Examine India’s role in strategic terms with regard to the land-locked countries in South Asia. With regard to Nepal, to what extent has the involvement of major powers such as China, the US and the EU impacted India’s strategic interests? (2009, 60 Marks)
South Asia has three landlocked states: Nepal, Bhutan and Afghanistan. The first two are effectively “India-locked”, since nearly every route to the sea crosses India. UNCLOS (Article 125) gives landlocked states a right of transit, but the terms are negotiated with the transit state, and that gives it leverage. India’s role is therefore both provider and gatekeeper; its strategic task is to use that position without provoking the hedging it fears.
India’s strategic role
| Country | India’s stake | Instruments |
|---|---|---|
| Nepal | Himalayan buffer; open border; Gorkha recruitment | 1950 Treaty; transit treaty (revised 2023); power trade |
| Bhutan | Chumbi Valley and Siliguri Corridor; Doklam | 1949/2007 treaty; hydropower; ₹2,288 crore budget aid (2026–27) |
| Afghanistan | Counter-terrorism; access to Central Asia | Zaranj–Delaram road; Chabahar; aid |
- Buffer and shield: since China took Tibet in 1950, Nepal and Bhutan have been India’s northern shield. Bhutan’s Operation All Clear (2003) and the Doklam stand-off (2017) show how directly their territory bears on Indian security.
- Transit and energy: India gives both access to Kolkata–Haldia and Visakhapatnam and buys their hydropower; the Long-Term Power Trade Agreement (2024) commits India to 10,000 MW of Nepali imports.
- Afghanistan is the exception, because Pakistan blocks India’s overland access. India built the 218-km Zaranj–Delaram road and invested in Chabahar, but the US sanctions waiver for the port lapsed in April 2026. After the Taliban returned, India engaged without recognising: Amir Khan Muttaqi visited Delhi in October 2025 and a Taliban chargé d’affaires took charge in January 2026, while Pakistan–Afghanistan relations slid into open fighting.
Nepal and the major powers
China has had the largest impact.
- Nepal’s purchase of Chinese arms helped trigger the 1989 trade and transit crisis, and the 2015 blockade pushed Kathmandu to sign a transit agreement (2016), a BRI MoU (2017) and a BRI framework (December 2024).
- Delivery lags. No commercial cargo moves under the transit protocol, and Nepal’s anti-graft body charged the Chinese contractor of the Pokhara airport in December 2025. China’s main gains are political: leverage over parties, Tibet-related commitments and proof that India is not Nepal’s only option.
The United States has largely converged with India.
- The Millennium Challenge Corporation compact (US$500 million, in force August 2023) builds about 300 km of transmission lines that carry Nepali power towards India.
- Its ratification in 2022 under an interpretive declaration, and Nepal’s refusal of the US State Partnership Program that year, show Kathmandu limiting even friendly powers.
The European Union has had a normative and marginal impact: development aid, election observation and support for the 2006 peace process. India was wary of an extended external role such as UNMIN (2007–2011), but the EU never competed strategically.
How far: an assessment
- Major-power involvement has diluted India’s exclusivity but not its primacy. The open border, transit, remittances and the electricity market remain structural.
- On Stephen M. Walt’s balance-of-threat logic, proximity magnifies perceived threat, so Nepal’s hedging is predictable. Constantino Xavier (2020) reads Nepal’s diversification as structural, not a betrayal.
- The deepest damage has come from India’s own coercion and slow delivery, which opened the space others used. Prime Minister Balendra Shah’s proposal at the UN (September 2026) for a Himalayan climate mechanism led by Nepal, India and China shows Kathmandu now prefers equidistance in form.
Conclusion
India’s role towards its landlocked neighbours is strategically indispensable but unevenly exercised: secure in Bhutan, contested in Nepal, and constrained in Afghanistan by Pakistan. In Nepal, China has eroded India’s monopoly more in symbol than in substance, the US has largely complemented India, and the EU has been peripheral. India’s interests are best protected by being the most useful neighbour, not the most controlling one.