Illustrate the issue of illegal cross-border migration in South Asia and its impact on regional alliances and bilateral relations. (150 words) (2012, 12 Marks)
South Asia’s borders were drawn across peoples, not between them: Bengalis, Pashtuns, Tamils, Nagas and Zo communities straddle frontiers. Movement driven by Partition, war, persecution, poverty and climate therefore continues across lines states now enforce. The key mechanism is that removal requires the sending state’s consent, so each enforcement drive becomes a bilateral demand the neighbour cannot concede without domestic cost.
The issue illustrated
| Corridor | Nature of the flow | Bilateral effect |
|---|---|---|
| Bangladesh → India | Economic and episodic movement across a 4,096 km porous border | Dhaka denies the migrants are its nationals; the NRC and CAA (2019) cost ministerial visits; 2,303 people pushed in between May 2025 and January 2026 drew protest |
| Myanmar → Bangladesh, India | Stateless Rohingya (over 700,000 in 2017); Chin refugees into Mizoram after 2021 | Repatriation failed; Mizoram’s shelter for Chin kin divides Delhi and Aizawl |
| Afghanistan → Pakistan | Refugees and undocumented Afghans since 1979 | Islamabad’s expulsion drive from late 2023 added to tensions, driven chiefly by the Pakistani Taliban dispute, that became open war by February 2026 |
| Bhutan → Nepal | Lhotshampa expelled around 1990–92 | Bilateral talks failed; most resettled in third countries |
| Sri Lanka → India | Tamils fleeing civil war | Shaped India’s intervention and the 1987 Accord |
| Nepal ↔ India | Lawful under the 1950 Treaty | Trafficking and third-country transit, not illegality |
Impact on regional alliances
- No regional regime: Afghanistan is the only South Asian party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and SAARC has only a trafficking convention.
- Blocked cooperation: smuggling-linked border killings poison India–Bangladesh ties, and border-state constituencies resist transit, land ports and visa liberalisation, slowing connectivity.
- Securitisation: for Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (Regions and Powers, 2003), South Asia is a conflict-prone regional security complex; migration becomes one more existential threat rather than a shared problem.
- Climate pressure ahead: Bangladesh’s low-lying delta will generate displacement that no bilateral or SAARC arrangement yet anticipates, and that no legal category covers.
Assessment
Migration is not itself the threat to regional relations. The damage comes from unilateral enforcement in a region with no institution to manage it, so domestic measures are read abroad as accusations. Myron Weiner showed in 1992–93 that a receiving state’s threat perception is a political fact that shapes diplomacy, whatever the numbers.
Conclusion
A South Asian framework for labour mobility, readmission and refugee protection would turn a recurring accusation into a managed process. Without one, migration will keep eroding bilateral trust and regional cooperation alike.