What have been the main challenges to India’s foreign policy in the last two decades? Are these essentially ‘concerns’ with domestic politics or ‘strategic’ issues? (200 words) (2012, 15 Marks)
Since 1991 India has had to rebuild its foreign policy for a world without the Soviet Union, inside a globalising economy and beside a rising China. The challenges of that period, which have only sharpened since, sit where external structure meets internal politics, a zone Bayless Manning called “intermestic” (1977).
The main challenges
- Post-Cold War adjustment: the loss of a Soviet partner and a unipolar America pressing on Kashmir and non-proliferation.
- Nuclear isolation: refusal of the CTBT (1996), the 1998 tests and sanctions, resolved only by the 2008 civil nuclear deal and NSG waiver.
- Cross-border terrorism: Kargil (1999), the Parliament attack (2001) and 26/11 (2008), with nuclear deterrence limiting India’s response.
- China’s rise: an unsettled boundary, a widening power gap, and Chinese port and lending footprints in South Asia.
- Neighbourhood instability: conflict in Sri Lanka and Nepal, regime swings in Bangladesh and Maldives, and a SAARC hobbled by India–Pakistan hostility.
- Great-power management: deepening ties with Washington without forfeiting Moscow or provoking Beijing.
- Energy security: import dependence that ties India to the Gulf, Iran and later Russia.
- Economic multilateralism: WTO bargaining on agriculture and food stockholding, and climate talks where India defends common but differentiated responsibilities.
- Capacity: a diplomatic service of under a thousand officers in position, stretched across more than two hundred missions and posts.
- Diaspora protection: millions of workers in the Gulf, requiring mass evacuations from Kuwait (1990) and Libya (2011).
Domestic concerns or strategic issues?
The dichotomy is false. Robert D. Putnam’s two-level game (1988) captures it: negotiators bargain abroad while securing ratification at home.
- Domestic politics shaping strategy: the Left’s withdrawal of support in 2008 nearly sank the nuclear deal; West Bengal blocked the Teesta accord in 2011; Tamil Nadu’s parties pressed India’s votes on Sri Lanka at the UN Human Rights Council.
- Strategy driven by structure: China’s rise, Pakistan’s use of terror and the nuclear order are systemic facts no election changes; in Kenneth N. Waltz’s terms they are third-image pressures arising from the distribution of power.
- Growth as strategy: Sanjaya Baru (Strategic Consequences of India’s Economic Performance, 2006) argued that India’s external weight rests on domestic growth, so economic reform is itself a strategic choice.
- Collapsed boundary: food security is both a welfare scheme and India’s fixed WTO position; energy is a macroeconomic and an alignment question.
The pattern has deepened. Buying discounted Russian oil, a domestic inflation decision, triggered a US penalty tariff in 2025; the Indus Waters Treaty, held in abeyance since 2025, is both a farm-economy and a security lever.
Conclusion
The challenges are strategic in origin but domestic in management. Systemic forces set the agenda, while coalition partners, states and public opinion set how far India can move. Foreign policy is therefore a coordination problem across ministries and federal units, not a preserve of diplomats. The National Security Council, created in 1998, was meant to integrate the two levels; its record of doing so remains uneven.