Comment on India’s growing relationship with USA in the background of constrained relations between India and China. (2016, 15 Marks)
Tanvi Madan’s Fateful Triangle (2020) shows that China has shaped India–US relations since the 1950s, drawing the two together whenever their threat perceptions converged. The year 2016 fits the pattern: India signed LEMOA and became a Major Defence Partner just as Beijing blocked its NSG bid at Seoul and the UN listing of Masood Azhar. The relationship grew because of China, but India has kept it short of a containment pact.
Constrained India–China relations as the driver
- Border: an unsettled frontier, later tested at Doklam (73 days, 2017) and Galwan (June 2020), where twenty Indian soldiers died.
- Diplomatic denial: obstruction of India’s NSG membership and, until May 2019, of Azhar’s listing.
- Encirclement concerns: CPEC through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, Chinese port projects in the Indian Ocean and the China–Pakistan two-front problem.
- Asymmetry: an economy close to five times India’s and a record trade deficit of $112.16 billion in FY2025–26.
How the US relationship answers it
India’s China strategy combines internal balancing (infrastructure, manufacturing, military modernisation) with external balancing, in Kenneth N. Waltz’s terms, and the United States supports both.
- Defence: LEMOA (2016), COMCASA (2018) and BECA (October 2020, amid the Ladakh standoff); US intelligence and winter equipment during that crisis; a ten-year defence framework in October 2025.
- Maritime: Malabar, the revived Quad (2017) and the 2015 Joint Strategic Vision for the Indian Ocean. India’s position near the Malacca Strait, through which much of China’s energy passes, gives it leverage.
- Signalling: Beijing takes Delhi more seriously because Washington does. Shivshankar Menon adds the limit: asymmetric power pushes India towards America but forbids commitments that shrink its options.
- Technology: semiconductors, critical minerals and the TRUST initiative aim to cut dependence on Chinese supply chains.
Why India stops short of choosing
- Two fears: a Sino-American condominium that leaves India exposed, and a Sino-American war that forces a choice. The first looks less remote: Donald Trump called his Busan meeting with Xi Jinping (October 2025) a “G2”, made a state visit to Beijing in May 2026 and hosted Xi in Washington on 24 September 2026.
- Strategic autonomy: India refuses a Taiwan commitment and keeps the SCO and BRICS as channels to Beijing. Washington, in turn, doubts that autonomy permits a true partnership.
- The 2025–26 hedge: when Washington imposed a 50% tariff, India steadied ties with China. Narendra Modi attended the SCO summit at Tianjin (August–September 2025), flights resumed, and Xi came to New Delhi for the BRICS summit, where on 12 September 2026 the two leaders pledged a “fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable” boundary settlement. Disengagement on the LAC is complete; de-escalation is not.
- Economic reality: China displaced the United States as India’s largest trading partner in 2025–26, a limit on any decoupling.
Conclusion
India’s growing tie with the United States is best read as balancing plus engagement, not containment. China’s pressure made the partnership possible; American volatility, and Washington’s own courtship of Beijing, keep India talking to China. India’s interest lies in realistic expectations of both, with strategic autonomy as the pivot of the triangle.