Illustrate the main causes of tension between India and China. Suggest the possibilities of improving relationship. (2016, 10 Marks)
The Asian giants began with Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai and the Panchsheel of 1954 and ended up at war in 1962. Realist readings borrow the Chinese proverb that one mountain cannot hold two tigers. In John H. Herz’s terms (1950), it is also a security dilemma: each side’s defensive moves read as offence to the other.
Main causes of tension
- The boundary: some 3,488 km without an agreed line. China holds Aksai Chin and claims Arunachal Pradesh. The undefined LAC produced Depsang (2013), Doklam (2017) and the Galwan clash of June 2020, in which 20 Indian soldiers died.
- The Pakistan axis: Pakistan’s 1963 cession of the Shaksgam Valley, CPEC through Gilgit-Baltistan to Gwadar, an 80% share of Pakistan’s arms imports (SIPRI, 2021–25), and Chinese holds on terrorist listings at the UN.
- The Indian Ocean and the neighbourhood: ports such as Hambantota and Gwadar give the “string of pearls” fear substance. Opaque Chinese lending raises debt-trap worries in India’s neighbours.
- Tibet and water: the Dalai Lama’s succession (his statement of July 2025) and the ~60 GW Medog dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo.
- Economic asymmetry: a deficit of $112.16 billion in FY2025–26, and dependence for APIs, electronics and rare earths.
- Status: China blocks India’s NSG entry and has not endorsed its bid for a permanent UNSC seat, while it reads the Quad as encirclement.
Possibilities of improving the relationship
- Boundary first: a framework under the 2005 Political Parameters, with an “early harvest” in the middle sector, where maps were exchanged in 2001. The Special Representatives’ 25th round (August 2026) added two military hotlines and set expert groups an “early and substantial harvest” on delimitation. De-escalating the forces still massed is the next test.
- Restored CBMs: the 1993–2013 agreements, revitalised through the WMCC.
- People and trade: direct flights resumed in October 2025, and border trade reopened in 2026 at Nathu La, Shipki La and Lipulekh. India eased Press Note 3 in March 2026, which lets Chinese capital produce in India and helps reduce the imbalance.
- Shared agendas: emergency hydrological data (August 2025), BRICS, the SCO and climate positions within BASIC.
- A diplomatic frame: S. Jaishankar’s “three mutuals” of respect, sensitivity and interest. When Xi Jinping came to New Delhi for the September 2026 BRICS summit, he and Narendra Modi committed to a “fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable” resolution of the boundary question.
Conclusion
Tension is structural, but so is interdependence. Cooperation serves both rising powers better than antagonism. The realistic goal is competitive coexistence: a quiet border, rebalanced trade and agreed rules for the rivalry, rather than friendship.