The growing closeness between India and Israel will strengthen the cause of Palestine. Comment. (2019, 10 Marks)
The claim assumes that India’s closeness to Israel is an asset Palestinians can draw on: a state trusted by both sides can speak to each with more effect. It rests on India’s de-hyphenation of the two relationships since 2014, which Narendra Modi’s separate visits to Israel (July 2017) and Ramallah (February 2018) put on display. The record supports only a narrow version of the claim.
The case for the claim
- Credible access: the United States is distrusted in Arab capitals for shielding Israel with its veto, and no Arab state has India’s standing in Tel Aviv. India’s ties with Israel, the Gulf monarchies, Iran and the Palestinian Authority together give it rare access to all parties.
- Liberal logic of engagement: a partner can raise humanitarian access, settlements and Palestinian economic needs privately, where public criticism would be ignored.
- Material support continues: UNRWA funding, the Indian-funded Palestinian Institute of Diplomacy, budget support and ITEC training show that closeness to Israel has not cut aid.
- A stronger voice: a successful Indian contribution to peace would raise its global standing, an incentive to use the access.
The case against
- Votes moved towards Israel: India abstained on the UN Human Rights Council’s Gaza inquiry report in July 2015, and in June 2019 voted with Israel at ECOSOC against observer status for the Palestinian NGO Shahed.
- The formula thinned: “East Jerusalem as its capital” disappeared from official statements in 2017.
- Leverage unused: Realists note that Israel offers India capability, not concessions. India has never tied defence purchases to Palestinian outcomes. Since 2023 it has abstained on the sharpest accountability texts, while backing most others.
- No mediating role: India sent only a junior minister to the Sharm el-Sheikh Gaza summit (October 2025) and attended the first Board of Peace meeting only as an observer (February 2026). Nicolas Blarel argues that India’s ties with Israel have a ceiling set by its Arab and Iranian interests, and the same ceiling limits what it can do for Palestine.
- Counterpoint: India voted for the New York Declaration on the two-State solution in September 2025, which shows that the Palestine file still works independently of the Israel file.
Conclusion
De-hyphenation means the two files run separately, so closeness to Israel has neither strengthened nor formally weakened the Palestinian cause. India’s access to both sides is a latent asset that it has not used. The claim would hold only if India chose to turn its partnership with Israel into diplomatic pressure, and so far it has preferred not to.