Critically examine the role of India in shaping the emerging world order. (2020, 15 Marks)
The US-led liberal order is strained by China’s rise, by a backlash against globalisation inside Western democracies and by Washington’s own retreat: in January 2026 it announced withdrawal from 66 international bodies. India presents itself as a shaper of what follows, seeking a polycentric order without hegemonic poles. Its role is real in agenda-setting and convening, and limited in rule-making.
India as a shaper
- Bridging and brokering. At the G20 New Delhi summit (2023) India secured a consensus declaration despite divisions over Ukraine, and the African Union’s permanent membership, a rare enlargement of a global forum.
- Multi-alignment. Membership of the Quad, BRICS, the SCO, BIMSTEC and the G20 lets India be courted by several powers and captured by none. S. Jaishankar’s The India Way (2020) sets the method: “engage America, manage China, cultivate Europe, reassure Russia”.
- Reform and alternatives. India presses for Security Council, IMF and World Bank reform while co-founding the New Development Bank and holding the second-largest stake in the AIIB. As BRICS chair it hosted the New Delhi summit of September 2026, whose declaration backed local-currency settlement and Bretton Woods reform.
- Norms and public goods. The International Solar Alliance, CDRI, Vaccine Maitri, digital public infrastructure and the AI Impact Summit (February 2026, declaration endorsed by 89 countries) place India on frontier as well as legacy issues; at the General Assembly on 26 September 2026 it cited 600 development projects in 78 countries.
- De-hyphenation. Simultaneous ties with Israel, the Gulf states and Iran; in the 2026 Iran war Tehran named India among the states allowed through Hormuz.
The critique
- Reformist, not architectural. G. John Ikenberry argues that rising powers seek more authority within the liberal order, not new rules. India seeks a larger seat and has never proposed ending the veto.
- Status without delivery. Rohan Mukherjee (Ascending Order, 2022) shows that rising powers cooperate when institutions admit them fairly. India won entry to the G20 and nuclear commerce but not the permanent five; Council negotiations had run 17 cycles by mid-2026 without a text.
- Capability gap. India was sixth by nominal GDP in the IMF’s April 2026 outlook, and Chinese lending dwarfs Indian credit lines.
- Contested leadership. China, Brazil and South Africa also court the Global South, and great-power ambition distances India from that constituency.
- Constraints at home and nearby. Two nuclear-armed neighbours with disputed borders absorb capacity, and V-Dem’s 2026 report still classes India an electoral autocracy, denting soft power.
- A rules-thin moment. No universal institution stopped the Iran war; passage was rationed bilaterally, so India’s gains came from bargaining rather than rules.
Conclusion
India is a norm-entrepreneur and convenor more than a rule-maker. Its stake lies in a rules-based multipolar order, because in a world without rules the Melian logic of Thucydides returns: “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”.