Write a brief note on India’s interests in West Asia. (2019, 15 Marks)
In C. Raja Mohan’s three concentric circles of Indian foreign policy, West Asia lies in the second, the extended neighbourhood, where India seeks influence and denies dominance to hostile powers. India’s interest there began with oil and migrant labour and has broadened into capital, connectivity, security and technology. Narendra Modi’s visit to the UAE in August 2015, the first by an Indian Prime Minister in 34 years, is usually taken as the turning point.
Core interests
| Interest | Content | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| People and remittances | 9–10 million Indians in the Gulf; about 38% of remittances | Hard to relocate; loss is immediate and household-level |
| Energy security | Gulf supplies most of India’s crude and LNG; Qatar is the largest LNG supplier | Price stability and supply security |
| Trade and capital | India–GCC trade US$178.56 billion (2024–25); Gulf investment over US$31 billion | The GCC is India’s largest trading bloc by goods |
| Sea lanes | Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandeb; naval escorts since Operation Sankalp (2019) | Most westbound trade and energy pass here |
Strategic and political interests
- The Pakistan flank: for decades the Gulf was Pakistan’s diplomatic and financial base. India has worked to dilute that tie; Riyadh and Abu Dhabi now speak of cross-border terrorism in terms India accepts, and the UAE invited India to the OIC foreign ministers’ meeting in 2019.
- Counter-terrorism: extradition, financial intelligence and a check on radical funding networks.
- Connectivity: Chabahar in Iran offers a route to Afghanistan and Central Asia that bypasses Pakistan; IMEC (2023) would link India to Europe through the Gulf.
- Rising profile: India has moved from passive recipient of outcomes to a partner seeking to shape them, through Link West after 2014 and strategic partnerships across the Gulf.
New areas
- Space and technology: ISRO’s PSLV carried the UAE’s Nayif-1 nanosatellite into orbit in 2017; AI and supercomputing deals with the UAE followed in 2026.
- Food and energy transition: the I2U2 food-park and Gujarat renewables plans, and Emirati crude stored in Indian strategic reserves.
- Trade agreements: the UAE CEPA (2022), the Oman CEPA (in force 1 June 2026) and GCC free trade talks launched in 2026.
Interests under strain
- The oil-price slump of 2014–16 cut Gulf demand for Indian labour; in 2026 the Iran war and the closure of Hormuz sent about 1.1 million Indians home by April and put roughly US$50 billion of remittances at risk.
- Uncertain US commitment has opened space for India, but the Gulf states are hedging: Saudi Arabia’s defence pact with Pakistan (2025) and the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement with Turkey and Pakistan (2026) show that economic ties do not bring alignment.
- Sanctions on Iran have left Chabahar in limbo since the US waiver lapsed in April 2026.
Conclusion
India’s interest in West Asia has grown from a petrol pump to a strategic space: its people, energy, capital and sea lanes all run through the region. Its policy of keeping every relationship intact has protected these interests well, but the 2026 crisis shows that India needs a voice in the region’s security as well as in its markets.