chabahar is hostage to US sanctions and IMEC has been slowed by war in West Asia.
- Restraint by design: India avoids bases, alliances and South China Sea patrols. Realists read this as under-ambition; liberal institutionalists see a rules-first posture that reassures small littoral states.
Conclusion
Maritime security has moved from the periphery to the core of Indian foreign policy, because India’s growth, energy and status now travel by sea. Doctrine and diplomacy have advanced faster than ships and money. The test is converting geography into sea control through steady naval funding, shipbuilding and littoral partnerships, without giving up the strategic autonomy that keeps India outside alliances.