Give a critical account of India’s role in the affairs of the Third World countries. (2006, 60 Marks)
For Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s freedom was incomplete while other Asian and African peoples remained colonised; solidarity was an obligation, not a sentiment. India convened the Asian Relations Conference (March 1947) before its own independence, and has claimed a leading voice for the “Third World”, now the Global South, ever since. For Vijay Prashad (The Darker Nations, 2007), the Third World was not a place but a political project, and India was among its authors. The record is substantial, but it shows a persistent gap between voice and resources and between solidarity and national interest.
The case for India’s role
- Decolonisation and anti-racism: India put the treatment of Indians in South Africa on the UN agenda in 1946 and was the first state to sanction the apartheid regime. It convened a conference on Indonesia in 1949 and backed liberation movements across Africa.
- Institution-building: India was a founder of Bandung (1955), the Non-Aligned Movement (1961) and the G-77 (1964), and hosted UNCTAD II in New Delhi (1968). Drawing on Raúl Prebisch’s critique of declining terms of trade, India was a leading voice for the New International Economic Order (1974).
- Peace and order: Panchsheel (1954) codified non-interference, and Indian contingents served from Korea and the Congo to today’s missions; India has sent nearly 300,000 personnel to more than 50 missions.
- Development partnership without conditions: ITEC (1964) has trained over 200,000 officials from 160-plus countries; lines of credit, the IBSA Fund, Vaccine Maitri (about 301 million doses to 99 countries) and the 2020 TRIPS waiver proposal with South Africa followed.
- Representation: India’s G20 presidency secured the African Union’s permanent seat (September 2023), and three Voice of the Global South summits (2023–24) followed.
The critical account
- Rhetoric without means: before 1991 India offered speeches and training slots, not capital. The NIEO failed and NAM, now some 120 members, lost coherence after the Cold War.
- Selective principle: India was muted on Soviet interventions in Hungary (1956) and Afghanistan (1979), which realists read as interest dressed as solidarity.
- Hegemony charge at home: smaller neighbours saw 1971, the IPKF in Sri Lanka (1987) and the 1989 Nepal blockade as regional dominance, not Third World fraternity.
- Interest over constituency: India’s defence of farm subsidies at the WTO diverges from Brazil’s and Africa’s export interests; its UN Security Council bid and BRICS chairmanship use Southern numbers for Indian goals.
- Delivery gaps: announced credit far exceeds disbursement, the India–Africa Forum Summit has not met since 2015 and was postponed for a third time in May 2026, and impact is not evaluated.
- Contested leadership: no one appointed India to speak for the South. China outspends it, and Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia have their own claims. Quad membership dents its non-aligned credentials.
Weighing the record
Post-colonial scholars see an authentic anti-imperial ethic; realists see status-seeking. The evidence supports a middle reading. Writing on India’s G20 presidency (Indian Express, January 2023), C. Raja Mohan urged Delhi to resist forming a bloc against the developed North and to offer the South sustainable economic cooperation instead; its conduct largely follows that advice. The New Delhi Declaration of the BRICS summit (September 2026), which called for IMF, World Bank and WTO reform without proposing a common currency, fits that pattern.
Conclusion
India’s role has been most effective where it set norms and opened doors: decolonisation, the African Union’s G20 seat and non-conditional training. It has been weakest where money and follow-through were needed. It is a convener and advocate of the South more than its financier, and its credibility depends on closing that gap.