Discuss the strategic implications of India’s ‘Look East Policy’ transforming into ‘Act East Policy’. (150 words) (2021, 10 Marks)
The Look East Policy of P. V. Narasimha Rao’s government (1991–92) was chiefly economic: Southeast Asian markets and capital after the 1991 crisis. When Narendra Modi told the East Asia Summit at Nay Pyi Taw in November 2014 that it had become Act East, the change was one of register more than of verbs: the policy acquired a security core and a wider map.
What the transformation changed
- Scope: from ASEAN to the Indo-Pacific, taking in Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Pacific Islands (the Forum for India–Pacific Islands Cooperation, 2014).
- Content: the four Cs (Culture, Commerce, Connectivity, Capacity building), with security added to trade.
- Tempo: Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships with Vietnam (2016), Indonesia (2018), Australia (2020) and ASEAN itself (2022), and a Strategic Partnership with the Philippines (2025).
Strategic implications
- Soft balancing of China. Act East is hedging, not alliance: it builds partners’ capacity to resist coercion, closer to Stephen M. Walt’s balance of threat than to bloc formation.
- India as security provider. BrahMos deliveries to the Philippines (from April 2024), defence credit lines to Vietnam, access arrangements with Singapore and Indonesia, and the first ASEAN–India Maritime Exercise (2023) carry Indian naval reach east of Malacca, on an UNCLOS and freedom-of-navigation position.
- The Indo-Pacific frame. Modi’s Shangri-La speech (June 2018) and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (2019) put India at the centre of a two-ocean system while affirming ASEAN centrality. The Quad adds a minilateral layer; its New Delhi ministerial (May 2026) launched a Critical Minerals Framework.
- Continental link. Kaladan and the Trilateral Highway tie North-Eastern security to Myanmar’s stability.
- Voice. East Asia Summit and ADMM-Plus seats let India shape agendas; 2026 is the ASEAN–India Year of Maritime Cooperation.
Limits
Danielle Rajendram (2014) read the rename as continuity delivered with more energy. Rajesh Rajagopalan (“Evasive balancing”, 2020) argues India seeks the benefits of balancing while avoiding its costs. Strategy runs ahead of economics: the RCEP exit (2019), a deficit of about US$45 billion with ASEAN (2024–25), an unfinished AITIGA review and stalled Myanmar corridors. Modi joined the October 2025 summit only virtually.
Conclusion
The shift turned a trade policy into a regional strategy and made India a credible, if limited, security partner in Southeast Asia. It also projects India as a responsible regional power offering partners an alternative to dependence on China. Its durability depends on matching strategic weight with economic depth.