Comment: The Gulf Crisis 1991-92. (1999, 20 Marks)
The Gulf crisis began with Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990, peaked in the war of January–February 1991 and ran on through the disarmament, Kurdish and no-fly-zone disputes of 1991–92. It was the first great test of the post-Cold War order: President George H. W. Bush hailed a “new world order” in September 1990, while sceptics saw American power wearing a UN mandate. Both readings hold part of the truth.
Causes
- Iraqi motives: debts of the eight-year war with Iran, anger at Kuwaiti over-production that depressed prices, a dispute over the Rumaila field, and an old claim to Kuwait as a lost province.
- Permissive environment: a Soviet Union in retreat and ambiguous American signals.
- Stakes for outsiders: a large share of world oil reserves and Saudi security.
Course of the crisis
- UN action was swift and unobstructed: Resolution 660 demanded withdrawal the same day; Resolution 661 imposed comprehensive sanctions; Resolution 678 (29 November 1990, 12–2–1) authorised “all necessary means” after 15 January 1991. The Soviet Union voted yes; China abstained.
- Operation Desert Storm: a coalition of some three dozen states began air strikes on 17 January and a ground offensive on 24 February; Kuwait was freed and a ceasefire declared on 28 February.
- Aftermath, 1991–92: Resolution 687 (April 1991) set ceasefire terms: destruction of weapons of mass destruction under a special commission (UNSCOM) and the IAEA, border demarcation, a compensation fund and continuing sanctions. Resolution 688 condemned the repression of Kurds and Shias; safe havens and a northern no-fly zone followed, and a southern zone in August 1992.
Significance
1. Collective security revived. With the veto unused, the Council acted as the Charter intended; for liberal institutionalists Chapter VII could work once great-power rivalry eased. Yet Inis L. Claude Jr. (Swords into Plowshares, 1956) had made collective security depend on peace being treated as indivisible and on power being diffused. In 1991 consensus existed but power was concentrated, so the system worked against a middle power only because the strongest state chose to act.
2. Collective security by delegation. Command lay in Washington, not with the Military Staff Committee. Realists read it as hegemonic management of a strategic resource; Charles Krauthammer called the moment “unipolar”. The Council was also selective: Kuwait was rescued; Palestine and Bosnia waited.
3. A new sovereignty debate. Resolution 688 treated internal repression as a threat to international peace, an early step towards humanitarian intervention. Yet the no-fly zones rested on a reading of 688 the text did not support.
4. The end of bipolarity confirmed. Moscow’s votes showed the Cold War was over; the joint US–Soviet sponsorship of the Madrid Peace Conference (October 1991) flowed directly from the war.
India and the crisis
India organised one of the largest civilian airlifts in history, bringing home some 170,000 nationals. The Chandra Shekhar government let US military transports refuel in India, then stopped in February 1991 after domestic protest. On the Council from 1991, India abstained on Resolution 688, defending sovereignty. The oil-price spike and lost remittances deepened the balance-of-payments crisis behind the 1991 reforms.
Legacy
The unresolved Iraq file ran from sanctions to the 2003 invasion. Iraq completed $52.4 billion in compensation to Kuwait in 2022, and the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq closed on 31 December 2025, ending three decades of UN oversight that began in 1991.
Conclusion
The Gulf crisis showed that collective security can work, but only when it coincides with a great power’s interest. It marked the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar order and from a strict to a qualified idea of sovereignty, and India learned how exposed non-alignment is to energy shocks.