What steps has India taken to regain its foothold in Afghanistan since the Taliban has taken over the country in August 2021? (2023, 15 Marks)
When Kabul fell on 15 August 2021, India lost its embassy, its remaining consulates, its partner government and its intelligence access within days. Since then New Delhi has climbed back in careful increments, a strategy best described as engagement without recognition: the practical benefits of a working relationship without the legal commitment.
Step 1: Opening a channel and shaping the regional line (2021)
- India’s ambassador in Doha met the Taliban’s Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanekzai on 31 August 2021, the first acknowledged contact.
- As Security Council president, India steered Resolution 2593 (30 August 2021), demanding that Afghan soil not shelter or train terrorists.
- National Security Adviser Ajit Doval hosted the Delhi Regional Security Dialogue (10 November 2021) with Russia, Iran and the five Central Asian states; China and Pakistan stayed away.
Step 2: Humanitarian assistance “for the Afghan people”
- Over 47,500 tonnes of wheat, about 1.5 million COVID-19 doses, 60 million polio doses, medicines and earthquake relief, routed largely through the World Food Programme and WHO so that aid reached a population rather than a regime.
- When Pakistan obstructed overland transit, India shifted cargo to Chabahar (from March 2023) and to a revived air-freight corridor (Kabul–Delhi, Kabul–Amritsar).
Step 3: Presence and political contact
- A technical team reopened the Kabul embassy in June 2022.
- Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Dubai (January 2025); S. Jaishankar spoke to him in May 2025 after Kabul condemned the Pahalgam attack.
- Muttaqi’s visit to India (9–16 October 2025) led to the mission’s restoration to embassy status (21 October 2025), and in January 2026 India accepted Mufti Noor Ahmad Noor as chargé d’affaires in New Delhi. Agriculture Minister Ataullah Omari followed in July 2026.
Step 4: Regional formats and economic re-entry
- India sits in the Moscow Format (October 2025) and the SCO, sharing the regional line against any foreign military return to Bagram.
- Pre-2021 assets, from the Salma Dam to the Parliament building, remain Indian goodwill; the Afghanistan budget line rose to ₹150 crore for 2026–27.
- In 2025 Afghan exports to India (about US$755 million) overtook those to Pakistan for the first time.
Assessment
The ladder works because the chargé–ambassador distinction keeps recognition, India’s biggest bargaining chip, unspent. Avinash Paliwal (My Enemy’s Enemy, 2017) argues that India’s Afghan policy has always sought a stable balance across the Durand Line rather than a particular regime, which explains why Delhi can deal with the movement it once opposed. Yet the foothold is partly a windfall: Pakistan–Taliban hostility, flaring again in September 2026, has pushed Kabul towards Delhi. Silence on the Taliban’s exclusion of women and dependence on Iranian and air routes limit what it can become.
Conclusion
India has regained access, goodwill and a voice without endorsing the Emirate. To make the foothold durable, it must institutionalise trade, scholarships and health links that can outlive the Pakistan–Afghanistan quarrel, and spend recognition only for verifiable counter-terrorism and transit guarantees.