Explain how Rawls used the liberal and egalitarian perspective to develop his theory of justice. (2025, 15 Marks)
For John Rawls, distributive justice concerns “the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation” (A Theory of Justice, 1971, §2). Rather than choose between liberty and equality, he built liberal freedoms into an egalitarian distributive scheme.
The liberal strand: what is distributed, and to whom
- The individual as the unit: “Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override.” Against utilitarian aggregation, no one’s share may be sacrificed for a larger total.
- Liberties distributed equally and first: the first principle guarantees civil and political liberties to all, with lexical priority; no economic gain can buy them.
- Primary goods as a neutral currency: rights, opportunities, income and wealth, and the social bases of self-respect are what any plan of life needs, so the state distributes means, not a vision of the good.
The egalitarian strand: why shares must be corrected
- Moral arbitrariness: talents and class origins are undeserved. “The natural distribution is neither just nor unjust … What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts.”
- Fair equality of opportunity: equal talent and effort should bring equal prospects whatever one’s class.
- Difference principle: inequalities are allowed only if they work to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged; talents become a common asset.
From liberal to democratic equality (TJ §12)
Rawls builds his scheme by pushing the liberal starting point steadily towards equality:
| Interpretation | Opportunity | Distribution | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| Natural liberty | Careers open to talents | Efficiency | Rewards the social lottery |
| Liberal equality | Fair equality of opportunity | Efficiency | Still rewards the natural lottery |
| Democratic equality | Fair equality of opportunity | Difference principle | Adopted |
Behind the veil of ignorance, parties guard their liberty and, reasoning by maximin, secure the worst position. Both strands emerge from one choice.
The institutional scheme
The subject is the basic structure, so distribution is pure procedural justice: fair background institutions make whatever results just. The Restatement (2001) rejects welfare-state capitalism for property-owning democracy, spreading ownership of capital beforehand, and a just savings principle protects future generations.
Limits
Robert Nozick finds the scheme too egalitarian, G. A. Cohen too liberal in tolerating incentives for the talented, and communitarians such as Michael Sandel and Charles Taylor still individualist. Amartya Sen faults primary goods for ignoring unequal ability to convert them, and the search for perfect institutions over realisable improvement.
Indian anchor
Article 38(2) directs the state to minimise income inequalities; Minerva Mills (1980) made the balance of Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles part of the basic structure; State of Kerala v. N. M. Thomas (1975) read reservation as a facet of equality. Property Owners Association v. State of Maharashtra (5 November 2024) narrowed the “material resources of the community” under Article 39(b), resetting the balance between holdings and redistribution.
Conclusion
Rawls showed that liberalism need not be blind to inequality: liberty is distributed first and equally, and every economic inequality must earn its place by helping the worst off. Sen’s capability approach extends, rather than abandons, that project.