Has the recent Indo-Israeli relationships given a new dynamics to India’s stand on Palestinian statehood? (2017, 10 Marks)
From 1992 India built a defence, agriculture and technology partnership with Israel while keeping it out of public view. Narendra Modi’s visit of 4–6 July 2017, the first ever by an Indian Prime Minister, ended that reticence: he did not stop in Ramallah, and ties were raised to a strategic partnership. The relationship has given India’s stand on Palestinian statehood a new dynamic of method and tone, but not a new substance.
What is new
- De-hyphenation: Israel and Palestine are handled as separate files. Mahmoud Abbas was received in Delhi in May 2017; in February 2018 Modi made the first prime ministerial visit to Ramallah, as a separate trip.
- Thinner wording: “East Jerusalem as its capital” vanished from India’s two-State formula during Abbas’s visit and stayed absent in Ramallah in 2018.
- Votes that favour Israel: India abstained on the UN Human Rights Council’s Gaza inquiry report (2015) and in June 2019 voted with Israel at ECOSOC to deny observer status to the Palestinian NGO Shahed. After 7 October 2023 it called the Hamas attack terrorism and abstained on some Gaza texts.
- Issue-based logic: Vijay Keshav Gokhale described India in 2019 as an aligned state, but based on issues, and Palestine is now one issue among many rather than the test of India’s West Asia policy.
What has not changed
- India recognised the State of Palestine in 1988 and has never withdrawn it; it still backs a sovereign, independent and viable Palestine living beside Israel.
- In December 2017, months after the Israel visit, India voted for the General Assembly resolution rejecting the American recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.
- Aid has continued: UNRWA funding, the Palestinian Institute of Diplomacy, and in September 2025 a vote for the New York Declaration on the two-State solution.
Assessment
- A realist reading (C. Raja Mohan) sees an overdue end to symbolic diplomacy that bought India little in Arab capitals, made possible because the Arab states were themselves dealing with Israel.
- Later critics such as Talmiz Ahmad answer that de-hyphenation hides a slow retreat from a principled position India held since Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi.
- P. R. Kumaraswamy called the 2017 shift a redefinition, and Nicolas Blarel’s account of incremental recalibration fits the evidence best: the old elements remain, reweighted.
Conclusion
The Israel partnership has changed how India talks about Palestine, and how loudly, but not what it supports. Statehood remains India’s declared goal; what has gone is the leadership India once claimed on it. For a rising middle power with interests on every side, a firm but quieter commitment is a defensible choice.