What diplomatic steps has India taken to articulate the interests of the Global South in International Politics?

What diplomatic steps has India taken to articulate the interests of the Global South in International Politics? (2023, 10 Marks)

The Global South is a political category more than a geographic one: states that share a colonial past and a demand for voice in an order they did not design. India has spoken for this constituency since Jawaharlal Nehru, and since 2023 it has moved from joining Southern platforms to convening them.

Foundational steps

  • Non-Aligned Movement (1961): a founder, India defended sovereignty and non-interference and later steered the movement’s economic turn towards the 1974 NIEO demand.
  • G-77 and UNCTAD: India signed the 1964 Joint Declaration and hosted UNCTAD II at New Delhi in 1968, where preferential market access (the GSP) was agreed in principle.
  • Group of 15 (1989) and the South Commission, with Manmohan Singh as Secretary-General, gave the South its own economic caucus and analytical capacity.

Summit and forum diplomacy since 2023

  • Voice of the Global South Summits (January 2023, November 2023, August 2024): opening the first, Narendra Modi told 125 countries “your Voice is India’s Voice. Your Priorities are India’s Priorities.” The second inaugurated DAKSHIN, a Global South centre of excellence; the third launched the Global Development Compact (trade, capacity building, technology sharing, concessional finance and grants).
  • G20 presidency: the African Union’s permanent membership (9 September 2023) and a consensus New Delhi Declaration.
  • BRICS chairmanship, 2026: the New Delhi Declaration (September 2026) called for IMF, World Bank and WTO reform and criticised unilateral tariffs and sanctions.

Negotiating positions that carry Southern demands

  • WTO: public stockholding for food security, special and differential treatment, and the October 2020 TRIPS waiver proposal with South Africa.
  • Climate: common but differentiated responsibilities; at Baku (November 2024) India objected to the $300bn-a-year-by-2035 finance goal as inadequate.
  • Institutional reform: IMF quota realignment, development-bank reform and Security Council expansion through the G4.

Development partnership as advocacy

  • ITEC (since 1964), lines of credit, the India–UN Development Partnership Fund, Vaccine Maitri (about 301 million doses to 99 countries), the International Solar Alliance and CDRI.
  • Demand-driven, conditionality-free cooperation embodies the Development Compact, India’s alternative to the donor model.

Conclusion

India has turned rhetorical solidarity into a convening role that delivers, of which the AU’s G20 seat is the hardest evidence. The caveats remain: the summits have not met since August 2024, disbursement trails pledges, China contests the leadership, and C. Raja Mohan (2023) warns that the label masks divergent interests, so advocacy works best issue by issue. India’s voice for the South is credible but self-appointed, to be re-earned through delivery.