Discuss India’s vision of a New World order in the 21st century. (2019, 2022, 15 Marks)
Hedley Bull defined international order in The Anarchical Society (1977) as a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary goals of a society of states. India judges the present order unequal and unrepresentative: economic weight has moved to Asia while institutions stay frozen in 1945. At the UN General Assembly on 26 September 2026, S. Jaishankar said the world was moving towards multipolarity. India’s vision has five elements, and its record of delivery is mixed.
The elements of the vision
- Multipolarity. A world, and an Asia, of several centres rather than one hegemon. Multi-alignment is the method: the Quad alongside BRICS, the SCO and BIMSTEC, built on what Jaishankar called (November 2019) “convergences and issue-based arrangements”.
- Reformed multilateralism. Universal institutions kept but repaired: an expanded Security Council, realigned IMF and World Bank shareholding, and restored WTO dispute settlement.
- A rules-based order made by many. The UN Charter, sovereignty, non-interference and peaceful settlement, with rules binding the strong as well as the weak; India cites its acceptance of the 2014 maritime award with Bangladesh.
- Development first. Fair trade, technology transfer, climate finance under common but differentiated responsibilities and non-conditional South-South partnership.
- An alternative universality. Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, the G20 theme, offers pluralism in place of one model, echoing Amitav Acharya’s “multiplex world” (The End of American World Order, 2014).
Instruments
- G20 New Delhi (2023): a consensus declaration and the African Union’s permanent membership.
- Three Voice of the Global South summits (2023–24); Vaccine Maitri’s 301 million doses to 99 countries; the International Solar Alliance and CDRI; some 600 development projects in 78 countries (cited at the 2026 General Assembly).
- MAHASAGAR (2025), widening SAGAR, and digital public infrastructure offered as a public good.
- The BRICS New Delhi Declaration (September 2026): local-currency settlement, Bretton Woods and WTO reform, and criticism of unilateral tariffs and sanctions.
Evaluation
- Strengths. The diagnosis is widely shared, and India occupies a bridging position: a large non-Western democracy outside every bloc, at the junction of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific, offering neighbours credit without crippling debt.
- Reformist, not transformative. India wants a bigger chair at the same table and has never proposed abolishing the veto. G. John Ikenberry’s argument in Liberal Leviathan (2011), that rising powers seek authority within the liberal order, fits.
- Little reform delivered. Security Council negotiations had run 17 cycles by mid-2026 without a text; the 2023 IMF quota increase changed no shares. Rohan Mukherjee (Ascending Order, 2022) shows that rising powers cooperate where institutions admit them fairly, which explains India’s mixed conduct.
- A capability gap. India was sixth by nominal GDP in the IMF’s April 2026 outlook; the United States’ exit from the ISA in January 2026 shows how fragile new bodies are.
- Consistency. Leaving RCEP (2019) and wide reservations to ICJ jurisdiction weaken the rules argument.
Conclusion
India’s vision is a coherent reformist programme: a multipolar world governed by repaired universal rules and centred on development. Its diagnosis is stronger than its delivery; credibility now rests on turning convening power into institutional change.