Assess the role of the rim countries of the Indian Ocean in making it a peace zone in the post-Cold War era. (1998)
The Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, adopted as UN General Assembly Resolution 2832 (XXVI) in 1971 on Sri Lanka’s initiative, asked great powers to remove bases, nuclear weapons and rivalry from the ocean. The end of the Cold War removed the superpower contest that had blocked it. The littoral states’ record since shows a quiet but real shift: from excluding outsiders to cooperative security among insiders.
The inheritance from the Cold War
- The UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean (1972) never convened its planned Colombo conference; Western naval powers opposed it, and several littoral states themselves hosted foreign bases.
- K. M. Panikkar had argued in India and the Indian Ocean (1945) that India’s security depends on control of the ocean’s approaches. That logic made demilitarisation a principle many littoral states praised and few practised.
What rim countries achieved after 1991
- Institution-building: Nelson Mandela’s call for rim cooperation during his 1995 visit to India led to the Indian Ocean Rim initiative, formally launched in Mauritius in March 1997 and renamed the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) in 2013. It now has 23 members and 12 dialogue partners; India chairs it for 2025–27.
- Denuclearisation from the rim: the Bangkok Treaty (1995) for South-East Asia and the Pelindaba Treaty (1996, in force 2009) for Africa carried the zone’s anti-nuclear idea across much of the littoral.
- Cooperative maritime security: India’s MILAN exercises (from 1995), the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (2008), the Information Fusion Centre in Gurugram (2018), SAGAR (2015), widened into MAHASAGAR in Mauritius (March 2025), and the Colombo Security Conclave; and patrols that curbed Somali piracy after 2008.
- Decolonising the ocean: Mauritius won a 2019 ICJ advisory opinion on Chagos, and the UK–Mauritius treaty of 22 May 2025 would transfer sovereignty while leasing back Diego Garcia. India backed it. But ratification was paused in April 2026 after Washington withdrew support: a reminder of where the final say still lies.
Why a peace zone was never realised
- The rim armed itself: India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in May 1998, and littoral navies have grown fast.
- Heterogeneity and weak institutions: IORA stretches from South Africa to Australia, works by consensus and avoids hard security.
- Outsiders stayed, new ones came: Diego Garcia, French territories, China’s base in Djibouti (2017) and port projects at Gwadar and Hambantota. Gulf states host American fleets by choice.
- New disorder: Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping from late 2023 and Iran’s restriction of Hormuz in 2026 showed that the ocean’s chokepoints are hostage to conflicts the rim cannot control.
Assessment
The rim countries have been important but not decisive. Realists expect as much: littoral states balance with outside navies rather than expel them. David Brewster (India’s Ocean, 2014) reads India’s maritime policy as a bid for regional leadership pursued with, not against, outside powers; its stated aim since 2013 of being a “net security provider” captures that turn from demilitarisation to managed security. Institutionalists still credit IORA and the naval forums with habits of cooperation absent in 1991.
Conclusion
A demilitarised Indian Ocean was never within the gift of the littoral states; a rule-governed one may be. The realistic post-Cold War achievement is not a zone of peace but a zone of rules, in which outside navies operate under arrangements the rim states help write. Giving IORA a maritime-security agenda during India’s chairship is the logical next step.