Examine the impact of coalition-politics on Indian political system. (2012)
Between 1989 and 2014 no party won a Lok Sabha majority, and every government was a coalition or a minority. Rajni Kothari had described a Congress “system” in which bargaining happened inside one party. Coalition politics moved that bargaining into the open, between parties. The claim to examine is that this reshaped India’s institutions more than any amendment did. It holds, but many of the changes proved reversible.
Impact on institutions
| Institution | Impact | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Prime Minister and Cabinet | From leader to manager; portfolios negotiated; collective responsibility diluted | Allied ministers dissenting in public; Manmohan Singh‘s “some compromises have to be made in managing a coalition” (2011) |
| Parliament | Confidence votes became real; the Speakership became a bargaining prize; the Rajya Sabha gained weight | Governments fell in 1990, 1997 and 1999; the TDP’s G. M. C. Balayogi as Speaker (1998) |
| President and Governors | Discretion revived in hung Houses | K. R. Narayanan required letters of support (1998); Sarkaria and Punchhi orders of preference |
| Federalism | Article 356 fell into disuse; state parties shaped national policy | S. R. Bommai (1994); Inter-State Council (1990); West Bengal stalling the Teesta deal |
| Judiciary and watchdogs | Filled the space weak governments left | PIL and Vineet Narain (1997); T. N. Seshan‘s Election Commission; CAG reports on 2G and coal |
Impact on the system as a whole
- Party system. Regional parties became national actors, and competition became bipolar by alliance. E. Sridharan shows that first-past-the-post rewards pooling votes before the poll, which is why the NDA and UPA were pre-poll fronts.
- Governance devices. The National Agenda for Governance (1998), the Common Minimum Programme (2004), coordination committees and Groups of Ministers are informal but real constitutional innovations.
- Policy. Consensus survived changes of government: liberalisation continued, and UPA-I passed the RTI Act and MGNREGA. Arend Lijphart would see power-sharing broadening representation in a plural society.
- Costs.
- Five general elections between 1989 and 1999.
- Horse-trading, as in the JMM bribery case.
- Ministries run as partner fiefdoms, which was the setting of the 2G allocation.
- UPA-II’s decision paralysis.
Testing the claim
- Rival causes. Bommai, liberalisation and an assertive judiciary did as much as coalitions to curb Article 356 and decentralise power, so causation is shared.
- Reversibility. The single-party majorities of 2014 and 2019 brought back prime-ministerial dominance, Union-branded schemes and the 2019 reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir. The coalition-era changes were practice, not structure.
- Return in 2024. With the BJP at 240, the TDP and JD(U) became pivotal. The results included packages for Andhra Pradesh and Bihar and the withdrawal of lateral entry. The 131st Amendment Bill (April 2026), backed by the NDA, was defeated 298–230 by the opposition because the government lacked a two-thirds majority.
Conclusion
Coalition politics made India’s political system more federal, more consultative and more representative. It also made it less decisive and harder to hold to account. Its impact is real, but it depends on Lok Sabha arithmetic: the constitutional form stays constant, while the power inside it shifts with the seat count. Durable gains need institutions, such as a stronger Inter-State Council and a neutral anti-defection adjudicator, that do not depend on who holds the balance.