The changing socio-economic profile of of legislators does not augur well for the health of Indian democracy. Comment. (2019, 15 Marks)
The concern grew as candidates’ affidavits, required since 2003, exposed lawmakers’ wealth and criminal records. Whether the change is unhealthy depends on the lens. On Anne Phillips‘s politics of presence, the Lok Sabha has become more inclusive. On the quality of representation and deliberation, it has become more plutocratic, criminalised and dynastic. Both are true, but they are not equally weighty.
Why the statement holds
- Criminalisation. In the 18th Lok Sabha 251 MPs (46%) have declared criminal cases and 170 (31%) face serious charges, up from 23% in 2004. In 2024 a candidate with cases had a 15.3% chance of winning, against 4.4% for one without. Milan Vaishnav‘s When Crime Pays (2017) explains why: such candidates self-finance, and voters reward them for “getting things done” where the state is weak. Lawbreakers as lawmakers blunts the will for police and anti-corruption reform.
- Plutocracy. 93% of MPs are crorepatis (average assets ₹46.34 crore). Office becomes an investment to be recovered, and wealth replaces caste as the barrier to entry.
- Dynasty. Kanchan Chandra (Democratic Dynasties, 2016) traces dynasty to weak party organisation. Recruitment by descent is the mark of an elite that has stopped circulating, in Vilfredo Pareto‘s sense.
- Exclusion persists. Women are 74 (13.6%), down from 78, though their win rate exceeds men’s; the bottleneck is nomination, under 10% of candidates. Muslim MPs number just 24 (4.4%), against a population share of about 14%.
- Weaker deliberation. The 17th Lok Sabha sat only 274 days and referred about 16% of bills to committees: a ratifying rather than deliberative House.
The counter-view
- Social deepening. Since 1989 OBCs, Dalits and Adivasis have entered legislatures in numbers, Yogendra Yadav‘s second democratic upsurge and Christophe Jaffrelot‘s “silent revolution”, achieved through the ballot. Presence has shifted policy attention towards them.
- Plebeianisation is not criminalisation. Criminality rose across parties of every social base, including the upper-caste right; blaming newcomers repeats elitist prejudice.
- More educated, younger. 77% of MPs are graduates, and the average age fell from 59 to 56.
- Disclosure works slowly. Voters now know what they are choosing. Court directions (Rambabu Singh Thakur, 2020) and the 106th Amendment’s women’s quota, enacted though not yet in force, are correctives.
Assessment
The statement is largely valid, with a qualification. The broadening of who sits in Parliament is a democratic gain. The narrowing of how they get there, through money, muscle and lineage, is a democratic loss, and it now threatens to close the door that the vote opened. India has seen elite circulation without elite transformation.
Conclusion
The profile does not augur well, not because the socially subordinate have arrived but because the cost of entry is excluding the ordinary citizen of every caste. The remedy lies in capping party spending, conditional state funding, disqualification at the framing of serious charges with safeguards, intra-party democracy and implementing women’s reservation.