Examine the implications of turmoil in Iraq and West Asia for India’s security and foreign policy concerns. (2014, 15 Marks)
In June 2014 the Islamic State took Mosul and declared a “caliphate”, while Syria, Libya and Yemen slid into civil war. India sits outside West Asia’s regional security complex, in the sense of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (Regions and Powers, 2003), but it is deeply exposed to it. The turmoil therefore matters to India through several distinct channels.
Implications for India’s security
- People. About seven million Indians then lived in the Gulf (some 9–10 million today), and their remittances are the region’s largest return to India. In 2014 46 nurses were trapped in Tikrit and 39 workers were abducted in Mosul; the workers were later found to have been killed.
- Energy. The Gulf supplied roughly two-thirds of India’s crude, and Iraq was one of its two largest suppliers. Any threat to southern Iraqi output or to Hormuz was a direct macroeconomic risk.
- Radicalisation and terrorism. Youths from Kalyan near Mumbai left to join the Islamic State in 2014, and Ayman al-Zawahiri announced al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent in September 2014. Online recruitment and terror financing through Gulf channels were the new risks.
- Sectarian spill-over. A Sunni–Shia war could echo among Indian Muslims.
- Sea lanes. State collapse in Yemen and Somalia threatened the Bab-el-Mandeb and Gulf of Aden routes.
Testing the claim: the limits of the threat
The danger was real but uneven. Oil prices actually fell sharply in late 2014 as US shale supply grew, so the energy shock never came. Very few Indians joined the Islamic State, suggesting strong social resistance to radicalisation. The real exposure was human and consular.
Implications for India’s foreign policy
- Non-intervention with protection. India did not join the anti-ISIS military coalition, as it had refused troops for Iraq in 2003, but built evacuation capacity, which delivered Operation Raahat in Yemen in 2015.
- Balancing rivals. India had to stay close to Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran and Israel at once. This pushed India from the “Look West” language of the mid-2000s to a more active “Link West” approach after 2014, with strategic partnerships and counter-terrorism cooperation with Gulf states. China’s growing presence, later visible in its 2023 Saudi–Iran brokerage, sharpened the competition.
- A case for regional dialogue. India’s interest lies in promoting confidence-building between Iran and the Gulf monarchies and, eventually, a cooperative security arrangement in the region. Its own lack of standing limits this.
The pattern since 2014
Later crises confirmed the exposure: Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping (2023–24), then the 2026 war on Iran, when Hormuz routes carrying about 45% of India’s crude and 90% of its LPG were disrupted and some 1.1 million Indians returned from the Gulf. Pakistan, not India, mediated the ceasefire, and the Saudi–Pakistan defence pact (September 2025), extended to Turkey at Mecca in August 2026, shows how quickly Gulf alignments can turn against Indian interests.
Conclusion
West Asian turmoil touches India’s citizens, fuel and internal security more than its territory. India’s restraint has protected access, but its security now depends on larger reserves, naval reach and enough diplomatic weight to help stabilise the region, not only to escape from it.